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South Africa, like many other countries with a long mining history, is faced with a legacy of 
the negative environmental impacts of mining. Amongst the most  outstanding environmental 
problems related to mining is ‘that of abandoned, ownerless and derelict mine sites, a legacy 
of centuries old practices of inadequate, insufficient or non-existent mine closure laws, 
policies, and regulations’.1 Inadequate and inefficient legislative controls and mine closure 
policies failed to prevent or minimise the possible long term environmental impacts of 
mining operations and mine closure.2 Even though the negative legacy of abandoned and 
derelict mines is a global concern, ‘the situation in South Africa is particularly severe and the 
magnitude of the impacts from past mining activities are often considerable as environmental 
concerns and environmental regulation of mining activities were not always adequately 
regulated under mining and other environmental legislation in the pre-constitutional 
dispensation’.3 
 
There was little or no concern for the environment and no thought of how mining activities 
might negatively impact the environment in the coming years.4 According to Kotze, there are 
various reasons for this, most of which are political in nature.5 He gave an example that, 
                                                          
1 The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Chilean Copper Commission (COCHILCO) 
‘Abandoned Mines - Problems, Issues and Policy Challenges for Decision Makers: Summary Report’ (2001) 
UNEP Report at 14, available at http://www.sosbluewaters.org/abandoned_report.pdf (accessed on 15 August 
2015). 
2 F Remy and M Gary ‘Large Mines and Local Communities: Forging Partnerships, Building Sustainability’, 
Mining and Development (2002). World Bank Group Mining Department, Washington, D.C, available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOGMC/Resources/largemineslocalcommunities.pdf (accessed on 10 June 
2015). It can be argued that the past inadequacy or deficiencies of the South African regulatory framework is 
manifest through the problem of Acid Mine Drainage as well as abandoned mines. 
3 Government of South Africa-Department of Minerals and Energy ‘White Paper on a Minerals and Mining 
Policy for South Africa’ (1998) (GN R2359 in GG 19344 of 20 October 1998), available at 
http://www.dmr.gov.za/publications/summary/125-white-papers/335-white-paper-minerals-and-mining-policy-
for-sa-1998. html (accessed on 10 January 2015). Chapter 4 of the White Paper particularly highlights the 
relationship between mining and the environment. Swart opined that, ‘Legislation at that time primarily focused 
on surface rehabilitation and the primary emphasis of mining was focused on its economic gains. With regard to 
environmental management and rehabilitation, mining companies complied with the absolute minimum 
requirements and also followed a re-active approach.’ See E Swart ‘The South African legislative framework for 
mine closure’  (2009) 10 The Journal of the South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, 489-492.  
4 DJA Van Zyl ‘Long-term liabilities, financial assurance and potential opportunities.’ (2000) In Southern 
African Workshop on Sustainable Development and the Mining and Metal Industries. November 20-22, 
Pretoria. 
5 LJ Kotzé ‘Judicial enforcement of liabilities and responsibilities for pollution prevention and remediation: No 
more ‘Business as Usual’ for South African mines’. In L Paddock et al (eds) Compliance and Enforcement in 
Environmental Law: Toward More Effective Implementation (2011) 475. 
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‘during the reign of apartheid, the South African economy had been dependent on revenue 
generated by mines because of political and economic isolation from the world’.6  The 
importance of this historic aspect of the mining industry is that ‘mining companies have not 
always been held responsible and liable for the historical consequences of their activities’.7 
This however, has unfortunately left South Africa with enormous negative environmental 
liabilities for future generations to deal with.8 This negative legacy also relates to the long 
term residual effects on the environmental well-being of communities residing in the vicinity 
of these unrehabilitated mining areas.9 The latter must ‘ultimately bear the financial burden of 
ensuring appropriate mine closure and rehabilitation, since mining activities have left a 
legacy of post closure environmental liabilities for the current and future generations to deal 
with’.10   
 
The potential costs of rehabilitation, the lack of clearly assigned or assumed responsible party 
or the legal and financial security mechanisms used for guaranteeing mine closure were 
inappropriate for such mining sites.11 A further critical complicating factor is that the 
availability of government funding to address the magnitude of the mine legacy left behind is 
very limited.12 The legacy of abandoned, ownerless and derelict mining site, their associated 
environmental problems, clean-up costs and the post mine land use development has led to an 
increased emphasis on mine closure planning and rehabilitation as they  provide difficult 
legacy issues for governments, communities and mining companies to deal with.13  South 
                                                          
6 Ibid 475. 
7 L Vorster ‘The liability of mines for the prevention, minimisation and remediation of pollution: a legal 
analysis’ (unpublished LLM Dissertation (Environmental Law and Governance) Cape Town University, (2012) 
6. 
8 AL Clark, K Naito, and JC Clark ‘Legal Framework for Mine Closure’ in T Khanna (Ed.) Mine 
Closure and Sustainable Development. Proceedings of a Workshop organised by the World Bank 
and the Metal Mining Agency of Japan, Washington, London: Mining Journal Books Ltd (2000) 
93. 
9 World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) - South Africa ‘R30 billion is just the start of South Africa’s mining 
hangover’ WWF, 15 August 2012, available at; http://www.wwf.org.za/?6600/acid-mine-draining (accessed on 
17 January 2016) C Colvin (World Wildlife Fund’s Freshwater Programmes Senior Manager, South Africa) had 
this to say, ‘ the impacts of abandoned mines on the environment are often felt by rural communities who do not 
have access to basic municipal services (such as piped and treated water supply), and are therefore directly 
reliant on natural resources for their food and water. These communities are the most vulnerable. For these 
reasons we urge government to act now to prevent further degradation of our rivers and aquifers.’  
10 Ibid. 
11 Abandoned Mines - Problems, Issues and Policy Challenges for Decision Makers: Summary Report (see note 
1 above) 14. 
12 E Swart ‘The South African legislative framework for mine closure’ (2003) 103 (8)   South African Institute 
of Mining and Metallurgy 489.  
13 ‘Abandoned Mine Sites: Problems, Issues and Options’ (Unpublished agenda note presented at Post-Mining 
Alliance Priority Setting Workshop hosted by UNEP, Paris), available at 
http://www.cepal.org/drni/noticias/noticias/9/7029/programmeunep.pdf (accessed on 10 February 2014).  
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Africa has only recently developed and implemented comprehensive legislation to regulate 
environmental management and mine closure processes. Consequently, a large number of 
historical mining operations have been abandoned by their operators with little or no regard 
to the management of the impacts on the environment.14 
 
It is important to note that the consequences of non-compliance and non-existent or 
inadequate enforcement of mining rehabilitation and environmental legislation will be with 
South Africa for some time to come. As a result, the country faces many challenges in respect 
of the remediation of historic and current mining activities as well as the prevention and 
minimisation of future negative legacy. Comprehensive mine closure for abandoned, 
presently operating, and proposed mines remains a challenge for the government and mining 
companies.15 To accommodate the need to close abandoned mines and to ensure that existing 
and proposed mines are appropriately closed and rehabilitated will require the cooperation of 
a diverse stakeholder community, new innovative methods of financing closure and 
significant policy and legislative amendments to ensure post mining sustainable development 
and economic viable post mine land use.16  
 
1.1 Outline of Dissertation Topic, Broad Problems and Issues to be investigated 
South Africa is richly endowed with mineral resources that are a major export and contributor 
to foreign currency inflows to the economy. The mining industry is central to economic 
growth as it provides economic opportunities, employment, and a semblance of social and 
infrastructure development in some areas.17 Globally, South Africa is also one of the most 
mineral rich regions, containing more than half of the world’s reserves of manganese, 
chromium and platinum group metals, and 40 percent or more of the reserves of vanadium, 
gold and vermiculite.18  As a result, it has attracted the mining industry, which is a long-
standing and key driver of South Africa’s national economy.19 However, ‘mining and its 
                                                          
14 M Makgae ‘The Status and Implications of the AMD Legacy Facing South Africa. Proceedings of the 
International’ (2012) Mine Water Association Symposium, Bunbury, 29 September-4 October 2012, 327-334. 
15 P Peck ‘Mining for Closure; Policies and Guidelines for Sustainable Mining Practice and Closure of Mines’, 
(2005) The Environment Security (ENVSEC), available at; 
http://www.grida.no/publications/security/book/2367.aspx (accessed on 20 May 2016). 
16  Ibid. 
17 T Murombo ‘Regulating mining in South Africa and Zimbabwe: Communities, the environment and perpetual 
exploitation’ (2013) 9(1) Law, Environment and Development Journal 32. In this article Murombo wrote that 
‘towns like Rustenburg in the North West provinces owe their existence to mining’. 
18 Ibid. 
19 S Malherbe and N Segal ‘A Perspective on the South African Mining Industry in the 21st Century.’ (2000). 
An independent report prepared for the Chamber of Mines of South Africa by the Graduate School of Business 
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related operations have significant biodiversity impacts, causing irreversible habitat loss, at 
times across large areas or in sensitive regions’.20  
 
The grave challenges that South Africa currently experiences with respect to acid mine 
drainage are proof of the destructive consequences of unsustainable mining practices. The 
court in the case of Director: Mineral Development, Gauteng v Save the Vaal Environment,21 
recognised the fact that unsustainable mining activities can cause irreparable damage to the 
environment when it stated that, 
… the application of the [audi alteram partem] rule is indicated by virtue of the enormous 
damage mining can do to the environment and ecological systems. What has to be ensured 
when application is made for the issuing of a mining licence is that development which meets 
present needs will take place without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs.22  
The Supreme Court acknowledged the potential significant environmental damage that can be 
caused by unsustainable mining activities and this runs parallel to the principle of sustainable 
development as enshrined in section 24 of the Constitution.23 Thus, regardless of mining 
being projected as one of the biggest contributors to job creation and economic growth there 
are huge environmental repercussions associated with it. The scope and extent of the legacy 
problems around inadequate regulation of rehabilitation and closure of mines is succinctly 
described in the extract from a 2012 WWF-SA report below:24 
Ongoing concerns regarding environmental degradation in mining areas, high numbers of 
ownerless and abandoned mines, and the incidence of acid mine drainage (AMD) have all 
highlighted the need for improved environmental maintenance and rehabilitation in the mining 
sector. It can be argued that a significant portion of current environmental impacts relate to 
abandoned and derelict mines, thus there is a clear need to also ensure that current and future 
mining activities do not add to unacceptable environmental impacts and impose costs on 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of the University of Cape Town in association with Genesis Analytics. However, ‘these economic benefits come 
at a high price, since mining, by its nature, adversely impacts on the environment. Not only does it lead to the 
depletion of the minerals that are being mined, but the process of extracting minerals also creates large-scale 
generation of waste and pollution.’ 
20 Government of South Africa-Department of Environmental Affairs ‘Mining and Biodiversity Guideline: 
Mainstreaming biodiversity into the mining sector’. (2013) DEA-Pretoria, available at 
https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/ legislations/miningbiodiversity_ guidelines 2013.pdf 
(accessed on  14 January 2014 ). 
21 Director: Mineral Development, Gauteng v Save the Vaal Environment (1999) 2 SA 719 (SCA). 
22 Ibid para 719B-719C. 
23 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
24 H van Zyl et al. ‘Financial Provisions for Rehabilitation and Closure in South African Mining: Discussion 
Document on Challenges and Recommended Improvements.’ (2012) World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) 1, 




society. The harsh lessons of the past need to be applied lest history be allowed to repeat 
itself…25   
 
It is beyond doubt that the bedrock principle of environmental law and regulation is that 
pollution costs should be borne by their creators.26 The South African environmental laws 
that regulate mining activities gives this principle form by requiring mining companies to 
financially guarantee the potential costs for ensuring mine closure and site rehabilitation 
when operations cease.27 The purpose of the financial security is to ensure that there will be 
sufficient funds to pay for mine site rehabilitation and post closure monitoring and 
maintenance at any stage in the life of the project, including early or temporary closure.28 In 
theory, ‘such mining securities ensure sufficient funds are available to a government to 
rehabilitate mine sites in the event operators fail to meet their mine rehabilitation and closure 
obligations’.29 
It is important to note that despite the South African government having the financial security 
for mine closure in place, there have been questions about their adequacy in covering the 
potential cost for mine closure in event of the mining company failing to do so. The 
challenges that has been identified in regards to the financial security mechanisms are that 
‘they are commonly insufficient to cover appropriate mine closure activities and 
environmental remediation in the case of a default and they do not solve the problem of 
historical abandoned mine sites’.30 This is because the rates used to calculate the potential 
amount for mine site rehabilitation are still not adjusted for inflation and this may result in 
significant under-estimations of adequate financial security provided by the mining 
company.31 Also they were not subject to frequent and independent review by a third-party. 
                                                          
25 Ibid. 
26 J Boyd, ‘Financial Responsibility for Environmental Obligations: Are Bonding and Assurance Rules 
Fulfilling Their Promise?’  in T Swason (ed) An introduction to the law and economics of environmental policy: 
issues in institutional design (Research in Law and Economics) (2002) vol 20 417. 
27 Section 24P of NEMA. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Government of Western Australia-Department of Mines and Petroleum ‘The Mining Rehabilitation Fund – 
The First Two Years’ (2015), available at http://www.dmp.wa.gov.au/Documents/Environment/ 
MRF_The_First_Two_Years .pdf  (accessed on 1 November 2016). 
30 van Zyl et al. (note 22 above). 
31 Ibid. Van Zyl et al observed that, ‘the legal and financial provisions are inadequate in that Master rates 
contained in the 2005 Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) guidelines (2005 DMR Guidelines) are not 
adjusted for inflation, resulting in significant underestimations of adequate financial provisions and also the 
guideline document is not legally binding.  There are indications that a number of mines are not making 
adequate financial provision for closure (uncertainty with regard to the adequacy of financial provisions appears 
to be greatest in relation to providing for adequate post closure water treatment and management).’   
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1.2 Purpose of the Research  
The above concerns give rise to questions about the adequacy of the financial security 
provisions made by mining companies for closure and rehabilitation of mines when 
operations cease. Thus, this dissertation is seeks to determine whether the existing financial 
security provisions framework are ‘adequate, appropriate, flexible and realistic in order to 
satisfactorily meet the closure and rehabilitation of the mine’.32 The dissertation will further 
seek to provide a critical analysis and review of the processes surrounding the financial 
security provisions for mine closure and site rehabilitation, given the prevalence of 
abandoned environmental obligations, and further assesses the implementation of the said 
provisions in South Africa and recommends potential improvements to the financial 
provisions system.33 This dissertation endeavours to expose the dangers of the absence of 
adequate legislative and a regulatory framework specifically created to deal with the adequate 
closure and rehabilitation of mines. This is appropriate given the important role financial 
provisions play in ensuring that mines do not leave a negative environmental legacy after 
closure. 
1.3 Outline of Research Questions to be answered 
The research questions will provide an indication of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
current financial security laws and regulations governing mine closure and site rehabilitation.  
1.3.1 The main research question 
The main research question is:  
a. Whether the South African financial provisions for mine closure and site 
rehabilitation, specifically the financial security mechanisms, are adequate to 
guarantee sustainable mine closure and site rehabilitation?  
 In simple terms, ‘are the current financial provisions adequate, appropriate, flexible and 
realistic to guarantee mine closure and site rehabilitation when the operator defaults? 
Whether the government and consequentially the tax payers are protected from footing the 
bill of rehabilitation of mines in the future?’34 
                                                          
32 Van Zyl et al. (see note 24 above). The legal and financial provisions are inadequate in that Master rates 
contained in the 2005 Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) guidelines (2005 DMR Guidelines) are not 
adjusted for inflation, resulting in significant underestimations of adequate financial provisions and also the 
guideline document is not legally binding.  There are indications that a number of mines are not making 
adequate financial provision for closure (uncertainty with regard to the adequacy of financial provisions appears 
to be greatest in relation to providing for adequate post closure water treatment and management).   
33 Van Zyl et al. (see note 22 above). 
34 AL Feris, and JL Kotze ‘The Regulation of Acid Mine Drainage in South Africa: Law and Governance 
Perspectives’ (2014) 17(5) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 5. 
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1.3.2 Sub-research questions 
a. What is the current South African financial provision framework governing mine 
closure and site rehabilitation and to what extent do the provisions regulate proper 
mine closure and rehabilitation? 
b. How can the financial provisions be realistic, flexible, adequate and appropriate to 
address closure and rehabilitation of mines yet not so burdensome as to push 
companies into bankruptcy or deter them from investing? This is so because ‘mine 
legislation development should be a responsive process and avoid the introduction of 
reactionary and prescriptive legislation that is often a reaction to past practices’.35  
c. What is the best way to deal with the legacy of abandoned mines? Can the current 
financial provisions address the legacy of the past inappropriate, insufficient and non-
existent mine closure and site rehabilitation policies?36  
d. Whether the One Environmental System,37 has the potential for improving 
performance as regards mine closure and rehabilitation?  
The development of answers in response to the dissertation questions will provide an 
understanding of the current mine closure and site rehabilitation legal and policy framework. 
The dissertation questions will provide an indication of the successes and failures of the 
current legal framework for mine closure and site rehabilitation within the South African 
mining industry. The questions will further assist in the development of a suggested best legal 
framework for mine closure and site rehabilitation standards and provide a comprehensive 
assessment of the current mine closure and site rehabilitation legislation and control. 
1.4 What are Abandoned and Derelict Mines 
It should be noted that the term ‘derelict and abandoned mines’ is not defined in the Minerals 
and Petroleum Resources Development Act,38 (hereafter MPRDA).  However, the mine 
closure provisions in the MPRDA provide some guidance on mine closure processes, which 
                                                          
35 The Australian and New Zealand Minerals and Energy Council (ANZMEC) and the Minerals Council of 
Australia. ‘Strategic Framework for Mine Closure’ (2000) ANZMEC, available at 
http://www.sernageomin.cl/pdf/mineria/cierrefaena/DocumentosRelacionados/Strategic-Framework-Mine-
Closure.pdf (accessed on 15 February 2014). 
36 Attempts to assign responsibility of the abandoned mine legacy to the mining sector are met with the response 
that it was not the present companies that caused the problem, the government has had the benefit of the taxes 
and royalties from the past activity and as a result, the government should now look after the consequences. The 
lack of current legal owners of old sites thus seems to place the accountability in the government arena. 
37 The One Environmental System is aimed at streamlining licensing processes for mining, environmental 
authorisations and water use. Under the system, the minister of mineral resources will be responsible for issuing 
environmental authorisations and waste management licences for mining and related activities. Read more: 
http://www.southafrica.info/business/one-environmental-system-101214.htm#.VaO9j1-qrg8#ixzz3fmJGgVR0. 
38 Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act No. 28 of 2002. 
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depict that mines are only regarded as closed when the closure certificate is issued in terms of 
section 43 of the MPRDA.39  Legally, the owner of a mine remains responsible for all 
liabilities related to that mine even after a closure certificate has been issued. This is provided 
for by section 43 of the MPRDA which states that, ‘the holder of a mining right…of works 
that has ceased to exist, remains responsible for any environmental liability, pollution, 
ecological degradation, the pumping and treatment of extraneous water…notwithstanding the 
issuing of a closure certificate’.40 Derelict and abandoned mines can be defined as, ‘mines 
whose owners or mining rights or lease holders have abandoned and are not operating nor 
maintaining to mitigate and manage their associated safety, health and environmental impacts 
and can no longer be traced’.41  
Section 46 of the MPRDA, classifies those mines for which a closure certificate has not been 
issued and no party can be traced to assume responsibility for their liabilities as abandoned 
and the government may provide funds for their rehabilitation.42 The other terms used to refer 
to these mines include derelict mines, orphan mines, unattended mines and inactive mines. 
According to Mackasey,43 in the selection of an appropriate definition of abandoned mines, 
the consideration of public safety and health together with environmental hazards associated 
with these mines are of greater significance than the ownership aspects.44 As a result, 
abandoned mine sites can be precisely defined as ‘mine sites and mineral operations that are 
no longer operational, not actively managed, not rehabilitated, causing significant 
environmental and/or social problems, and for which no one is currently accountable for the 
                                                          
39 Section 43 of the MPRDA, provides that the holder of a prospecting right, mining right, retention permit or 
mining permit remains responsible for any environmental liability, pollution, ecological degradation and the 
management and sustainable closure thereof, until the Minister of Minerals and Energy has issued a closure 
certificate in terms of this act to the holder concerned. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Department of Mineral Resources ‘The National Strategy for the Management of Derelict and Ownerless 
Mines in South Africa’ (2009) Department of Mineral Resources, available at http://cer.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2011/10/The-National-Strategy-for-the-Management-of-Derelict-and-Ownerless-Mines-in-
South-Africa-2009.doc. (accessed on 15 February 2014). 
42 Section 46 (1) of the MPRDA provides that; If the Minister directs that measures contemplated in section 45 
must be taken to prevent pollution or ecological degradation of the environment, to address any contravention in 
the environmental authorisation or to rehabilitate dangerous health or safety occurrences but establishes that the 
holder of a reconnaissance permission, prospecting right, mining right, retention permit or mining permit, the 
holder of an old order right or the previous owner of works, as the case may be or his or her successor in title is 
deceased or cannot be traced or in the case of a juristic person, has ceased to exist, has been liquidated or cannot 
be traced, the Minister in consultation with the Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, may instruct the 
Regional Manager concerned to take the necessary measures to prevent pollution or ecological degradation of 
the environment or to rehabilitate dangerous health and social occurrences or to make an area safe. 
43 WO Mackasey ‘Abandoned Mines in Canada’, (2000) available at http://www.abandoned-




site’s remediation or rehabilitation’.45 
1.4.1 Main Causes of Abandoned and Derelict Mine Sites 
The mining-related elements that created the legacy of abandoned and derelict mines are held 
to include: 
a. The general absence of mine closure and site rehabilitation legal framework, policies 
and regulations until the latter part of the twentieth century;  
b. Ineffective enforcement of mine closure and site rehabilitation legal framework, 
policies and regulations if, and where in existence;  
c. The absence of appropriate, realistic and flexible financial security mechanisms to 
ensure funds for parties such as governments to conduct remediation in the event a 
mining company going bankrupt and being unable to cover the costs of rehabilitation;  
d. Inadequate financial security to address remediation if, and where such funds were set 
aside.  
e. Unforeseen economic events that caused early cessation of activity or left companies 
bankrupt, such as a sudden drop in metal prices, insurmountable difficulties with 
mining/milling, and/or infrastructure problems.46 
1.5 Mine closure and site rehabilitation 
Mine closure and site rehabilitation refers to the period of time when the operational stage 
and economic viability of a mine has ceased or ended, and the final decommissioning has 
commenced.47 If a mine ceases to operate, it is only regarded as closed if a closure certificate 
has been issued in terms of section 43 of the MPRDA.48  Mine closure in some instances may 
only be temporary, or may lead into a program of care and maintenance.49 Mine completion 
is the overall objective of mine closure and rehabilitation. Mine site rehabilitation is the 
process used to repair the impacts of mining on the environment. The long-term objectives of 
mine site rehabilitation include ‘the conversion of a mine site and disturbed mine land to an 
                                                          
45 SE Mhlongo and F  Amponsah-Dacosta  ‘A review of problems and solutions of abandoned mines in South 
Africa.’,(2016) 30 (4) International Journal of Mining, Reclamation and Environment, 280. 
46 Peck (note 15 above). 
47 B Smith ‘Mining for Closure: Sustainable Mine Practices, Rehabilitation and Integrated Mine Closure 
Planning’ 6, available at 
https://www.be.unsw.edu.au/sites/default/files/upload/pdf/schools_and_engagement/resources/_notes/5A3_16.p
df (accessed on 20 May 2016). 
48 MPRDA (note 31 above). 
49 HWB Lacy and KE Benett ‘Updating the Leading Practice Sustainable Development (LPSD) Mine Closure 
Guide Australia 2015’ Presented at Goldfields Environmental Management Group Workshop 2016, May 18-
20th Kalgoorlie Western Australia 1-13, available at http://au.mwhglobal.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/Lacy.H-Bennett.K-2016-Updating-the-Leading-Practice-in-Sustrainable-Development-
LPSD-Mine-Closure-Guide-Australia-2015_GEMG-Submission.pdf (accessed 20 January 2016). 
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environmentally safe and sustainable landform, and the restoration of the pre-mining 
conditions as closely as possible to support future sustainability of the site’.50 
The current mine closure and site rehabilitation practices focus on the concept of avoiding 
future abandoned and derelict mines, which occurred as a result of previously poor mine 
planning and rehabilitation  practices.51 The dissertation is developed in response to existing 
mine closure and site rehabilitation practices, and legislative framework which fail to ensure 
and recognise the need for an integrated approach to mine closure and site rehabilitation 
planning. The premises of the dissertation are based on the assumption that mine closure and 
site rehabilitation requires the recognition that mining is a temporary use of the land; however 
‘the manner in which mine closure and site rehabilitation is planned can have a significant 
influence on the magnitude and duration of impacts during mine operations and after mine 
closure’.52  
1.6 Financial Provisions for Mine Closure and Site Rehabilitation 
The financial provisions for mine closure and site rehabilitation give rise to a set of design 
issues such as choices open to mining companies with regard to making financial provisions, 
inadequate funding levels for rehabilitation and closure being maintained and secured.53 It 
has been argued that there is,  
limited auditing of the adequacy of financial provisions by the mining companies and the 
government, and the interaction of financial provisions rules with other areas of law most 
importantly the tax, insolvency and company law. There can be inadequate protection of 
financial provisions in the event of insolvency or sale, also establishing whether the financial 
provisions system and/or the provisions themselves that exist at present are insufficient or 
inadequate to adequately address current and future environmental rehabilitation.54 
It is important to recognise that each mine is unique, meaning that some flexibility will be 
required as the mine operates.  This dissertation highlights the above issues and identifies a 
set of correctable weaknesses present in the said provisions as this is where the problem is at 
its most intractable, where the need for new action is greatest, and where the challenges of 
innovation and new action frameworks still need to be met.  
                                                          
50 Van Zyl et al. (see note 24 above)  
51 B Smith ‘Mining for Closure: Sustainable Mine Practices, Rehabilitation and Integrated Mine Closure 
Planning’ 6, available at 
https://www.be.unsw.edu.au/sites/default/files/upload/pdf/schools_and_engagement/resources/_notes/5A3_16.p
df (accessed on 20 May 2016). 
52  M Carley and I Christie Managing Sustainable Development 2nd ed (2000) 173.  




1.7 Classification of Impacts Relating to Derelict, Abandoned and Ownerless Mines 
It is trite that mining operations and activities are ‘by nature, detrimental to the environment 
and if not managed properly and effectively governed can have disastrous effects for the 
local.’55 The detrimental effect of mining on the environment is not a new phenomenon and 
the negative effects have existed since time immemorial as opined by Agricola;56  
...the fields are devastated by mining operations… further, when the ores are washed, the water 
which has been used poisons the brooks and streams, and either destroys fish or drives them 
away. Therefore, the inhabitants of these regions, on account of the devastation of their fields, 
woods, groves, brooks and rivers, find great difficulty in procuring the necessaries of life… 
Thus it is said, it is clear to all that there is greater detriment from mining than the values of the 
metals which mining produces.57 
1.7.1.1 Public Health and Safety 
Some of the most significant impacts related to derelict and ownerless mines are those 
relating to public health and safety. These are particularly high when the public has direct 
access to sites, as is the case in most areas in South Africa where mining occurs within close 
proximity to communities and in the case of old mine dumps or residues in urban areas where 
people are resident within proximity to such.58 The risks include, but are not limited to, 
‘cavities and subsidence features, human and animals falling into shafts, illegal and unsafe 
mining on derelict and ownerless mine sites, contamination of surface water bodies and 









                                                          
55 Human Rights Watch ‘Out of Control: Mining, Regulatory Failure and Human Rights in India,’ (The 70-page 
report,) available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/06/14/out-control/mining-regulatory-failure-and-human-
rights-india (accessed on   02 February 2016). 
56 Agricola, G, De re metallica, Trans. from the first   Latin edition of 1556 by Herbert C. Hoover and Lou H. 
Hoover, (1950 [1912]), In Lottermoser, B Mine Wastes: Characterization, Treatment and Environmental 
Impacts (2010) 3rd ed. 23. 
57 Ibid at 8. 





Figure 1: Correlation between abandoned mines in South Africa and population density60 
In 
Figure 1 above, the link between the location of abandoned mines and high population 
densities in South Africa is evident, indicating that abandoned mines pose a huge health risk 
to a large section of the South African public.61 
1.7.1.2 Environmental factors  
It is common cause that all unsustainable mining activities detrimentally affect environmental 
quality, especially that of water.62 The South African Courts in the three cases of Minister of 
Water Affairs and Forestry v Stilfontein Gold Mining Co Ltd and Others,63 Kebble v Minister 
                                                          
60 Government of South Africa-Department of Environmental Affairs ‘2nd South Africa Environment Outlook: 
A report on the state of the environment. Executive Summary’ (2012) DEA, available at 
https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/reports/environmentoutlook_executivesummary.pdf 
(accessed on 1 December 2016). 
61 The Auditor-General of South Africa ‘Report of the Auditor-General of South Africa to Parliament on a 
performance audit of the rehabilitation of abandoned mines at the Department of Minerals and Energy’ (2009) 
Auditor-General at 4, available at http://cer.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/ 
AG_Report_on_abandoned_mines-Oct-2009.pdf, (accessed on  18 July 204). 
62 H Thompson ‘Water law: a practical approach to resource management and the provision of services’ (2006) 
4-5 In LJ Kotze and N Lubbe ‘How (not) to silence a spring: The Stilfontein saga in three parts’ (2009) 16 South 
African Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 50. 
63 Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry v Stilfontein Gold Mining Co Ltd and Others 2006 (5) SA 333 (W). 
This case involved water pollution caused by mining by means of water coming into contact with mined-out 
reefs. The cause of the water pollution is because the mined-out reefs contain iron pyrite which oxidises when 
exposed to air and water, causing the total dissolved solids content of the water to rise. This leads to 
groundwater with low pH and high sulphate or heavy metal content.  
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of Water Affairs,64 and Harmony Gold Mining Co Ltd v Regional Director: Free State, 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 65 highlighted the devastating environmental 
effects of mining on water resources. The above court decisions considered, among others, 
‘the broader obligation on mining companies to prevent, minimise and remedy water 
pollution’.66 It is beyond doubt that South Africa’s natural resources, especially water, are 
scarce and under severe pressure.67 This is highlighted in Figure 2, indicating the extent to 
which river ecosystems are endangered. The environmental impact of abandoned and derelict 
mines puts a further strain on vulnerable ecosystems, with the current number of abandoned 
mines to be rehabilitated clearly emphasising the significance and urgency of the matter.68 
 





                                                          
64 Kebble and Others v Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry [2007] SCA 111. 
65 Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited v Regional Director Free State Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry and Another [2006] SCA 65.  
66 LJ Kotze and N Lubbe (see note 62 above) 50. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Report of the Auditor-General of South Africa (see note 61 above).  
69 South Africa Environment Outlook (see note 60 above). 
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1.7.1.3 Surface Water 
It is important to note that,  
Open water bodies for example storm water storage systems, return water dams which are 
unlined, natural and anthropic mine depressions, open canals and any other place where surface 
water can accumulate and which are close to or in direct contact with the mine residue areas, 
pose high risk to the environment and humans due to the pollution of such water resources. If 
these open water systems get their water from mine dumps, it contains soluble heavy metals 
and high acidity and salinity as a result of chemical reactions in the process.70     
Also, water flowing from the dumps or decanting from underground also has an impact on 
natural wetlands which are close or adjacent to such mine dumps or underground water 
decant points.71 If this happens, the wetlands get polluted and cease to be functional. In 
addition to the risk of pollution, some mining activities could also result in the disturbance 
and diversion of river courses.72 This can result in silting up of streams or dams, as well as 
significant soil erosion.  
1.7.1.4 Groundwater 
The pollution in underground or deep open pit mining is often facilitated by the dewatering of 
mine workings.73 This can lead to the localised depression of the water table and a reduction 
in the availability of groundwater.74 However, in many cases, after mining, the groundwater 
levels recover to their pre-mining levels or levels close to these, but the groundwater is 
polluted due to chemical reaction in the mined out areas.75  In the gold and coal mining areas, 
this results in the formation of acid mine drainage which as it rises over time to fill the mine 
voids underground, sometimes decants onto  the surface thus polluting surface water bodies 
and in some cases land suitable for irrigation.76 Pollution of groundwater resources is also 
evident in areas where there is seepage or ingress of polluted water to the underground 
aquifers from the surface.77   
1.7.1.5 Acid mine drainage (AMD) 
AMD is one of the most serious and potentially enduring environmental problems for the 
mining industry. If left unchecked, it can result in such long-term water quality impacts that it 
                                                          
70 ‘The National Strategy for the Management of Derelict and Ownerless Mines in South Africa’, (see note 33 
above) 14. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid 15. 
73 Ibid 16. 
74Ibid. 






could well be this industry's most harmful legacy.78 The South African environment, 
including its water resources, soil and people, are now threatened by pollution stemming 
from AMD, which is a legacy left behind by abandoned, derelict and defunct mines, and a 
continuing by-product of existing mining activities.79 The detrimental effect of AMD lies in 
the environmental impact of the elevated levels of heavy metals, which are often toxic to 
fauna, flora and human health.80 Parallel to AMD and with further implications to health and 
the environment are sulphates, metals,81 radioactivity and biodiversity.82 
1.7.1.6 Air Quality  
Two major impacts on air quality have been identified namely windblown dust and, in the 
case of some coal mines, combustion gases arising from the spontaneous reaction of coal 
both in underground mine workings and in discard and spoil heaps.83  Dust from uncovered 
mine dumps causes visual pollution, inconvenience and discomfort, and could have serious 
health implications.84 Unconsolidated discarded dumps can also cause spontaneous 
combustion. Coal, coal discard and other carbonaceous material produce heat when exposed 
to air. If they are put in a heap which is porous enough to let air in but also large enough to 
prevent the heat escaping, the heat builds up and the material ignites on its own. Localised 
acid rain occurs as a result of rain washing these gases from the air. One other big commodity 
easily transported by air is asbestos, it can be transported over long distances resulting in 
people contracting non-occupational asbestosis.85 
                                                          
78 International Network for Acid Prevention ‘Acid Drainage’ (2016) INAP, available at   
http://www.inap.com.au/.. (accessed on 15 January 2017) ‘Whilst AMD carries a potential threat to the 
environment as a whole, it poses a particular threat to the country's water resources which will have severe 
consequences for the health and well-being of people.’ 
79 L Feris & LJ Kotzé ‘The regulation of acid mine drainage in South Africa: law and governance perspectives.’ 
(2014) 17(5) PER: Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad, 2105-2163. 
80 Wells et al ‘Terrestrial Minerals’ (200) 535-536. 
81 Vorster  (see note 7 above) 7. Metals contained in AMD; such as aluminium, iron, nickel, etc.; may be toxic 
and are linked to cancer, necrosis, tumours and even death. 
82 Vorster (see note 7 above) 7.  ‘AMD leads to the decimation of aquatic life in the water bodies into which 
mine effluent is discharged. Metals and other pollutants are accumulated in organisms during the food chain. 
During the process of bio-accumulation, some toxins become more concentrated as they travel up the food chain 
and have a detrimental effect on higher tropic levels’.  
83 The National Strategy for the Management of Derelict and Ownerless Mines in South Africa’, (see note 33 
above) 20. ‘Secondary effects include spontaneous combustion of the coal worked, as air has been provided 
with ready access to the mine, accelerated subsidence due to the strength of many pillars being reduced by 
burning. Spoil heaps also form blemishes on the landscape. These contain significant amounts of coal and have 
undergone spontaneous combustion’.  
84 J Glazewski Environmental Law in South Africa 2nd ed (2005) 458. 
85 Vorster (note 7 above) 9.  ‘The harmful effects of mining activities, and more specific air pollution, have been 
illustrated in the judgment of Bareki NO v Gencor Ltd (2006) 1 SA 432 (T), where a mine was not rehabilitated 
and asbestos dumps, a beneficiation plant and a haul road remained on the land. Mining activities relating to 
asbestos, negatively affect the health of people (asbestosis) and the natural environment, due to asbestos fibres 




Radioactivity is a health risk and is associated with gold tailings, dumps and dams. Some of 
the metals contained in AMD such as uranium, thorium, radium, polonium, and some 
isotopes of lead are, in addition to being chemically toxic, also radioactive.86 Uranium is 
identified as the principal contaminant of concern emitted by the gold mining industry. 
Uranium is radioactive and chemically toxic with an extremely long half-life of 1010 years. 
Its impacts, after mine closure, on persons, property, and the environment are, therefore, long 
term and of appreciable magnitude.87 Uranium and its daughter products have a long-term 
impact on the environment due to the fact that these elements accumulate in the sediments 
and will continue to leach out of the mine tailings and slimes dams for centuries to come.88 
Plants absorb these metals readily though their roots, and from there, they are passed on into 
the rest of the food web.89 
1.7.1.8 Land Use and Availability 
Due to a long history of mining, a significant portion of South Africa’s land is locked up in 
mine dumps.  This is one of the biggest negative impacts particularly on economic 
development.  It is estimated that 45 million cubic meters of underground mine excavations 
exists between Crown and Carletonville on the West Rand and that there are three billion 
cubic meters of gold tailings in South Africa.90 These mining activities and tailings occupy a 
large area without any proper development or land use.   
1.8 Environmental Principles upon which this Dissertation will be based  
1.8.1 Sustainable Development 
The question is, ‘how far does the obligation to protect the next generation from the legacy of 
abandoned, derelict and ownerless mine extend?’ The emphasis and importance of 
sustainable development and improved mine closure and site rehabilitation planning is 
accredited to the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development.  The 
conference defined sustainable development as, ‘a system of development that meets the 
basic needs of all people without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
                                                          
86 ES Van Eeden, M Liefferink, and JF Durand ‘Legal Issues concerning mine closures and social responsibility 
of the West Rand’ (2009) 5(1) The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa 55. 
87 Ibid. 
88 ibid.  
89 Ibid. 




own life-sustaining needs.’91 However, for the purpose of this dissertation sustainable 
development will be defined as, ‘the integration of social, economic and environmental 
factors into planning, implementation and decision-making so as to ensure that development 
serves present and future generations’.92 
 
The South African Constitution,93 whilst it does not contain specific provisions for 
rehabilitation, does enshrine the right of every citizen to an environment that is not harmful to 
health or wellbeing.94 The inclusion of environmental rights as part of fundamental human 
rights ensures that environmental considerations are recognised and respected during the 
administrative and legal processes and implemented during the closure and rehabilitation of 
mined land. The wording of section 24,95 specifically suggests that sustainable development 
is an explicit constitutional objective to the extent that it is inherent in the environmental 
right. This means that government must achieve, advance, respect, protect and promote the 
ideal of sustainable development as set out in the environmental right.96  
The landmark case of Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director General: 
Environmental Management, Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, 
Mpumalanga Province,97 in its interrogation of sustainable development, the Constitutional 
Court found that;98 
… development cannot subsist upon a deteriorating environmental base. Unlimited 
development is detrimental to the environment and the destruction of the environment is 
detrimental to development. Promotion of development requires the protection of the 
environment. Yet the environment cannot be protected if development does not pay attention to 
the costs of environmental destruction. The environment and development are thus inexorably 
linked.99 
The court also added that; 
The idea that development and environmental protection must be reconciled is central to the 
concept of sustainable development. At the core of this Principle [sic] is the principle of 
                                                          
91 GH Brundtland, and World Commission on Environment and Development. Our Common Future: Report of 
the World Commission on Environment and Development, (1987) 45.  
92 National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998, Section 1. 
93 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
94 Ibid, Section 24. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Feris & Kotzé (see note 79 above) 2116. 
97 Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director-General: Environmental Management, Department 
of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, Mpumalanga Province (2007) 6 SA 4 (CC). 
98 Ibid, 21 para C. 
99 Ibid, 21 paras E-H. 
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integration of environmental protection and socio-economic development … The practical 
significance of the integration of the environmental and developmental considerations is that 
environmental considerations will now increasingly be a feature of economic and development 
policy.100 
 
The national environmental management principles contained in section 2 of NEMA101 is the 
corner stone of environmental governance and liability in South Africa and is based on the 
foundation of sustainable development.102 These principles all apply directly to mines by 
virtue of the MPRDA which provides that regard must be had to the NEMA principles by 
stipulating that the principles set out in section 2 of NEMA:103 
a. Apply to all prospecting and mining operations, as the case may be, and any matter or 
activity relating to such operation; and 
b. Serve as a guideline for the interpretation, administration and implementation of the 
environmental requirements of this Act [MPRDA]. 
1.8.2 Polluter Pays 
It is now trite law that the pollution costs should be borne by their creators. South African 
environmental laws and regulations give this principle form through the polluter pays 
principle (PPP). The assertion that taxpayers ought not to be burdened with these costs relies 
on the polluter pays principle. This concept has been accepted by the South African 
government as a fundamental environmental law principle and is reflected in section 2 (4) (p) 
of NEMA in particular, which provides that the costs of remedying pollution, environmental 
degradation and consequent health effects must be paid for by those responsible for environmental 
pollution.104 This principle is now one of the bedrock principles of environmental law and 
regulation and was included in the Rio Declaration..105 Conceptually the principle is nearly 
unassailable as a guiding principle for environmental regulation. The costs of remedying 
pollution, environmental degradation and consequent adverse health effects and of 
                                                          
100 Fuel Retailers supra, 24 paras A, F-G. 
101 NEMA section 2 (see note 92 above). 
102 Glazewski (see note 84 above) 480. 
103 Section 37(2) of the MPRDA, further provides that; ‘these principles apply to the private sector and therefore 
the mining industry must adopt a risk-averse and cautious approach; prevent negative impacts or effects of their 
activities on the health and well-being of people and the environment; and pay for all their pollution since they 
remain liable for the effects of their policies, projects, programmes, products, processes, services or activities 
throughout their life cycles.’  
104 Section 2(4)(p) of NEMA (note 92 above). 
105 Principle 16 of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development of 1992 (hereafter 
referred to as the Rio Declaration). The Declaration provides that,’ national authorities should endeavour to 
promote the internalisation of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the 
approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest 
and without distorting international trade and investment’.  
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preventing, controlling or minimising further pollution, environmental damage or adverse 
health effects must be paid for by those responsible for harming the environment.106 This 
dissertation is premised on the acceptance of the polluter pays principle. 
 
The PPP has been adopted in South Africa in a number of policy documents including the 
White Paper on Environmental Management in South Africa which states that, ‘Those 
responsible for environmental damage must pay the repair costs both to the environment and 
human health, and the costs of preventive measures to reduce or prevent further pollution and 
environmental damage.’ The PPP means that polluters and users of natural resources (should) 
bear the full environmental and social costs of their activities.107 The PPP can also be 
described as an economic principle that requires the polluter (the mining industry in this 
instance) to be held liable to compensate or pay for pollution prevention, minimisation and 
remediation.108 Therefore, the crux of the principle is to impose economic obligations when 
environmental damage is caused by a polluter and this is achieved by setting minimum rules 
on liability for environmental damage.109  
From the above it can be argued that those who pollute must pay to remedy the effects of that 
pollution and compensate those, as well as the environment, who suffer the negative 
consequences of pollution.110 The principle can thus hold the mining industry financially 
liable for its activities by establishing liability for environmental damage, internalising the 
costs of pollution, and also assessing and recovering historical damages in an equitable 
way.111 
1.8.3 Preventive 
The preventive principle is reflected in the concept that the disturbance of ecosystems and 
loss of biological diversity are to be “…avoided, or…minimised and remedied.”112  
Furthermore, the principle prescribes that the disturbance of the landscape and the nation’s 
cultural heritage is to be avoided, and where it cannot be altogether avoided, must be 
                                                          
106 Key to the achievement of improved environmental management and rehabilitation were the provisions of 
the MPRDA and particularly the repealed provisions of section 41 of the MPRDA, which incorporated the 
‘polluter pays principle’ into South Africa’s mining legislation.   
107 D Hunter, J Salzman and D Zaelke  International Environmental Law and Policy 2nd ed (2002) 412. 
108 LJ Kotzé and W Du Plessis ‘Absolving historical polluters from liability through restrictive judicial 
interpretation: some thoughts on Bareki NO v Gencor Ltd’ (2007) 1 Stellenbosch Law Review 180. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Kotzé and Du Plessis (see note 108 above) 180. 
111 Vorster see (note 7 above) 14. 
112 Section 2(4)(a)(ii) of NEMA (see note 92 above). 
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minimised and remedied.113 Any negative impacts on the environment and on people’s 
environmental rights should also be anticipated and prevented, and where they cannot be 
altogether prevented they should minimised and remedied.114;115 The principle aims to 
minimise environmental damage by requiring that action be taken at an early stage of the 
process, and if possible, before such damage actually occurs.116 However, Kidd opines that 
the preventive principle cannot be an absolute principle, since pollution cannot be completely 
prevented as it is an inevitable side-effect of human life.117 
1.9 Research Methodology  
This is a desktop study. The goal is an exhaustive review of the financial provisions that 
relate to the closure and rehabilitation of mines from the standpoint of their legal 
effectiveness, their efficacy, appropriateness, realistic, flexibility, desirability and how these 
can be improved rather than a synthetic overview of the many general environmental issues 
and legislation that governs mine closure and rehabilitation.  This dissertation is qualitative 
and descriptive with reference to various pieces of legislation and policy documents as well 
as regulations. The dissertation will be contextualised through an overview of mine closure 
and site rehabilitation laws development in South Africa. Thereafter the financial provisions 
framework for mine closure and site rehabilitation in Canada and Australia will be analysed 
drawing insights on the difference, adequacy, advancement and efficacy of the said legal 
provisions.  
 
These jurisdictions were selected because they offer a useful comparison with South African, 
specifically the financial provisions for mine closure.   This will help in assessing whether the 
existing South African legislative provisions for securing mine closure and site rehabilitation 
obligations are sufficient and efficient. These were also selected for comparative analysis 
based on having different levels of experience with mining legacy issues, the on-going and 
anticipated future development in mine closure provisions. The selected mining jurisdictions 
are comparatively advanced in mining regulation practise, as they have been engaging in the 
mining activities for a long time. The ability of the Australian mining industry to recognise 
and establish improved mine closure practices and mining regulations is the fundamental 
reason why it was selected as a comparative jurisdiction for this dissertation. The main reason 
                                                          
113 Section 2(4)(a)(iii) of NEMA (see note 92 above). 
114 Section 2(4)(a)(viii) of NEMA (see note 92 above). 
115 Glazewski (see note 84 above) 481.  
116 Ibid 18. 
117 M Kidd Environmental Law 2nd ed (2011)10. 
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for choosing Ontario as a comparative jurisdiction is to determine whether the decision of the 
Ontario provincial government to allow the self-assurance of closure obligations pursuant to 
paragraph five of section 145(1)(5) of the Mining Act,118 can be feasible in the South African 
context. This dissertation will be a comparative analysis of the legislation, regulations, policy 
and guideline documents and systems which were enacted in an attempt to minimise or 
prevent the legacy abandoned with a specific reference to South Africa. The aim is to 
examine what lessons South Africa can learn from the other jurisdictions. Various desktop 
sources will be utilized in writing this dissertation. Relevant South African and international 
sources will be used. 
 
1.10 Structure of Thesis  
Chapter One  
Introduction 
a) Background to the research; research questions 
b) The problem and environmental impact of abandoned mines 
c) Justification for choice of comparative systems 
d) Methodology. 
Chapter Two  
South African legal framework that governs closure and rehabilitation of mines and the 
related legislation 
Chapter Three  
Analysis and review of the current South African financial provisions for mine closure and 
site rehabilitation 
Chapter Four 
Selected Foreign Jurisdiction legislative framework 
a) Canada – Ontario  
b) Australia – Western Australia 
Chapter Five  
a) Comparative analysis of the different jurisdictions’ legislative frameworks.  
b) Comprehensive analysis and review of the legislation framework through 
identification of strengths, weaknesses, gaps and areas of improvement. 
Chapter Six  
                                                          




Identification of gaps in SA legislative framework and areas of improvement 











South Africa has put in place various and far-reaching legislative acts to manage the different 
aspects of the environment in a sustainable manner. This chapter aims at chronicling the 
government’s effort to develop efficient, adequate, and flexible legislation that deals with the 
environmental effects of mining. A detailed analysis of the relevant South African mining 
environmental legislative framework will reveal that there is significant diversity of legal 
mechanisms and requirements which were enacted and are implemented specifically towards 
mine closure and rehabilitation.119 This chapter will be a historical treatment of financial 
provisions for mine closure and site rehabilitation that were applicable before the introduction 
and the commencement of the one environmental system. The aim is also to explore, examine 
and develop a comprehensive understanding of the previous mine closure and site 
rehabilitation key legislative framework and to consider whether the legal framework was 
adequate and enforceable to prevent the legacy of derelict, ownerless and abandoned mines. 
 
2.1 Background: The History of the Legacy  
It is trite that formal mining in South Africa has been happening since time immemorial and 
for most of its history, the mining industry has not been subjected to comprehensive 
environmental regulation.120 This has resulted and continues to result in significant adverse 
environmental related challenges as previous practises in mine planning, closure and 
rehabilitation neglected the fundamental concepts of sustainable development. It is important 
to note that, even where mining operations have been discontinued, environmental problems 
associated with mining frequently continue.121 These environmental problems are inter alia, 
acid water which emanates from an abandoned mine which causes the pollution of both 
surface and groundwater. Dust from mine dumps and soil erosion from opencast mines 
                                                          
119 This will be done through a critical assessment of past, present and future of the mining environmental 
legislative framework and the determination of which controls and policies are most relevant to the 
improvement of sustainable mine closure and rehabilitation practices. 
120 T Muzoroza 'Mining Laws and Policy: A Comparative Analysis of South Africa and Zimbabwe's Mining 
Laws and Policy Regimes' (Unpublished LLM Dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2010) 57. ‘Mining in South 
Africa started in 1661 and the first attempts to regulate it only started in 1903, with the Transvaal Mining laws.  
These only dealt with safety aspects. Between 1931 and 1951, mining was governed by Mines, Works and 
Machinery regulations.’ See also NCOP Economic and Business Development. ‘Mining Charter; Derelict and 
Ownerless mines: progress report by Department of Mineral Resources’. Chairperson: Mr F Adams (ANC, 
Western Cape), Date of Meeting: 11 October 2010, available at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/12080/, 
(accessed on 15 May 2016). 
121 Kidd (see note 117 above) 225. 
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constitutes further environmental challenges which exist because of abandoned unclosed and 
un-rehabilitated mines.122 As a result, the country is burdened with a negative legacy of 
abandoned, derelict and ownerless mines.  
It is against this background that the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
described abandoned mine sites as one of the major outstanding international environmental 
problems related to mining:123  
It is a legacy of centuries old practices and of inadequate, insufficient or non-existent mine 
closure. The potential costs of rehabilitation, the lack of clearly assigned (or assumed) 
responsibility, the absence of criteria and standards of rehabilitation and other factors have 
delayed action by all parties - industry, governments, and communities.124 
Accordingly, the UNEP noted that: 
In addition to the obvious problems for a community, most of these situations represent a 
considerable cost to public authorities which are often expected to make the sites secure and 
prevent ongoing pollution. The public is increasingly demanding action and this visible legacy 
of the past is producing growing community opposition to current mining activities. The orphan 
[abandoned] sites problem therefore continues to cast a shadow over all mining at a time when 
major operators are improving their operations and are trying to improve the image of their 
sites and their company.125 
Thus, it can be argued that issue of mine closure and site rehabilitation have increased in 
prominence around the world and South Africa in particular due to the legacy of abandoned 
and derelict mining sites. As a result, the policy and legislative frameworks for dealing and 
addressing the environmental challenges associated with mine closure and site rehabilitation 
have been enacted, amended and reconsidered time and again.126 However, even though that 
may be the case, the environmental risks associated with mine closure and site rehabilitation 
plus the potential costs to the government and the society, if they are not performed 
adequately remain as severe as ever.127 The severity of many of the negative environmental 
impacts that were not considered when mines closed in the past are only beginning to emerge 
                                                          
122 Ibid 225. 
123 JF Castrilli ‘Wanted: A Legal Regime to Clean up Orphaned/Abandoned Mines in Canada.’ (2010) 6 McGill 
Int'l J. Sust. Dev. L. & Pol'y 109. 
124 United Nations Environment Programme, Division of Technology, Industry and Economics, Abandoned 
Mines - Problems, Issues and Policy Challenges for Decision Makers: Summary Report (June 2001) at 14 
[UNEP Report 2001] as Cited in Castrilli J.F. ‘Wanted: A Legal Regime to Clean up Orphaned/Abandoned 
Mines in Canada.’ (2010) 6 McGill Int'l J. Sust. Dev. L. & Pol'y 109. 
125 United Nations Environment Programme, Division of Technology, Industry and Economics, Abandoned 
Mines - Problems, Issues and Policy Challenges for Decision Makers: Summary Report (June 2001) at 14 
[UNEP Report 2001].  
126 S.B Hewitson ‘An assessment of the quantum for financial provision of mine closures: a Monte Carlo 
approach’ (unpublished LLM thesis, UCT 2012) 1. 
127 Ibid 1. 
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now and the cost of cleaning these impacts are extremely high.128 The estimated costs for 
cleaning, closing and rehabilitating abandoned and derelict mining site,129 ‘have effectively 
brought the consequences of inadequate environmental rehabilitation in the mining sector 
into sharp focus’.130  It is submitted that;  
the size of liability facing government points to a need to improve the system of performing 
mining closure and rehabilitation so that they not only performed with sustainability in mind, 
but also, any damage associated with mining is contained to the extent that the rehabilitation 
required is funded by the mine concerned.131  
However, to achieve this goal there must be significant improvements in the way mining 
companies make financial provision for mine closure and, most importantly, the accuracy of 
their financial provision estimates. Kidd opines that, in order to combat the challenges posed 
by derelict, ownerless and abandoned mines effectively, especially in the long term, provision 
should be made for the rehabilitation of the affected surfaces, once mining operations finally 
cease.132 
In recent years, however, this has changed significantly and the mining industry is now 
required to comply with a complex web of mining environmental policies and legislative 
framework.133 The realisation that past mining practices failed to plan for mine closure and 
site rehabilitation prompted an increased awareness and inclusion of environmental issues 
within mine closure planning and rehabilitation. Mining operations and activities that in the 
past resulted in legacies of abandoned, derelict and ownerless mine sites, ‘are now 
unacceptable, and require improved mining environmental legislation and control to ensure 
mine site closure and rehabilitation is completed successfully, in a sustainable manner’.134   
                                                          
128 Ibid 1. 
129 Auditor-General Report to Parliament on a performance audit of the rehabilitation of abandoned mines at the 
Department of Minerals and Energy October 2009. The South African Council for Geoscience estimated that the 
cost of rehabilitating South Africa’s abandoned mines stood at R30 billion. However, as the 2009 Auditor-
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130 Colvin et al. ‘Coal and Water Futures in South Africa: A case for protecting headwaters in the Enkangala 
grasslands.’ (2011) World Wide Fund For Nature WWF-SA, available at 
http://awsassets.wwf.org.za/downloads/wwf_coal_water_report_2011_web.pdf. 
131 Hewitson. (see note 126 above) 3. 
132 Kidd (see note 117 above) 225. 
133 The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2005 (the MPRDA), the National 
Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (NEMA) and the National Water Act 36 of 1998 (NWA), the 
National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004, the Regulations thereto amongst other Acts 
regulate the impacts of mining operations conducted in South Africa on the environment and prescribe statutory 
duties in respect of, inter alia, environmental standards, the mitigation of environmental impacts and 
rehabilitation of the affected environment.   
134 Peck (see note 14 above) 
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Thus, the concept of rehabilitation during and after prospecting, exploration and mining 
activities is now well accepted and is entrenched in law.135   
South Africa has passed a number of environmental laws aimed at, among other things, the 
sustainable development of the country’s natural resources, and there is now a progressive 
environmental and mining regulatory framework.136 The introduction of environmental 
legislative and policy frameworks in an endeavour to regulate the mining industry has 
enhanced the awareness for improved mine closure and site rehabilitation planning, which is 
fundamental to the sustainable development of mine operations.137 This was against the 
realisation that a clear, consistent and efficient environmental and mining legislative 
framework which establishes the parameters for mine closure and site rehabilitation is 
fundamental for the eradication of the negative legacy of ownerless, abandoned and derelict 
mining sites, thus the government enacted progressive laws. 
 
2.2 Mine Closure and Rehabilitation: The requirements prescribed by legislation 
 
2.2.1 The History of South African mining environmental legislative and policy 
framework  
2.2.1.1 The Mines and Works Act 27 of 1956 
The requirement for mine closure and the basic requirement for environmental recovery only 
became a legislative requirement through the promulgation of the Mines and Works Act 
(MWA) of 1956.138 The mine rehabilitation was limited to topsoil treatment and vegetation 
recovery, although in terms of the Water Act139 some remediation with regards to 
contaminated water was required.140141 The Mining Rights Act142 which was enacted in 1967 
                                                          
135 JP McLean, & P Carrick “Environmental management and rehabilitation under the Minerals and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act: A biodiversity outlook’ (2007) 14 (2) SAJELP 135 – 225. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Smith (see note 51 above). 
138 The Mines and Works Act No.27 of 1956. 
139 The Water Act No. 54 of 1956. 
140 The Mines and Works Act entailed ‘limited environmental protection measures, namely the filling in of 
subsided areas, prohibiting the release of water containing injurious matter, and requiring soil cladding of dumps 
to prevent pollution’. See Chamber of Mines of South Africa, ‘Environmental Legislation and Water 
Management Issues During Mine Closure in South Africa’.  International Mine Water Association Congress 
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141 When the MWA was amended in 1977 it enabled ‘the Minister to formulate regulations that were aimed at 
the conservation of the environment at or near mines. These regulations also pertained to the restoration of land 
on which activities in connection with mines or works were performed or had been performed. The legal 
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added to GN R922.119. Regulation 5.12 directly regulated the rehabilitation of mining surfaces and introduced 
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was also ineffective as far as environmental management was concerned as it gave no 
consideration for management of environmental impacts of mining.  
2.2.1.2 Minerals Act 50 of 1991 
The Minerals Act was the first legislation that paid significant attention to the impacts of 
mining on the environment143 (hereafter MA). The MA provided a basis for environmental 
management for the first time, and prior to its passing into law, many mining companies, 
‘used irresponsible mining methods with no regard towards protecting the environment and 
had often shirked their responsibility towards environmental rehabilitation by leaving an area 
unrehabilitated prior to them being liquidated or leaving the country’.144  This is so because 
mining companies that operate in countries with less stringent and consistent regulation plus 
weak regulatory capacity often capitalise on weak enforcement with regards to their 
environmental responsibility.145 
A shift in the closure requirements was realised with the promulgation of the MA, and it 
addressed the negative environmental consequences of ineffective and inadequate 
environmental requirements for mining activities and focused on mine environmental 
management through the introduction of stricter requirements and sound environmental 
principles for the mining industry.146 The MA required that environmental impacts 
assessments be carried out and that mining companies prepare proper closure plans.147 This 
act prescribed more comprehensive environmental management and rehabilitation which 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the rehabilitation programme. Regulation 5.12.2 required that the rehabilitation of the surface of an opencast 
mine was to be an integral part of the mining operations. Mines were obliged to conduct rehabilitation while the 
mine was in operation and, in certain situations, rehabilitation had to be done in accordance with a programme 
that was prescribed by the Inspector of Mines after consultation with the manager and after the plan had been 
approved by the Government Mining Engineer. Regulation 5.13.3 imposed a duty on the owner of a mine to 
rehabilitate the surface, as far as it is practicable to its natural state, when mining operations ceased. Once the 
clearance certificate had been issued by the Inspector of Mines in terms of regulation 2.11, the owner or 
manager could not be held responsible for compliance of the regulations contained in chapter 5.125. Although, 
in terms of the MWA, liability ended with the issuing of a clearance certificate, an owner could at that time still 
be held liable for pollution that was caused by mining in terms of then Water Act 54 of 1956 and the 
Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act 45 of 1965’.  
142 The Mining Rights Act 20 of 1967.  
143 Minerals Act 50 of 1991.  
144 Swart (see note 12 above) 489. 
145 J Hönke et al. ‘Fostering environmental regulation? Corporate social responsibility in countries with weak 
regulatory capacities: the case of South Africa’. (2008) SFB- Governance Working Paper Series. No 9. Berlin. 
University of Potsdam and European University Institute.  3.  
146 The object of the Minerals Act was to regulate the prospecting for and the optimal exploitation, processing 
and utilisation of minerals; to regulate the orderly utilisation of and the rehabilitation of the surface of land 
during and after prospecting and mining operations and related matters. Thus, while it pays some heed to 
environmental concerns, this was limited to rehabilitation. Government and the mining industry had accepted 
the principle that the polluter must pay for pollution or the damage that prospecting or mining actions incur on 
the environment. 
147 Regional Mining and Closure Strategies. 
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included providing financially for rehabilitation at the commissioning stage of mining. There 
had to be consultation on closure and the closure plan had to be managed by the State, and 
there were life cycle planning guidelines.148 
In terms of section 38 of the MA, the rehabilitation of the surface of land concerned in any 
prospecting or mining was to be carried out by the holder of the prospecting permit or mining 
authorization concerned in accordance with the environmental management programme 
approved in terms of section 39, and as an integral part of the prospecting or mining 
operations concerned throughout the life of the operation until closure.149 In terms of section 
12 of the MA,150 the responsibility to comply with the relevant provisions of the Act 
remained with the holder of a prospecting permit or mining authorisation until a closure 
certificate had been issued to the effect that the said provisions have been complied with.151 
Regulations were promulgated to ensure that financial provision was made by a mine in the 
form of guarantees for the execution of its EMP.152 
2.2.1.3 The Constitution Republic of South Africa, 1996 
In terms of section 24 of the Constitution of South Africa (Constitution),153 the right to 
environmental health has been elevated to a basic human right,154 and since then a series of 
Acts155 have been enacted to ensure the realisation of the right and environmental protection. 
Section 24 of the Constitution grants everyone the right to an environment that is not harmful 
to their health or well-being; and to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present 
and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that prevent 
                                                          
148 NCOP Economic and Business ‘Development Mining Charter; Derelict and Ownerless mines: Progress 
Report by Department of Mineral Resources’ (2010), available at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/12080/ 
(accessed on 15 December 2016). 
149 Section 38 of the Minerals Act. 
150 Section 12 of the Minerals Act. 
151 Section 12 of the Minerals Act is titled - Continuation of liability until certificate is issued. 
152 Swart (see note 12 above) 490. Regulations for EMP performance assessment and monitoring were 
promulgated in GG 20219 of 25 June 1999, Notice No. R801. ‘The inclusion of monitoring and performance 
assessment into the mining environmental management process completed the last link of an integrated, cradle-
to-grave environmental management process adopted by the DME. Only when the objectives have been met and 
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153 Section 24 of the Constitution Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
154 In the BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Agriculture, Conservation and Land Affairs 2004 (5) SA 124 
(W) case, the Court stated that ‘By elevating the environment to a fundamental justiciable human right, South 
Africa has irreversibly embarked on a road, which will lead to the goal of attaining a protected environment by 
an integrated approach, which takes into consideration, inter alia, socioeconomic concerns and principles.’ 
155 The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2005 (the MPRDA), the National 
Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (NEMA) and the National Water Act36 of 1998 (NWA), the 
National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004, the Regulations thereto amongst other Acts. 
The environmental right in the Constitution is supported by other environmental legislation to protect the 
environment while pursuing sustainable economic growth.   
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pollution and ecological degradation; promote conservation; and secure ecologically 
sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic 
and social development.156 
The importance of the protection of the environment and the environmental right was 
highlighted by the Constitutional Court in the case of Fuel Retailers Association of Southern 
Africa v Director-General: Environmental Management, Department of Agriculture, 
Conservation and Environment, Mpumalanga Province and Others.157 The Court had this to 
say,  
The importance of the protection of the environment cannot be gainsaid. Its protection is 
vital to the enjoyment of the other rights contained in the Bill of Rights; indeed it is vital to 
life itself. It must therefore be protected for the benefit of the present and future generations. 
The present generation holds the earth in trust for the next generation. This trusteeship 
position carries with it the responsibility to look after the environment.158 
It important to note that the Court in the Fuel Retailers case recognised that socio-economic 
rights that are set out in the Constitution are indeed vital to the enjoyment of other human 
rights guaranteed in the Constitution but development cannot subsist upon a deteriorating 
environmental base. Thus, the Court further held that; 
The Constitution contemplates the integration of environmental protection and socio-
economic development. It envisages that environmental considerations will be balanced 
with socio-economic considerations through the ideal of sustainable development.… 
Sustainable development and sustainable use and exploitation of natural resources are at the 
core of the protection of the environment.159 That unlimited development is detrimental to 
the environment and the destruction of the environment is detrimental to development. 
Promotion of development requires the protection of the environment. Yet the environment 
cannot be protected if development does not pay attention to the costs of environmental 
destruction. The environment and development are thus inextricably linked.160  
It can be argued that the right to environment intersects with a number of other substantive 
and procedural constitutional human rights.161 The significance of the environmental right 
                                                          
156  Section 24 of the Constitution. 
157 Fuel Retailers supra. 
158 Supra at para 102. 
159 Supra at para 45. Thus, Murombo opines that, ‘the Fuel Retailers decision is a landmark development in the 
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was highlighted in the case of Director: Mineral Development, Gauteng Region, and Another 
v Save the Vaal Environment and Others,162 when the court held that, 
Our Constitution, by including environmental rights as fundamental, justiciable human rights, 
by necessary implication requires that environmental considerations be accorded appropriate 
recognition and respect in the administrative processes in our country. Together with the 
change in ideological climate must also come a change in our legal and administrative approach 
to environmental concerns.163 
The above cases highlight positive significant developments in the South African 
environmental legal framework and they also highlight the role of the Courts in 
environmental protection. The courts’ role is especially important in the context of the 
protection of the environment and giving effect to the principle of sustainable 
development.164 The decision of the Constitutional Court in MEC, Department of Agriculture, 
Conservation and Environment v HTF Developers (Pty) Ltd,165 reinforces the Courts’ 
determination to ensure that the right to an environment not harmful to our health and 
wellbeing is safeguarded through the promotion of the concept of sustainable development.166  
2.2.1.4 The National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) 
The National Environmental Management Act (NEMA),167 is the overarching document for 
environmental governance in South Africa.168 It represents, arguably, the most significant 
environmental law reform in South Africa, as it provides the overall framework for the 
management of all natural resources within the country.169 It encompasses a comprehensive 
liability regime and compensation procedure for environmental damage.170 It is against this 
background that Soltau171 opines that; 
NEMA as a whole represents a milestone in South African environmental law. Environmental 
liability rules are crucial in a system of regulation: they concretise the polluter pays principle, 
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167 The National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998. 
168 Hönke et al. (note 145 above) 13. 
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serving to put a proper value on the environment in the economic decision-making of polluters. 
Putting such remedies in the hands of the state should create a tool for the restoration and 
remediation of polluted environments.172 
NEMA applies to any activity, including mining that could have significant impacts on the 
environment.173 It is based on two guiding principles; The first is to ‘impose a duty of care of 
the environment prospectively in other words, to ensure that persons take reasonable 
measures to address environmental harm caused by those persons after the promulgation of 
the Act. The second is to address historic pollution and degradation of the environment.’174 
This is in line with the best international principles of sustainable development and integrated 
environmental management. NEMA serves to realise some aspects of the Constitution, by 
assisting the government to fulfil the duty imposed on the state in terms of section 24(b) of 
the Constitution to protect the environment through reasonable legislative measures.175  
This dissertation will focus on some but not all aspects of NEMA, namely the provisions of 
the Act especially the financial provisions that deal with closure and rehabilitation of mines. 
Please note that the NEMA financial provisions that are currently applicable to in 
guaranteeing mine site closure and rehabilitation will be dealt with in the next chapter as this 
chapter looks specifically at the laws applicable before the one environmental system. 
a) Section 28 of NEMA: Duty of care and remediation of environmental damage176 
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NEMA deals specifically with the duty of care to prevent damage and the duty to remedy 
environmental damage. Thus, section 28 (1) provides that; 
Every person who causes, has caused or may cause significant pollution or degradation of the 
environment must take reasonable measures to prevent such pollution or degradation from 
occurring, continuing or recurring or, in so far as such harm to the environment is authorised by 
law or cannot reasonable be avoided or stopped, to minimise and rectify such pollution or 
degradation of the environment.177 
A question arose whether section 28 operated retrospectively. In Bareki NO and Another v 
Gencor Ltd and Others,178 the court held that the provisions of section 28 were NOT 
retrospective and, accordingly, the obligation to take corrective measures did not apply where 
the acts of pollution and degradation complained of were caused or began prior to 29 January 
1999.179 The court held that retrospectivity would entail an unfairness that parliament could 
not have intended. This was apparent by the duty or obligation created by section 28 is 
strict.180 The conclusion was also due to the fact that there is no monetary limit to the liability 
and no statutory defences in favour of the person who cased the pollution.181 
It is important to note that the judgement was subsequently overruled by an amendment to 
NEMA. Section 28 (1A) was inserted which provides that the provisions of section 28(1) also 
apply to significant pollution or degradation that:182 
a. Occurred before the commencement of the Act; 
b. Arises (or is likely to arise) at a different time from the actual activity; 
c. Arises though an act or activity of a person that results in a change in to a pre-existing 
contamination.  
The importance of this duty lies in its very generality in that all conduct, whether past, 
present or future, which causes pollution or degradation of the environment, is subject to the 
duty to take ‘reasonable measures’.183 The duty to take reasonable steps is triggered where a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
degradation. This creates extensive statutory duties for any person who is involved in an activity that has the 
potential to cause pollution damage or degrade the environment.’ 
177 Section 28 (1) of NEMA. 
178 Bareki NO and Another v Gencor Ltd and Others 2006 (1) SA 432 (T). 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid. 
181 The Court held that section 28 of the NEMA, ‘which provides for a wide duty of care and remediation of 
environmental damage, does not have retrospective application. This effectively means that, as a matter of 
precedent, polluters cannot be held liable for pollution and pollution damage which occurred prior to the 
promulgation of NEMA in 1999. This creates a problem as a considerable degree of pollution in South Africa is 
historical and occurred during times when no comprehensive environmental law and liability regime existed or 
the existing laws had not been enforced.’ 
182 The general duty to take reasonable measures in section 28 (1) must in this respect be read with subsections 
2, 3, and 4. 
183 Soltau (see note 171 above) 43. The general duty to take reasonable measures in section 28 (1) must in this 
respect be read with subsections 2, 3, and 4. 
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person’s activities cause, caused or threated to cause significant pollution or degradation of 
the environment.184 What is clear from the above is that our law imposes obligations to 
remove pollution from the environment, and to rehabilitate affected areas. 
2.2.1.5 The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) 
Mining in South Africa is regulated by the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development 
Act (MPRDA),185 which repealed the MA, which itself consolidated virtually all previous 
mining legislation.186 It is evident from the preamble to the MPRDA that the South African 
government is obliged to protect the environment for the benefit of present and future 
generations, to ensure ecologically sustainable development of mineral resources.187 The 
MPRDA was the principal piece of legislation governing all the mining process in South 
Africa before the introduction of the One Environmental System or the National 
Environmental Management Amendment Act.188 The MPRDA was a key statute, which 
governed the entire mining cycle, primarily through the granting of regulatory authorisations 
for mining and mining related activities and it also contained the financial provisions for 
mine closure and rehabilitation.  
The MPRDA forms part of a complex and interlinking network of national legislation geared 
towards sustainable development and the protection of South Africa’s environmental 
resources.189 It is argued that, while the MPRDA contained laudable goals for protecting, 
managing and rehabilitating the environment, there appears to be a stark contrast between 
overarching, legislated ideals and mining practice.190 It can be argued that,  
while the MPRDA contained some improved mechanisms for environmental protection, 
management and rehabilitation, the implementation of many of those mechanisms has yet to 
achieve the environmental ideals now enshrined in South African laws. Moreover, certain 
fundamental problems and gaps in the legislation mean that environmental protection may be 
given insufficient consideration at various stages of the regulatory process.191 
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In an endeavour to meet its environmental objective, the MPRDA introduced more extensive 
environmental mechanisms than found in previous mining legislation.192 Section 37 of the 
MPRDA,193 confirms the adoption of the principles for sustainable development as set out in 
section 2 of NEMA, as well as other generally accepted principles of sustainable 
development by integrating social, economic and environmental factors into the planning, 
implementation, closure and post closure management of prospecting and mining 
operations.194 
Before the commencement of the One Environmental System, section 41 of the MPRDA 
required the mining company to make financial provision for all mining related 
environmental liabilities. It provided that, ‘An applicant for a prospecting right, mining right 
or mining permit must before the approval of the environmental management plan or 
environmental management programme…make the prescribed financial provision for the 
rehabilitation or management of negative environmental impacts’.195 However, this section 
has since been repealed in the MPRDA and is now included in 24P of NEMA. The Mineral 
and Petroleum Resources Development Regulations196 were also used determine the method 
of financial provisioning197 and the quantum of financial provision198. Regulation 53 provided 
that;  
Financial provision required in terms of section 41 of the Act to achieve the total quantum for 
the rehabilitation, management and remediation of negative environmental impacts must be 
provided for by one or more of the following methods:  
a) An approved contribution to a trust fund as required in terms of section 10(1)(cH) of 
the Income Tax Act, 1962 (Act No. 58 of 1962) and must be in the format as approved 
by the Director General from time to time;  
b) a financial guarantee from a South African registered bank or any other bank or 
financial institution approved by the Director-General guaranteeing the financial 
provision relating to the environmental management programme or plan in the format 
as approved by the Director General from time to time;  
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c) a deposit into the account specified by the Director-General in the format as approved 
by the Director-General from time to time; 
d) any other method as the Director-General may determine. 
Regulation 54 on the other hand provided that; 
1). The quantum of the financial provision as determined in a guideline …include a detailed 
itemization of all actual costs required for- 
a) premature closure regarding- 
i. the rehabilitation of the surface of the area; 
ii. the prevention and management of pollution of the atmosphere; and 
iii. the prevention and management of pollution of water and the soil; and 
iv. the prevention of leakage of water and minerals between subsurface 
formations and the surface. 
b) decommissioning and final closure of the operation; and 
c) post closure management of residual and latent environmental impacts. 
2). The holder of a prospecting right, mining right or mining permit must annually update 
and review the quantum of the financial provision - 
a) in consultation with a competent person; 
b) as required in terms of the approved environmental management programme or 
environmental management plan; or 
c) as requested by the Minister. 
3). Any inadequacies with regard to the financial provision must be rectified by the holder 
of a prospecting right, mining right or mining permit – 
a) in an amendment of the environmental management programme or environmental 
management plan, as the case may be; 
b) within the timeframe provided for; or 
c) as determined by the Minister. 
 
Under section 43 the MPRDA,199 the holder of a prospecting right, mining right, retention 
permit or mining permit was responsible for any environment liability, pollution or ecological 
degradation and the management thereof, until a closure certificate is issued by the Minister. 
However, due to the 2008 MPRDA amendment the mining company will remain liable and 
continues to be liable for any latent environmental hazards notwithstanding the issuance of a 
closure certificate. The land must be rehabilitated in accordance with the identifiable land use 
as specified in the environmental management programme or environmental management 
plan.200 It is important to note that section 45 of the MPRDA allows the minister to recover 
costs in the event of urgent remedial measures. If mining activities cause or result in 
ecological degradation, pollution or environmental damage, or is in contravention of the 
conditions of the environmental authorisation, requires urgent remedial measures, the 
Minister may direct the holder of the relevant right to take certain measures. These are, to 
investigate, evaluate, assess and report on the impact of any pollution or ecological 
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degradation or any contravention of the conditions of the environmental authorisation; and to 
take such measures to rectify the problem within a specified time period.201 If the concerned 
person does not do the remedial work then the Minister will step in and do the remedial work 
and claim the costs from the person concerned.202 In terms of section 46 of the MPRDA, if 
the mine is derelict and ownerless the Minister has to take remedial measures to close and 
rehabilitate the mine concerned and this will be funded from the financial provision made by 
the mining company.203 
2.2.1.6 National Water Act 36 of 1998 
The express objective of the National Water Act,204 (hereafter NWA) is to, ‘ensure that the 
nation’s water resources are protected, used, developed, conserved, managed and controlled 
in ways which take into account - meeting the basic human needs of present and future 
                                                          
201 Section 45 of the MPRDA - Minister's power to recover costs in event of urgent remedial measures; 
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pollution or ecological degradation of the environment or to rehabilitate dangerous health and social 
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2. The measures contemplated in subsection (1) must be funded from financial provision made by the 
holder of the relevant right, permit, the previous holder of an old order right or the previous owner of 
works in terms of the National Environmental Management Act, 1998, where appropriate, or if there is 
no such provision or if it is inadequate, from money appropriated by Parliament for the purpose. 
204 The National Water Act36 of 1998. 
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generations.205 The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry stated that the NWA is 
intended to ensure that water resources are conserved and used in a manner which reduces 
and prevents pollution, protects aquatic and associated ecosystems, and preserves biological 
diversity.206 Section 19 of NWA,207 deals with the prevention of pollution from activities 
performed on land or any situation which exists on land which causes, has caused or is likely 
to cause, pollution of water resources. The section permits a water management institution to 
do whatever is necessary to prevent the pollution and remedy its effects, where it has issued a 
directive which has not been complied with.208 All reasonable costs can be recovered from 
the persons responsible for the pollution, including the owner of the land at the time when the 
potential for pollution or actual pollution occurred, or any person who was responsible for the 
pollution or contributed to it.209 
The detrimental impact of mining on water resources is further regulated by the NWA 
regulations.210 In terms of these regulations; 
a. No person in control of a mine or mining activity may place or dispose of any residue or 
substance which causes or is likely to cause pollution of a water resource, in the workings 
of any underground or opencast mine excavation, prospecting diggings, pit or any other 
excavation.211  
b. Every person in control of a mine or activity must take reasonable measures to prevent 
water containing waste or any substance which causes or is likely to cause pollution of a 
water resource from entering any water resource, either by natural flow or by seepage.212 
The NWA regulations also provide the regulations for rehabilitation of coal residue deposits 
by stating that;213 Any person mining or establishing coal residue deposits must rehabilitate 
such residue deposits so that- 
a. all residue deposits are compacted to prevent spontaneous combustion and minimise the 
infiltration of water; and 
                                                          
205 Preamble to the NWA. 
206 Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (2000). ‘Operational Guideline’ No. M6.1. ‘Guideline document 
for the implementation of regulations on use of water for mining and related activities aimed at the protection of 
water resources’. 2nd ed. 
207 Section 19 of NWA (see note 198 above). 
208 ibid 
209 Ibid. 
210 Department of Water Affairs and Forestry. ‘Regulations on the Use of Water for Mining and Related 
Activities Aimed at the Protection of Water Resources’. GG 20119 (4 June 1999).  
211 Regulation 4 (c) of the ‘Regulations on the Use of Water for Mining and Related Activities Aimed at the 
Protection of Water Resources’. 
212 Regulation 7(a) of the Regulations on the Use of Water for Mining and Related Activities Aimed at the 
Protection of Water Resource, - Protection of water resources. 
213 Regulation 8(d) of the Regulations on the Use of Water for Mining…. - Additional regulations for 
rehabilitation of coal residue deposits. 
38 
 
b. the rehabilitation of the residue deposits is implemented concurrently with the mining 
operation. 
c. Every person in control of a mine or activity must take reasonable measures to prevent the 
erosion or leaching of materials from any residue deposit or stockpile from any area and 
contain material or substances so eroded or leached in such area by providing suitable 
barrier dams, evaporation dams or any other effective measures to prevent this material or 
substance from entering and polluting any water resources.214 
d. Every person in control of a mine or activity must protect any existing pollution control 
measures or replace any existing pollution control measures deleteriously affected, 
damaged or destroyed by the removing or reclaiming of materials from any residue deposit 
or stockpile, and establish additional measures for the prevention of pollution of a water 
resource which might occur, is occurring or has occurred as a result of such operations.215 
e. Any person in control of a mine or activity must at either temporary or permanent cessation 
of operations ensure that all pollution control measures have been designed, modified, 
constructed and maintained so as to comply with the regulations.216 
f. Any person in control of a mine or activity must ensure that the in-stream and riparian 
habitat of any water resource, which may have been affected or altered by a mine or 
activity, is remedied so as to comply with the regulations.217 
 
2.2.1.7 National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act 39 of 2004 
The Air Quality Act addresses the limitations of the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act of 
1965. The main objectives of this Act are to protect and enhance the quality of air in South 
Africa, and to reduce risks to human health and the environment, while taking into account 
the need for sustainable development. The most important section of this Act that relates to 
mining activity is Section 5, where it provides that dust must be controlled during mining 
operations and that rehabilitation measures for the source of dust emission should be in place 
before and after closure of the mine.  
2.2.1.8 Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989 
The section that relates to the environmental liabilities in terms of the Environment 
Conservation Act is section 31A.218 The potential scope of section 31A219 is very wide, not 
only may an authority direct a polluter to take steps to prevent or minimise damage to the 
environment, but it can also direct that person to rehabilitate damage caused to the 
environment.220 Upon a failure to rehabilitate any damage as directed, the authority may itself 
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take the necessary steps and recover the cost incurred from the polluter.221 Prior to the 
promulgation of NEMA, the Environmental Conservation Act was South Africa’s primary 
piece of legislation dedicated to environmental matters. 
2.2.1.9 Nuclear Energy Act 46 of 1999 
South African gold mines are associated with radio-active elements such as uranium and its 
decay products due to chemical leachates or oxidation of pyrites. In terms of mine closure, 
radiological requirements in terms of this Act must also be met before a closure certificate is 
granted.222 
2.2.1.10 White Paper: A Minerals and Mining Policy for South Africa 
In terms of the White Paper: A Minerals and Mining Policy for South Africa,223 the South 
African government has an obligation to ensure that the costs of environmental impacts of the 
mining industry are not passed over to the community. In order for the government to meet 
this obligation, the government should implement effective and affordable measures and 
standards for environmental impact management, the prevention or efficient management of 
water, soil and atmospheric pollution, and the rehabilitation of areas affected by past mining 
operations.  
The White Paper224 also sets out a number of specific points which give substance to 
sustainable development, namely that: 
a) The rehabilitation of defunct and derelict mines which are a risk to the environment, public 
safety and human health should be appropriately regulated;225 
b) The environmental damage caused by the mining industry should be managed and 
contained irrespective of the size of the mine;226 
c) The rehabilitation of land for post-mine use should be ensured and carried out to standards 
that permit its use for the purpose set out in the EMPR and closure should only be granted 
only after satisfying that there are no foreseeable residual impacts that will be inherited by 
parties acquiring such land.227 
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2.3 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for closure and rehabilitation of mines 
Environmental impact assessments (EIA) are the vehicle by which mining companies are 
required to produce a detailed closure plan. Mine closure process is a ‘cradle-to-the-grave’ 
concept and states that the closure process must start at the commencement of the operation 
and continue throughout the life of the operation. This means that mine closure and site 
rehabilitation plans must be reviewed on a regular basis. All risks must be identified and 
managed pro-actively, and residual and possible latent risks must be identified and quantified. 
The planning phase of any proposed mining activity is critical in identifying potential long-
term impacts and designing rehabilitation systems that will minimise or prevent those impacts 
in the long term.  
In terms of South African environmental legislation, before a mining company may 
commence with prospecting, mining, or exploration it is required to produce an EIA in 
accordance with section 24N of NEMA,228 its regulations229 and the MPRDA230 for approval 
by the minister responsible for mineral resources and without which mining activities may 
not commence.231 This EIA must contain details on how environmental impacts will be dealt 
with and environmental costs internalised and must include the presentation of a 
rehabilitation and closure plan.232 The EIA233 is regarded as a tool to achieve a 
comprehensive and accurate environmental management plan (EMP) for mine closure and 
rehabilitation.234 Thus, it can be argued that most mining operations require environmental 
authorisations under NEMA and the Environmental Assessment Regulations,235 promulgated 
under NEMA for certain listed activities associated with mining. One of the prerequisites for 
granting of a prospecting, or a mining right is that the prospecting will not result in 
unacceptable pollution, ecological degradation or damage to the environment.236 An applicant 
for a prospecting right must submit an EMP which has plans to manage and rehabilitate the 
                                                          
228 Section 24N (2) (a) and Section 24N (7) of NEMA (as amended by Act 25 of 2014). 
229 NEMA: Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations: Listing Notice 2 of 2014.  
230 Sections 16 and 17 of the MPRDA. 
231 Kidd (see note 117 above) 221.  
232 Section 24N (2) (f) and (g) of NEMA (as amended by Act 25 of 2014). 
233 See M Kidd and F Retief ‘Environmental Assessment’ In HA Strydom and ND King (eds) Fuggle and 
Rabbie’s Environmental Management in South Africa 2nd ed (2009) 971. It has been argued that, “EIA is not a 
decision-making tool but rather a decision aiding tool that only serves to provide information to decision-makers 
on the consequences of their decisions thereby authorising actions in the full knowledge of their environmental 
consequences”. 
234 NEMA: Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations: Listing Notice 2 of 2014. 
235 2014 (EIA Regulations). 
236 Kidd (see note 117 above) 221. NEMA now expressly provides that “Reconnaissance, prospecting, mining or 
retention as per the MPRDA, as well as the construction of various mining related infrastructure” are included 
as listed activities as from April 2006. This means that the legal requirement to obtain an environmental 
authorisation is applicable to the undertaking of rehabilitation and closure activities at a mine. 
41 
 
environmental impact as a result of prospecting, reconnaissance, exploration or mining 
operations conducted under the authority of a reconnaissance permission, prospecting right, 
reconnaissance permit, exploration right or mining permit, as the case may be.237  
It is important to note that the EIAs under MPRDA were a subject of criticism. Van Zyl et al 
noted that the mining companies have been providing inadequate EMPs and associated 
rehabilitation plans.238 There have been cases where the information contained in the EMP 
was insufficient and inconsistency both for the Minister to fully evaluate the reported impact 
of the proposed mining activity, and for the applicant’s subsequent actions to be measured 
against the EMP’s contents.239 This is a major challenge since the EIAs form part of the 
cradle-to-the-grave approach to closure and rehabilitation of mining sites. Van Zyl et al 
further submit that the content and quality of EMPs varies significantly in practice. The 
authors also found a degree of variability in the quality of EMPs with some EMPs not having 
any rehabilitation plans at all.240 The authors refer to these types of EMPs as ‘black boxes’ 
because of their lack of information and transparency.241 The authors further noted that the 
‘EMPs that contain insufficient rehabilitation plans with tenuous links to the calculation of 
financial provisions. These often contain limited or unclear distinctions between areas that 
can be rehabilitated concurrent to mining and those that can only be rehabilitated at closure. 
These can be best described as “grey box” EMPs given their only barely adequate 
information and low levels of transparency.242 
The requirement for mines to obtain environmental authorisations for mining and 
prospecting activities is welcome since NEMA contains far more 
comprehensive requirements for impact assessments in an application for an 
environmental authorisation, and mitigation measures to address anticipated 
environmental impacts.243 It is submitted that, ‘over the last decade, EIAs have shifted to 
compliance rather than dealing with risk, however with the arrival of the new 2014 
EIA regulations, the importance of integrative planning, applying the mitigation hierarchy to 
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design out impacts and whittling down alternatives to a permissible project has again come 
full circle, and is encouraged ahead of commencing the permitting process, which is now the 
only part of the new authorisation system to be regulated’.244 
It is important to note that the opportunity to bring the environmental authorisations in the 
mining context under NEMA have allowed a more uniform and stringent EIA regime to be 
applied in mining. It is submitted that NEMA provided a strengthened, principled basis for 
EIA, both in terms of the NEMA principles articulated in section 2 which states that ‘the 
environmental impact of activities, including disadvantages and benefits, must be considered, 
assessed and evaluated, and decisions must be appropriate in the light of such consideration 
and assessment’. However, despite this, some may argue that overall the basic thrust of the 
EIA process remains the same as the 2010 EIA regulations, even though there are were 
textual changes to many of the provisions it does not amount to significant changes of 
substance.245  
It should be borne in mind however that ‘EIAs have limitations and are not a panacea to the 
environmental degradation and pollution problem, thus environmental practitioners need to 
arm themselves with greater range of environmental tools to assist them in understanding the 
full environmental ramifications of specific development proposals’.246 This so because, 
‘knowledge of the environment will never be sufficient to accurately predict the exact nature 
of project. Assessors are therefore forced to decide on how best to make predictions on future 
impacts’.247 
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Van Zyl et al places the prevalent negative legacy of abandoned and derelict mining sites in 
context:  
Ongoing concerns regarding environmental degradation in mining areas, high numbers of 
ownerless and abandoned mines, and the incidence of acid mine drainage have all highlighted 
the need for improved environmental maintenance and rehabilitation in the mining sector.248 
These concerns give rise to questions about the availability of funds to manage the impacts of 
mining and the adequacy of financial provisions made by mining companies for 
rehabilitation.249  
The authors further note that: 
While there is relatively broad consensus that a significant portion of current environmental 
impacts relate to abandoned mines, there is a clear need to also ensure that current and future 
mining activities do not add to unacceptable environmental impacts and impose costs on 
society. The harsh lessons of the past need to be applied, lest history be allowed to repeat 
itself.250 
It is submitted that key to the achievement of sustainable mine closure, rehabilitation and 
improved environmental management are the provisions of MPRDA and NEMA, particularly 
the provisions of section 24P of the NEMA251 that incorporate the polluter pays principle into 
South Africa’s mining legislation.252 Among other things, section 24P requires applicants for 
prospecting or mining rights to make financial provision for the rehabilitation or management 
of negative environmental impacts.253 It is submitted that the financial provisions as provided 
for in NEMA and its Regulations,254 particularly those relating to mine closure and site 
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rehabilitation are key tools aimed at ensuring that the taxpayer is not burdened with the costs 
of rehabilitation.255  
The adequacy and accurate estimation of the financial provisions for closure and 
rehabilitation, the efficiency and appropriateness of the types of financial instruments that 
may be used as an incentive to compel mines to undertake concurrent, final and post closure 
rehabilitation to prevent and mitigate environmental harm and the protection of the provision 
against claims from other creditors, is the focal point of this dissertation in general and this 
chapter in particular. This is so because there are challenges with regards to previous 
financial provisions (as was provided for in MPRDA and its regulations) for mine closure and 
site rehabilitation which have been identified and raised in previous researches namely;256  
the inadequate clarity in legislation governing mine closure and rehabilitation, constraints 
associated with the financial instrument choices open to mines with regard to making financial 
provisions, inadequate funding levels for rehabilitation and closure being maintained and 
secured, limited auditing of the adequacy of financial provisions by the mines and the state; and 
an inadequate protection of financial provisions in the event of insolvency.257 
It is submitted that even though mining companies are legally obliged to set aside money to 
be used for closure and rehabilitation of mines in event they default, the system was failing 
South Africa as it was not achieving the goals of protecting the environment sufficiently. It is 
against the above challenge that this chapter seeks to, determine whether the current financial 
provisions as now provided for in section 24P of NEMA258 and its regulations259 are 
sufficient to adequately address the mining companies’ liability for present as well as future 
environmental damage and to suggest recommendations for potential improvements to the 
financial provisions.  
3.2 Financial Provision for Closure and Rehabilitation of Mined Land 
This section of the chapter evaluates the use of financial provisions (and the 
instruments/methods) by looking at their strengths and weaknesses, and their effectiveness as 
tools to impose liability on the mining companies to close, rehabilitate, and manage the 
environmental impacts caused by mining activities. As discussed in the preceding chapters, 
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‘the costs of remedying environmental degradation,  pollution, and of preventing, controlling 
or minimising further pollution, environmental damage must be paid for by those responsible 
for harming the environment’.260  As a result, the costs of mine closure and site rehabilitation 
should thus be internalised and be borne by the mining companies who would have caused 
environmental degradation and pollution rather than the tax payers.261 The White Paper on a 
Minerals and Mining Policy for South Africa,262 acknowledges this by stating that, ‘The 
polluter-pays principle will be applied in the regulation and enforcement of environmental 
management. The mining entrepreneur will be responsible for all costs pertaining to the 
impact of the operation on the environment’.263 It is therefore submitted that the purpose of 
the financial provisions is to ensure that there will be sufficient funds to pay for mine closure 
and site rehabilitation as well as post closure monitoring and maintenance at any stage in the 
life of the project, including early or temporary closure if the mining company defaults.264  
The inadequacy and inefficiency of the financial provision estimates as was provided for 
under the MPRDA pointed to the need to improve the system of determining and making 
financial provision for closure and rehabilitation. It is submitted that ensuring that adequate 
financial provision for closure and rehabilitation is made available by a mine is critical 
because it means that even if the mine is abandoned the government will have adequate funds 
available to close, rehabilitate and manage the negative environmental impacts that may arise. 
As with all mining operations, there are real and significant financial considerations with 
respect to mine closure and site rehabilitation, especially given that closure and rehabilitation 
occur at a time when an operation is no longer financially viable.  This is one major reason 
why the government is increasingly requiring mining companies to provide adequate 
financial provision for mine closure and rehabilitation, prior to a commencement of mining 
activities.  
It is trite that mine closure and site rehabilitation activities must be guided by the financial 
provisions as provided for in many South African mining related legislation and 
regulations.265 Section 24 of the Constitution266 is one such legislation. Although the 
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Constitution does not specifically set out provisions pertaining to the closure and 
rehabilitation of mined land, it should be noted that section 24 is very relevant within the 
context of the protection and management of the environment at all stages of the life cycle of 
a mining project. This is so because mining activities negatively affect the environment and 
impact adversely on the entire array of interests safeguarded by section 24 of the 
Constitution,267 thus it is important that mines be held liable for environmental degradation 
and pollution caused by the mining activities.268  
In addition to general obligations for rehabilitation of environmental damage that exist in a 
number of environmental statutes, certain key environmental legislation expressly provide for 
the provision of security in relation to other operations and activities which have an 
environmental effect.269 270 Section 30 of the NWA provides that a responsible authority may 
‘if it is necessary for the protection of the water resource or property require the applicant for 
a water use licence to provide security in respect of any obligation or potential obligation 
arising from a licence to be issued under the NWA’.271 Section 30(3) provides that the 
responsible authority must determine the type, extent and duration of any security required,272 
whilst section 30(4) expressly stipulates that the duration of the security may extend beyond 
the time period specified in the licence in question.273 
The financial provisions are essentially equivalent to guaranteeing that the mining site will be 
stabilised and all necessary rehabilitation carried out so that ongoing environmental problems 
are remediated.274 By requiring the payment of the financial provision, the government 
wishes to protect the environment for which it is responsible and avoid the costs of cleaning 
up abandoned and derelict mining sites.275 Financial provisions, particularly those relating to 
mine closure are key tools aimed at ensuring that the taxpayer is not burdened with the costs 
of rehabilitation. Thus, the government is empowered in terms of section 46 (2) of the 
MPRDA to use the financial security for mine closure and site rehabilitation if the mining 
operators fail or unwilling to do so. When one considers that mining activities negatively 
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affect the environment it then becomes imperative that mining companies be held liable for 
present and future environmental degradation and pollution.276 
3.2.1 Previous financial provision requirements under the MPRDA Regime 
It is beyond doubt that the financial provision for mine closure and site rehabilitation formed 
an integral part of the MPRDA before the commencement of the One Environmental System.  
Section 41 of the MPRDA required the mining company to make financial provision for all 
mining related environmental liabilities. This section provided that, ‘an applicant for a 
prospecting right, mining right or mining permit must before the approval of the 
environmental management plan or environmental management programme…make the 
prescribed financial provision for the rehabilitation or management of negative environmental 
impacts’.277 However, this section has since been repealed and superseded by section 24(P) of 
NEMA.278 Section 89 of the MPRDA on the other hand prohibits any mining activities from 
taking place before the financial security has been made which is, ‘acceptable to the 
designated agency guaranteeing the availability of sufficient funds for the due fulfilment of 
all exploration and production work programmes by the holder’.279 Under section 43 the 
MPRDA,280 the mining company was responsible for any environment liability, pollution or 
ecological degradation and the management thereof, until a closure certificate was issued and 
was not liable for any latent or residual risks that could materialise long after the closure 
certificate had been issued.  
Prior to the commencement of the new NEMA Regulations for Financial Provision and 
Closure Regulations,281 the required quantum for financial provision was determined through 
reference to Regulations 53 and 54 promulgated in terms of MPRDA, which prescribed a 
payment method and the quantum was assessed through the Guideline Document for the 
Evaluation of the Quantum of Closure-Related Financial Provision.282 These MPRDA 
regulations have now been superseded by National Environmental Management Act: 
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Regulations: Pertaining to the Financial Provision for Prospecting, Exploration, Mining or 
Production Operations.’283  It terms of the MPRDA financial regulations the amount that was 
to be paid as financial security determined and compiled in-house or by external consultants. 
One of the major weaknesses of the financial provisions under the MPRDA related to the 
calculation of the guarantee amount as there was limited oversight over the provisions’ 
calculations.284 The latent and residual impacts from mining activities were mainly not 
considered in the liability estimation and there was also lack of concurrent rehabilitation.285  
3.2.2 The Estimation and Accuracy of the Financial Provision in terms the 
MPRDA Regime 
The use of financial provision raises some fundamental questions about how to accurately 
calculate the funds, what assurance mechanisms to use and when to give back the money to 
the mining company. The determination of the quantum of financial provision with accuracy 
is very difficult, and has been described as an inexact science.286 This is due to the fact that 
mine closures will happen many years down the line, so the accuracy of the closure cost 
estimates is usually difficult to predict because of inflation, the changing standard of 
rehabilitation and the escalation of closure and rehabilitation costs on a regular basis.287 The 
standard of rehabilitation required of the mining companies will clearly affect the cost of 
restoration and consequently the amount of financial assurance required. It has been noted 
that,  
the process of actually calculating adequate financial provisions for closure is challenging, as 
the calculations must provide clarity on what actions must be taken together with the cost 
estimations in respect of such actions, which  are based primarily on experience built up over 
time.288  
It is against this background that the government realised that the previous financial provision 
legislation as was provided for in the MPRDA was inadequate and extended the concept of 
financial provision much more broadly to include cradle-to-grave environmental performance 
by specifying the need for and extent of financial assurance.  
It is beyond doubt that there were obviously some challenges associated with quantum 
estimation as observed by van Zyl et al namely; non-inflation of master rates contained in the 
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2005 DMR guidelines and the reservations that a number of mines were not making adequate 
financial provision for closure.289 Even though the 2005 DMR guidelines made it clear that 
master rates require annual updating in order to take inflation into account, a number of 
Environmental Management Programmes were found to still be using the master rates 
contained in the 2005 DMR guidelines.290  The 2005 DMR guidelines have not been updated 
for 11 years now thus there is no factoring in of inflation and escalation of costs. This means 
almost certain underestimation of the necessary financial provisions, yet financial provision 
calculations that do not inflation-adjust their numbers have been accepted by the DMR.291  
AngloGold Ashanti submits that the calculation of environmental liabilities is such that there 
is currently a shortfall between the presently declared environmental liabilities and the 
current balance in the company's trust fund.292 This is concerning as it points to the 
inadequacy of the financial provision made by mining companies. This risk is not currently 
adequately taken into account and places severe limitations on the viability of the mine 
closure process.293 it is against this background that van Zyl et al submits that the, 
EMPs and associated rehabilitation and closure plans that need to be prepared and regularly 
updated for mines are central to the accurate estimation of appropriate financial provisions. 
These plans must describe the concrete actions that are required to adequately mitigate 
environmental impacts and achieve an acceptable closure. Once these actions have been 
described in detail, they need to be individually and clearly costed allowing for proper 
calculation of the overall financial provisions. 294 
3.3 The One Environmental System  
The One Environmental System (hereafter OES) is intended to streamline the licensing 
processes for mining, environmental authorisations and for aligning the laws on the 
environmental management of mining in South Africa. This environmental system replaces 
the ‘fragmented, contradictory and ineffective model constituted by rules and institutional 
arrangements that developed in separate mineral development and environmental laws’.295 
Humby submits that the OES is, ‘framed by the overarching concept of cooperative 
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government in the South African Constitution, shifts the statutory authority for environmental 
management of mining to the environmental laws, but gives effect to a unique splitting of 
implementing authority between the authorities responsible for mineral resources and 
environment respectively’.296 
The OES has given a considerable amount of power to the environmental authorities to make 
regulations pertaining to mining with respect to mine closure requirements and financial 
provision amongst other powers. The National Environmental Management Amendment 
Act297 (hereafter NEMAA) has strengthened certain of the provisions of the primary Act 
dealing with financial provision and liability for pollution, ecological degradation and the 
pumping and treatment of polluted or extraneous water.298 To support this point Humby 
submits that when the minister of minerals considers an application for environmental 
authorisation he must now consider the ability of the applicant to comply with the prescribed 
financial provision.299 For mining and prospecting rights the methods of acceptable payment 
have been limited and the wording of the trust deed and financial guarantee is prescribed in 
the regulation is also more onerous than before.300 
The requirements for financial provision for the management of environmental impacts 
caused by mining operations are now regulated by NEMA and no longer the MPRDA. The 
NEMA Regulations for Financial Provision and Closure Regulations301 were effective from 8 
December 2014.302 It is submitted that the NEMA regulations governing financial provisions 
for closure and rehabilitation, are more detailed provisions than those previously found in the 
similar MPRDA Regulations.303 It is important to note that the NEMA regulations have 
increased the amount of the fine that is payable if the mining company does contravene the 
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regulations.304 The regulations also have a wider scope than just financial provisions as they 
deal with care and maintenance of mining operations and ‘deemed closure of mines’, which 
is not currently regulated under the MPRDA. A mine can be deemed to be under closure by 
the Department of Mineral Resources in specified circumstances.305 Under the new 
Regulations, mining companies will have to apply to the Minister of mineral resources to be 
placed under care and maintenance,306 which may not exceed a specified period.307 
3.4 Financial Provision for Remediation of Environmental Damage in Terms of 
Section 24P of NEMA 
The financial provisions are important in the context of mine closure and site rehabilitation 
because the feasibility of the mine closure rests on the assumption that the financial provision 
that has been made by a mine is adequate to cover the rehabilitation costs.308 A question thus 
arises as to whether the current financial provision as regulated by section 24P of NEMA will 
be sufficient to adequately address present and future environmental impacts associated with 
mine closure and rehabilitation. Financial provision is defined by NEMA as;  
the insurance, bank guarantee, trust fund or cash that applicants for an environmental 
authorisation must provide in terms of this Act guaranteeing the availability of sufficient funds 
to undertake the rehabilitation of the adverse environmental impacts of the listed or specified 
activities; rehabilitation of the impacts of the prospecting, exploration, mining or production 
activities, including the pumping and treatment of polluted or extraneous water; 
decommissioning and closure of the operations; remediation of latent or residual environmental 
impacts which become known in the future; removal of building structures and other objects; or 
remediation of any other negative environmental impacts.309  
Section 89 of the MPRDA310 provides that, in addition to section 5(4),311 no mining activities 
may commence unless the mining company has provided for a financial provision 
guaranteeing the availability of sufficient funds for the due fulfilment of all exploration and 
production work programmes by the holder. Whilst financial regulation 4 provides for the 
determination of the financial provision by requiring the mining company to determine and 
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make financial provision to guarantee the availability of sufficient funds to undertake 
rehabilitation and remediation of the adverse environmental impacts of prospecting, 
exploration, mining or production operations, to the satisfaction of the Minister.312  
Section 24P of NEMA313 is titled ‘Financial provision for remediation of environmental 
damage’ as it regulates the financial provision for mine closure and rehabilitation. In terms of 
this section, ‘before the Minister responsible for mineral resources (hereafter the Minister) 
issues the environmental authorisation the mining company should comply with the 
prescribed financial provision for the rehabilitation, closure and ongoing post 
decommissioning management of negative environmental impacts’.314 It is important to note 
that this section includes financial provision for post closure environmental management, 
something that was not found in terms of section 41 of the MPRDA.315 This is welcome as 
most environmental impacts of prospecting and mining manifest long after cessation of the 
operations. It is important to note that section 24P(2) further provides that, ‘failure to close, 
rehabilitate and to manage any impact on the environment by a mining company will result in 
the Minister using all or part of the financial provision provided by a mining company to 
rehabilitate or manage the environmental impacts.’316 It is against this background that it is 
imperative that the financial guarantee amount should be adequate and calculated accurately 
so that when a mining company defaults the government and consequently the taxpayer will 
be protected from footing the closure and rehabilitation costs. 
Section 24P(3) obliges the mining companies to annually assess their environmental liability 
in the manner prescribed by the Minister and must increase their financial provision to the 
satisfaction of the Minister’.317  The question that arises in this instance is what the prescribed 
method is, is it efficient and accurate enough to estimate the exact cost of closure and 
rehabilitation of the mine. It is submitted that the prescribed manner is expressly stated in the 
NEMA Financial Regulations,318 whether this method it is sufficient and accurate remains to 
be seen.  The mining company is further required, ‘to submit an audit report to the Minister 
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on the adequacy of the financial provision from an independent auditor’.319 This is 
commendable and is in line with the key recommendations of the report by van Zyl et al that 
there should be an ‘augmented and structured use of the independent review mechanism as a 
standard, default approach when assessing the adequacy of financial provisions’.320 The use 
of an independent auditor is also appropriate as it gives assurance as to the adequacy and 
compliance of a particular financial provision. The review by an independent auditor could 
also serve as an opportunity for capacity building and learning since the DMR officials may 
learn from the auditor’s skills.321  
Another welcome provision is section 24P(5) which provides that, ‘the minister may maintain 
and retain the financial provision notwithstanding the issuing of a closure certificate…such 
portion of the financial provision may be retained as may be required to rehabilitate the 
closed mining or prospecting operation in respect of latent, residual or any other 
environmental impacts, including the pumping of polluted or extraneous water, for a 
prescribed period’.322 This section should be read together with section 24R(2) which also 
provides for the retention of a portion of financial provision, ‘for any latent, residual or any 
other environmental impact, including the pumping of  polluted or extraneous water, for a 
prescribed period after issuing a closure certificate’.323 This is in line with section 30(4) of the 
NWA which expressly stipulates that the duration of the security may extend beyond the time 
period specified in the licence in question.324 The NWA effectively gives effect to the 
obligation of mining companies to pump water or treat water post closure and this obligation 
has now been strengthened. Another further (and new) requirement is that the provision made 
for latent or residual environmental impact must specifically address the pumping and 
treatment of extraneous or polluted water. NEMA now specifically provides that liability, 
including the responsibility for extraneous or polluted water, continues after closure. 
Section 24P(5) can be read together with section 43(6) of the MPRDA which provides that 
when the minister, ‘issues a closure certificate he or she must return such portion of the 
financial provision as may be deemed appropriate to the mining company but may retain any 
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portion of such financial provision for latent325 and residual326 safety, health or environmental 
impact which may become known in the future’.327 Section 24R(1) of NEMA also provides 
for the continuation of liability notwithstanding the issuing of a closure certificate when it 
provides that the mining company, ‘remain responsible for any environmental liability, 
pollution or ecological degradation, the pumping and treatment of polluted or extraneous 
water, the management and sustainable closure thereof notwithstanding the issuing of a 
closure certificate…’328 The requirement to maintain and retain the financial provision is very 
important as it provides for the continuation of liability despite the issuance of a closure 
certificate in terms of section 43 of the MPRDA.329 The above sections are also aligned with 
the section 24 of the Constitution, section 19 of the NWA as well as section 28 of NEMA.  
It is acknowledged that environmental impacts of prospecting and mining may only become 
known many years after cessation of the operations and the mining company will remain 
liable for the damage or degradation caused by its activities throughout the life cycle of the 
mining operations until decommissioning, rehabilitation and post closure. This is so because 
the environmental degradation and pollution are part of the life cycle of a mine, that is, from 
the identification, exploration phase through project planning, implementation, operations 
and post-operational closure, decommissioning and rehabilitation.330 This is thus in line with 
the PPP and it protects the government from incurring costs of remedying the negative 
environmental impacts caused by mining companies that emerge long after the mining 
company is closed. It should be noted that due to the absence of the maximum retention 
period, the retention period could be for the predicted life of the impacts (i.e. the expected 
time of mine decant) as assessed on cessation of the mining operation and annually thereafter, 
until the impacts have been remediated.331 This is commendable given the Acid Mine 
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Drainage (AMD) challenge, which can start over 40 years after the mine has closed as was 
the case with the Blesbokspruit in Gauteng.332  
Another commendable amendment is section 24P(6) of NEMA which provides that the 
Insolvency Act333 does not apply to any form of financial provision provided by a mining 
company and all amounts arising from that provision.334 It can thus be argued that the gap 
that existed in terms of MPRDA has been filled as the financial provision is now ring-fenced 
in event of insolvency of the mining company and it’s protected from other creditors.  
3.5 NEMA: Regulations for Financial Provision for Mine Closure and 
Rehabilitation335 
In order to better understand the estimation and accuracy of the financial provision, reference 
should be made to the NEMA: Regulations for Financial Provision for Mine Closure and 
Rehabilitation. In terms of section 24(5)(b)(ix) of NEMA,336 the Minister is empowered to 
make regulations consistent with subsection (4),337 laying down the procedure to be followed 
in respect of, among other matters, financial provision.  On the other hand, section 24(5)(d) 
of NEMA338 empowers the Minister to make regulations requiring the provision of ‘financial 
or other security to cover the risks to the State and the environment of noncompliance with 
conditions attached to environmental authorisations’.339 It is important to note that the above 
obligation is explicitly cross referenced to the financial provision in section 24Pof NEMA 
and this determines the extent of overlap or the extent to which they complement each other. 
The regulations are used for determining the method of making financial provision for the 
costs associated with the management of environmental impacts caused by mining activities 
and operations. The purpose of the regulations is  
to regulate the determine and making of financial provision for the costs associated with the 
undertaking of management, rehabilitation and remediation of environmental impacts from 
prospecting, exploration, mining or production operations through the lifespan of such 
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operations and latent or residual environmental impacts that may become known in the 
future.340  
It is important that the regulations recognise the cradle-to-the-grave principle of mine closure 
and site rehabilitation as they provide for the determination of the financial provision for 
closure and rehabilitation during all stages of mining. The scope of financial provision 
provided for by the NEMA regulations is now very wide and this is commendable. In terms 
of Regulation 5, the mining company must provide financial provision for 
‘(a) rehabilitation and remediation; (b) decommissioning and closure activities at the end of 
prospecting, exploration, mining or production operations; (c) and remediation and management of 
latent or residual environmental impacts which may become known in future, including the 
pumping and treatment of polluted or extraneous water. 
There is now certainty with regard to the availability of financial provisions in relation to 
providing for adequate post-closure water treatment even though the adequacy of the 
financial provision is still debatable since the costs associated with treatment can be 
particularly high.341 At least there is now consideration of water related impacts in closure 
liability estimation. This is welcome since the guideline document for the evaluation of the 
quantum of closure-related financial provision provided by a mine was inadequate as it has 
not been updated for at least 11 years and there was limited consideration of water related 
impacts in closure liability estimation.342  
It is important to note that the financial provision is now to be determined through a detailed 
itemisation of all activities and costs, calculated according to the actual costs of 
implementation of the measures required for closure and rehabilitation of the mine as well as 
post closure environmental management.343 In this regard Regulation 6 provides that,  
An applicant must determine the financial provision through a detailed itemisation of all 
activities and costs, calculated based on the actual costs of implementation of the measures 
required for— 
(a) annual rehabilitation, as reflected in an annual rehabilitation plan; 
(b) final rehabilitation, decommissioning and closure of the prospecting, exploration, 
mining or production operations at the end of the life of operations, as reflected in a 
final rehabilitation, decommissioning and mine closure plan; and 
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(c) remediation of latent or residual environmental impacts which may become known in 
the future, including the pumping and treatment of polluted or extraneous water, as 
reflected in an environmental risk assessment report. 
The inclusion of the financial provision for annual rehabilitation helps if the mine is to close 
prematurely as there will be enough money to fund rehabilitation as well as remediation of 
the environmental degradation. Regulation 7 commendable though onerous in that it provides 
for the availability of the financial provision which the mining company must ensure is 
always, ‘at any given time equal to the sum of the actual costs of implementing closure, 
rehabilitation as well as remediation of the mine’.344 Another notable regulation is regulation 
9 which provides that, ‘the determination, review and assessment of the financial provision 
must be undertaken by a specialist or specialists’.345 This regulation should be read with 
regulation 11 which provide for the review, assessment and adjustment of financial provision 
by the mining company. On the other hand, regulation 11 (3) provides that, ‘The results of 
the assessment of the adequacy of the financial provision including proof of payment or 
arrangements to provide for any adjustments to the financial provision, must be audited by an 
independent auditor’.346 
Regulation 11(1) provides that; ‘The holder of a right or permit must ensure that a review is 
undertaken of the requirements for (a) annual rehabilitation, as reflected in an annual 
rehabilitation plan, and (e) remediation of latent or residual environmental impacts which 
may become known in the future, including the pumping and treatment of polluted or 
extraneous water, as reflected in an environmental risk assessment report’.347 This encourages 
concurrent rehabilitation which greatly reduces the costs the government will have to incur in 
even of mine site abandonment.  
3.6 Payment Method of the Financial Provision 
3.6.1 The choice of financial provision instrument 
Financial provision instruments may be chosen from a number of options. Different 
instruments may be appropriate depending on the financial strength of the mining company, 
the amount of the potential environmental liability, the time frame over which the liability is 
to be extinguished and so on.348 It is submitted that the financial provision instrument used 
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should meet two tests: (a) it should be effective in assuring the government that the operator 
can take all necessary and reasonable measures to protect the environment (or that another 
party is enabled to do so if the operator fails) and (b) it should be the least costly of all the 
effective instruments available.349 The NEMA regulations essentially provides for three 
different formats in terms of which the financial provision may be made, either one or a 
combination of: a cash deposit, bank guarantee, or trust fund.350 Regulation 8 provides that,  
(1) An applicant or holder of a right or permit must make financial provision by one or a 
combination of a— 
(a) financial guarantee from a bank registered in terms of the Banks Act, 1990 (Act No. 94 
of 1990) or from a financial institution registered by the Financial Services Board as an 
insurer or underwriter; 
(b) deposit into an account administered by the Minister responsible for mineral resources; 
or 
(c) contribution to a trust fund established in terms of applicable legislation.351 
It can be argued that the choices open to mining companies in South Africa for making 
financial provisions introduce flexibility, which offers mining entities choices among 
financial service providers that would in all probability provide for more cost effectiveness in 
making the financial provision.352 The risk of default is spread and diversified among more 
entities, thereby lowering the risks of default.353 This raises a question on how should 
financial surety instruments be established to ensure they are used for their intended purpose? 
Van Zyl et al however note that the main disadvantage of the flexibility is that alternatives 
can introduce a degree of financial complexity that may not be commensurate with the level 
of financial expertise or capacity at the DMR, which is of major concern.354 It is against this 
background that the World Bank notes that;  
The Success of any financial surety instrument depends on the care and effort put into setting it 
up and managing it. Most will work if they are done properly. Financial failure of the mining 
company and organisations involved in the financial guarantee resulting in a failure to provide 
funding for mine closure can be mitigated by: 
(a) Establishing non-accounting provisions monitoring financial performance; 
(b) Separating the financial structure for the closure fund from that of the company; 
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(c) Allowing only investments of closure funds in financial instruments providing ‘assured’ 
future payment; 
(d) Spreading the risk to a combination of financial vehicles to jointly secure closure 
funds.355 
Although the need for financial provision is clear, there is a challenge in choosing the best 
form of financial instrument to be used as a vehicle for financial provision. The financial 
instruments to be used by mining companies should be realistic, flexible and sufficient to 
address mine rehabilitation yet not so burdensome as to push companies into bankruptcy or 
deter them from commencing operations by unduly depressing capital availability or damage 
the investment climate.356  This entails agreeing on the appropriate financial instruments. 
3.6.1.1 Cash deposit 
A deposit can be made for a financial surety as cash. The cash option of placing an amount of 
cash on deposit into an account specified by the Minister is the least used instrument due to 
the constraints it places on the working capital requirements of the mining entity. Significant 
capital is tied up for the duration of the mine’s life, especially for large mining projects, and 
the government may be tempted to use the deposited cash for purposes other than securing 
the mining project.357 It does, however, present a low risk subject to the proviso that the 
quantum of such cash is sufficient to undertake the requisite remedial work and is ring-fenced 
from other creditors in the event the mining company becomes insolvent. The advantages of a 
cash deposit are that cash is readily available for mine closure and site rehabilitation and it 
helps public acceptance due to the visibility of the guarantee.358 
3.6.1.2 Bank guarantee 
This can be defined as an agreement between a banking institution and a mining company 
whereby the bank will provide funds to a third party (the beneficiary, which in this case 
would be the government), under specific terms contained in the letter of credit.359 This 
guarantee is unconditional, irrevocable and must be paid on demand. Therefore, the issuing 
bank must honour all legitimate claims i.e. those in compliance with the terms of the letter of 
credit presented by the beneficiary.360 Any changes to the letter of credit require the consent 
of all parties involved. Since rehabilitation funding is a long-term commitment, the normal 
practice is to issue a letter of credit in the amount of the estimated cost of rehabilitation, with 
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a one year term which is then automatically extended each year, based on an annual financial 
review of the company by the bank.361 The advantages of a bank guarantee are that the costs 
associated with opening a letter of credit are expensed as a tax deductible item, it is usually 
cheap to set up as such  and some mines to turn to bank guarantees for financial provision 
because of the smaller degree of responsibility required, no capital is tied-up. 
The disadvantage of using the guarantee mechanism is the cost involved to the mining entity; 
as such guarantees are typically renewable annually and attract a fee calculated as a 
percentage of the guaranteed amount.362 As a result, mines that claim to use bank guarantees 
for financial provision for closure may avoid the cash flow issues that a trust fund presents 
but there is  an incentive to understate the size of the rehabilitation cost as the guarantee 
incurs a fee based on the size of the provision.363 Also the availability of a bank guarantee 
may be restricted by a company's credit.364 
Van Zyl et al submit that the Minister should only accept a bank guarantee after identifying 
the creditworthiness of the banking institution or guarantor.365 This is so because the banking 
institution may become insolvent or be placed under a business rescue. The other issue with a 
bank guarantee is that it relies on the closure cost estimate made by the mine. Thus, it can be 
submitted that given the high likelihood that the cost estimated by the mine will not be 
correct at closure, the bank guarantee will not be adequate if it is based on the mine’s original 
estimate. There will therefore be a larger than anticipated liability on the part of the bank at 
the time of the mine’s closure.366 
3.6.1.3 Trust fund 
A trust fund is a fund set up by a mining company for an amount that is determined to be 
sufficient to cover specific costs of closure and rehabilitation which are contained in the 
closure plan.367 Trust funds are preferred to bank guarantees for a number of reasons such as 
the fact that they allow the mine to make financial provision on its own accord.368 A trust 
fund is set up independently of other liabilities of the mining company so that debtors do not 
have a claim against the trust fund in the event of insolvency. Trust funds are also regarded as 
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the most desirable type of financial instrument from the point of view of regulators and 
society because they force the mine to assume responsibility for funding its rehabilitation at 
closure.369  
In order to improve the efficacy of a trust fund there is a need to ensure that the trustees who 
have been made responsible for the trusts funds become personally liable themselves if 
adequate provisions are not met. Improved and greater provision for liability of trustees needs 
to be aligned with section 34 of NEMA, section 43 of the MPRDA as well as section 77 of 
the Companies Act and section 9 of the Trust Property Control Act. In addition, trustees 
should become personally liable if the provisions of the trust deed are not complied with. 
The size of the trust fund at closure will only be adequate if the closure cost estimation is 
correct. The accuracy of current closure cost estimates is questionable. This needs to be 
addressed by assessing the quantum for financial provision on a regular basis so that the size 
of the trust fund contributions increases as the rehabilitation costs of closure increase. The 
fund must be structured in such a way as to give the government "reasonable assurance" that 
sufficient funds will be available to meet expected reclamation costs.370 
3.7 Conclusion 
As alluded to above, before the implementation of the OES, the MPRDA was the primary 
legislation governing the environmental regulation of mining, and provided the most specific 
provisions on financial provision for rehabilitation of mining areas. However, this has since 
changed, and NEMA is currently the primary legislation regulating the environmental 
regulation of mining especially the financial provision for closure and closure of the mine.371 
It is argued that the promulgation of the Financial Regulations in terms of NEMA is in line 
with a move towards 'One Environmental System', and the transfer of all environmental 
governance law out of the domain of the MPRDA. The Regulations now provide more 
certainty on how to calculate the financial provision required of all mining and prospecting 
rights. It is submitted that the required financial provision will necessarily increase in light of 
the requirement of a very detailed itemisation of the cost of carrying out all planned 
rehabilitation and remediation, the annual rehabilitation requirements, that sufficient funds 
must be in place to cover the implementation of plans for 10 years and the express 
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requirement for post-closure provision for the treatment and pumping of polluted or 
extraneous water. The same will also apply for the existing provision because such provision 
must also be reviewed and re-assessed in order to ensure that it complies with the 
Regulations. Financial provision will also have to be re-assessed annually, and may therefore 
increase annually. 
The NEMA Financial Regulations requires that a final rehabilitation, decommission and mine 
closure plan is developed which includes the determination of financial provision to 
guarantee the availability of sufficient funds to undertake rehabilitation and remediation of 
the adverse environmental impacts of mining. The new regulations are far more stringent in 
terms of the financial provisions required for rehabilitation and the financial vehicles allowed 
to provide for the rehabilitation liabilities. It is important to note that the financial provision 
now expressly extends to the ongoing post-decommissioning management of negative 
environmental impacts in addition to rehabilitation and closure.372 The fact that a mine’s date 
of closure is often only in a decade or longer means that correctly estimating costs now can 
be incredibly difficult, even with the most effective systems in place.  
Thus, the adequacy of the financial provision at closure ultimately depends on the accuracy 
of the closure cost estimate, irrespective of how the provision has been made. It is therefore 
important that mines first correctly estimate the cost of closure. In light of the above 
background a concerted effort needs to be made to regularly assess whether the financial 
provision made is accurate. The first step in the process through which financial provision is 
made is the accurate estimation of the amount of money necessary to undertake the required 
environmental rehabilitation and mine closure. The manner in which the amount is 
determined is therefore critical to the overall success of the financial provisions system. 
A key requirement of NEMA is for mining companies to make an accurate determination of 
the quantum required for the rehabilitation or management of impacts, and to make sufficient 
financial provision for these in event that they default on their obligations of repairing the 
environment. By requiring that mining companies make financial provisions for closure and 
rehabilitation of mines is effectively giving effect to section 24 of the constitution. At least 
there will be some guarantee that the environment will be protected for the future generations 
as well. The legislation requires sufficient funds to be provided to achieve closure and to 
provide for any latent impacts.  The main challenges are therefore to determine the extent of 
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liability, predict the latent and residual impacts and calculate the amount required.373 In 
regards to the funding of residual and latent environmental effects, there is no prescription 
about how the Minister should calculate the amount of the financial provision to be kept in 
order to cover the future costs of latent or residual environmental impacts, apart from the 
environmental risk report submitted by the holder. While residual impacts can be planned for 
in the environmental risk report, latent impacts can clearly not be accurately forecast, and it is 
therefore unclear exactly how the Minister calculates how much of the financial provision to 
retain in order to make provision for this eventuality.374 
One of the shortfalls of the NEMA financial provisions regulations is that they do not make 
reference to the Guidelines Document nor do they specify that the Guidelines Document 
should be reviewed and updated, and the first document released by the Department has also 
been the last. Therefore, the quantum calculations remain at 2005 levels, without provision 
being made for inflation, and although some of the major mines have built inflation into their 
calculations, many others have not.375 This creates the possibility that the government could 
have to bear the financial responsibility of rehabilitating mines where operations are closed 
and the companies are unable to raise enough capital to carry out the rehabilitation 
themselves.376 Van Zyl et al reported relatively high levels of variability with regard to the 
perceived adequacy of financial provisions.377 The authors note that uncertainty with regard 
to the adequacy of financial provisions appears to be highest in relation to providing for 
adequate post-closure water treatment.378 The costs associated with treatment can be 
particularly high and combined with uncertainty about what is strictly required can lead to 
mines effectively trying to downplay or even ignore unacceptable risks.379  
The new regulations take a much broader view of the lifecycle of the mine, including annual 
rehabilitation, rehabilitation at closure at the end of life of mine, and rehabilitation of latent or 
residual impacts that may arise long after mining has ended. The regulations are more 
specific about the accurate calculation of financial provision, and importantly now require 
mines at any time to have funds available to pay for rehabilitation costs within a 10-year 
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timeframe (mining companies traditionally hold far less funds in trust for rehabilitation). The 
regulations also require involvement of more independent specialists, regular review and 
audits, and publication of financial provision and audits on mining companies’ websites. 
Financial provision must also be signed off by the Chief Executive Officer of the mining 
company to ensure accountability at the highest level. The use of an independent auditor is 
also appropriate as it gives assurance as to the adequacy and compliance of a particular 
financial provision. The review by an independent auditor could also serve as an opportunity 
for capacity building and learning since the DMR officials may learn from the auditor’s 
skills.380 This also helps in adjusting the financial provision to be in line with the escalating 
costs and inflation. In essence, ‘the system is now geared towards guaranteeing that adequate 
funds are available for planned or premature closure at all times and in all possible 
circumstances’.381 
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4. Mine Closure Planning Provisions from other Jurisdictions 
4.1 Introduction  
The prevalent negative legacy of abandoned, derelict and ownerless mining sites around the 
world has compelled governments of major mining jurisdictions to strengthen their 
requirements for financial security to guarantee rehabilitation upon mine closure. It is beyond 
doubt that, ‘in the past, mining companies used irresponsible mining methods with no regard 
towards protecting the environment and had often shirked their responsibility towards 
environmental rehabilitation by leaving an area unrehabilitated’.382 Mining activities that 
have left negative environmental legacies, ‘are now unacceptable, and require improved 
mining legislation and control to ensure mine site closure is completed successfully, in a 
sustainable manner’.383 Governments of traditional mining jurisdictions around the world 
have progressively enacted legislation, regulations, adopted policies and guideline documents 
that oblige mining companies to provide financial security to guarantee the costs of mine 
closure and site rehabilitation when mining operations cease.384  It is now an increasingly 
accepted practice that when mining activities cease for whatever reason the mining company 
will be responsible for carrying out the rehabilitation of that mining site before they leave.385  
 
The first part of this chapter will examine the different types of financial security mechanisms 
that are in place in different mining jurisdictions, for mine closure and rehabilitation. There is 
a need to examine ways in which the South African mine closure provisions could be 
improved along with a range of other measures to deal with the ever-present environmental 
risk due to mine site abandonment. The second part of the chapter will assess other traditional 
mining jurisdictions’ on-going innovation in mine closure and rehabilitation. The aim is to 
determine what legislation, regulations, policies, financial securities and guideline documents 
exists for managing mine site closure. This will help in assessing whether the existing South 
African legislative provisions for securing mine closure and site rehabilitation obligations are 
sufficient and efficient. 
Two traditional mining jurisdictions namely Australia and Canada were selected for 
comparative analysis based on having different levels of experience with mining legacy 
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issues, and the on-going and anticipated future development in mine closure provisions. The 
selected mining jurisdictions are comparatively advanced in mining regulation practice, as 
they have been engaging in mining activities for a long time. This chapter does not 
comprehensively discuss their entire mining laws, as that would be beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. Rather, its focus is on the laws relating to mine closure, specifically the financial 
security provisions in major mining jurisdictions. 
4.2 Financial Security Mechanisms for Mine Closure386  
The governments in major mining jurisdictions have recently recognised the need for 
guaranteeing that the taxpayers are not left with the financial responsibility of mine closure, 
environmental clean-up and rehabilitation of mining sites, as has often been the case in the 
past. Thus, governments now require financial security to guarantee the costs of preventing or 
repairing environmental damage when mining operations cease, which are to be lodged by 
the prospective mining company before the beginning of mining activities.387 Miller describes 
financial security instruments as, ‘guarantees issued by a bonding company, an insurance 
company, a bank, or another financial institution which agrees to hold itself liable for the acts 
or failures of a third party’.388 The main objective of the financial securities is ‘to ensure that 
sufficient funds are available to government to rehabilitate mine sites in the event of 
operators not fulfilling their mine rehabilitation and closure obligations’.389;390 The financial 
security mechanisms are crucial in ensuring that mine closure and site rehabilitation is 
completed in accordance with state requirements without the use of taxpayers’ money.391  
It is important to note that laws, policies and regulations may require mine closure and 
rehabilitation, but in the end it is the financial security mechanisms that guarantee the 
completion of rehabilitation activities.392 Government departments should therefore ensure 
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that there is an appropriate mechanism in place that will guarantee that funds are readily 
available to complete mine closure and site rehabilitation in the event that a mining company 
becomes unwilling or unable to complete the required rehabilitation activities.393 Financial 
security mechanisms can be used to guarantee both ongoing environmental performance 
during a mining operation’s lifetime and to guarantee environmental performance after 
closure. However,  
‘the most common use of financial security mechanisms is to guarantee environmental 
performance after closure through the funding of mine site rehabilitation. This is essentially 
equivalent to guaranteeing that the site will be stabilised and all necessary rehabilitation carried 
out so that ongoing environmental problems are avoided’.394  
It is therefore beyond doubt that the ‘responsible management of the rehabilitation and 
closure mine sites and the affected environs requires an effective regulatory, policy, and 
financial securities framework in place’.395 The financial security mechanism must therefore 
be robust, up to date, and legally sound to protect the taxpayers.  
4.3 Types of Financial Security Mechanisms  
It is trite that there are several financial security mechanisms available and the choice is 
dependent on the financial strength of the mining company, the amount of surety required 
and the timeframe over which the fund will need to be in place.396 This section discusses the 
most frequently used types of surety instruments for guaranteeing mine closure and 
rehabilitation. The most common form of financial security mechanism currently in use in 
different mining jurisdictions is the letter of credit even though surety bonds, trusts funds and 
cash may be also an option. Due to the limited scope of this dissertation only selected 
financial security mechanisms which are frequently used will be reviewed. 
4.3.1 Letter of Credit 
A letter of credit ‘is an unconditional agreement between a banking institution and a mining 
company whereby the bank will provide funds to a third party, under specific terms contained 
in the letter of credit.’397 The third party in this case would be the relevant government 
department. A letter of redit is also known as a Bank Guarantee and is irrevocable. It includes 
the terms and conditions of the agreement between the mining company and the government, 
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regarding the rehabilitation program and the agreed costs. Any changes to the letter of credit 
require the consent of all parties involved.398 Since rehabilitation funding is a long-term 
commitment, ‘the normal practice is to issue a letter of credit in the amount of the estimated 
cost of rehabilitation, with a one year term which is then automatically extended each year, 
based on an annual financial review of the company by the bank’.399 The government will 
usually specify from which banks it will accept a letter of credit. 
4.3.2 Performance Bonds/ Surety Bonds 
A performance bond is ‘an agreement between an insurance company and a mining company 
in order to provide funds to a third party under certain circumstances’.400 In this instance, the 
third party is the relevant government department. A performance bond will include the terms 
and conditions of the agreement between the mining company and the government, regarding 
the rehabilitation program, the agreed costs and the conditions for the release of the bond.401 
Under the performance bond agreement,  
the insurer agrees to act as surety for the company and makes a commitment to be financially 
responsible for all claims and expenses arising out of the decommissioning plan up to a certain 
limit. The government is the beneficiary under the bond and any changes to the bond would 
have to be agreed to by all three parties to the transaction.402  
The operation of a performance bond is similar to that of a letter of credit. The performance 
bond is issued for a specific time period at the face amount of the cost of carrying out the 
rehabilitation work under the mine closure plan and is renewed for a further time period 
based on a credit review of the company.403 If the performance bond is not renewed, then the 
government has the option of drawing the full amount.  
4.3.3 Trust Fund 
A trust fund ‘is an agreement between a trust company and the mining company for the sole 
purpose of funding the rehabilitation of a mine site’.404 In addition to a trust fund, ‘there 
should be a signed agreement between the mining company and the government, 
administered by the trust company that stipulates the mining company’s responsibility with 
regard to the trust. This agreement should specify that a trust fund is to provide security for 
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the rehabilitation costs for a particular site, the total amount required and an outline schedule 
of payments’.405 Trust fund contributions are typically a series of payments scheduled over a 
specific time period and are typically called an incrementally funded trust fund. A percentage 
of the total may be required as an initial deposit to lower the risk of insufficient funds if the 
project is abandoned before adequate payments are made.406 
4.3.4 Cash/ Bank Draft  
A deposit can be made for a financial surety as cash or a bank draft. The funds should be 
placed in a special purpose account under the management of the financial institution with the 
government and company holding joint signatory powers.407 Alternatively, the cash can be 
used to purchase a certificate of deposit that can be pledged to the relevant government 
agency.408 Most commercial banks would charge nominal fees for setting up such accounts 
and the money would attract interest that would accrue to the fund. 
 
4.3.5 Company Guarantee / Corporate Financial Test 
A company guarantee ‘is based on an evaluation of the assets and liabilities of the company 
and its ability to pay the total rehabilitation costs’.409 A company guarantee requires ‘a long 
history of financial stability, a credit rating from a specialized credit rating service and at 
least an annual financial statement prepared by an accredited accounting firm’.410 A company 
guarantee that may also be called a Corporate Financial Test, a Balance Sheet Test or a Self-
Guarantee.411   
 
4.4 Mine closure and Site Rehabilitation Provisions from Other Jurisdictions 
It is beyond doubt that almost every country that has been involved in major mining activities 
has been burdened with a legacy of abandoned, derelict and ownerless hazardous mine sites,  
which have occurred as a result of inefficient or non-existent mining legislation which has 
failed to prevent or minimise the possible long term environmental impacts of mining 
operations. These mining sites that have not been rehabilitated to standards that would be 
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considered appropriate or acceptable in the mining industry’s current context, are a direct result 
of such insufficient mine regulations and specific mine closure best practice standards.412  
It is to avoid such challenges in the future that government agencies in several jurisdictions 
have adopted legislation and policies that require mining companies to provide environmental 
financial security to guarantee the costs of preventing or repairing environmental damage at 
the end of a mine’s life.413 
4.4.3 Australia414 
The ability of the Australian mining industry to recognise and establish improved mine 
closure practices and mining regulations is the fundamental reason why it was selected as a 
comparative jurisdiction for this dissertation.415 A key factor of the Australian mining 
industry has been the systematic development of a legal framework that aims to protect the 
environment, the mining company, the government, the taxpayer and secure their interests.416 
Australia, like South Africa, has been burdened with a legacy of unrehabilitated abandoned, 
derelict and ownerless mining sites.417 Past mine closure practices, 
which have often resulted in abandoned unrehabilitated mines, were a result of inefficient 
mining legislation and control. Until recently, mine site closure was not a requirement of mine 
closure practices and procedures, since the Australian states had either ineffective or non-
existent mine site closure provisions.418  
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It is important to note that,  
the Australian mining industry has identified the importance of improved legislative control in 
the development of a sustainable mining industry. Issues related to mine closure and site 
rehabilitation are now identified as an important consideration in the assessment process for 
mining proposals in Australia.419  
The management of the mining cycle especially with respect to mine closure and legacy 
issues in Australia is now an important component of the regulatory system.420 As a result, 
the states have developed comprehensive regulatory schemes to ensure the costs of 
rehabilitation are met by mining companies. This is not to say that ‘the current legislative 
control of mining operations within Australia does not contain deficiencies and 
inconsistencies.’421  
This section seeks to provide an overview of key legal features of one of Australia’s state’s 
mine closure provisions and aims to demonstrate the advantages of such a system. It is 
important to note that the individual states and territories of Australia have the power to 
regulate the mining activities that take place within their borders, including enactment of 
individual legislation, regulations and guidance.422 While there are obviously differences 
between each state’s mining laws, there are several common features between each of the 
regimes’ mine site closure provisions. All states and territories have mine closure policies 
which require mining companies to develop site specific post mining rehabilitation plans for 
approval by the relevant organisation as part of the development assessment process.423 It is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation to provide an account of each jurisdiction’s mine closure 
provisions here, thus only the mine closure provisions of Western Australia are discussed 
below. The emphasis is on examining and explaining the policy and regulatory provisions 
within the Western Australia mining industry. Underpinning this section is the assumption 
that recent regulatory developments for mine closure and site rehabilitation in Western 
Australia may be of value for adaption and application in South Africa.424  
 




422 Gorey (see note 243 above). 
423 Chilean Copper Commission ‘Research on mine closure policy’ (2002) Paper 44 Mining for the Future, 




4.4.4 Western Australia425 
Even though mining activities have been taking place in Western Australia since the 1880s, 
the consistent application of mining securities in Western Australia did not commence until 
the late 1980s.426  A negative result of this is that there was, and is, a legacy of more than 
17,000 abandoned mine sites, which are a result of more than a century of mining prior to the 
introduction of appropriate legislation and regulation.427 It is against this background that the 
Western Australian government has prioritised reforms which are specifically targeted to 
ensure that these environmental risks are adequately managed and mitigated. In addition to 
comprehensive and clear legislation, the policies and guidelines for mine closure and site 
rehabilitation re comprehensive and up-to-date. What remains to be seen however, is whether 
the initiatives have strengthened the regulatory framework for addressing potential long term 
environmental risks posed by mining activity.  
It is important to note that, ‘mining activities in Western Australia are regulated under a 
number of different pieces of environmental legislation in addition to the provisions of the 
Mining Act,428 including the Environmental Protection Act,429 the Conservation and Land 
Management Act 1984,430 and the Contaminated Sites Act’.431 Morrison- Saunders opined 
that,  
while these legislations, regulations and policies can assist in the enforcement matters of 
pollution, environmental harm, the mining securities system is a key mechanism by which the 
government can be guaranteed access to funds to complete rehabilitation works rather than 
through protracted court action (which may be an issue with some of the other legal 
mechanisms).432  
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4.4.5 Types of Financial Security Mechanisms Used in Western Australia 
4.4.5.1 Performance Bond System 
Prior to 2013, the Western Australian government used a bank-guaranteed unconditional 
performance bond as a financial security mechanism to guarantee mine site closure and 
rehabilitation.433 The Western Australian Department of Mines and Petroleum (hereafter 
DMP) defines an Unconditional Performance Bond as,  
a contract between the Minister for Mines and Petroleum and a third party of a financial 
standing that is acceptable to the Minister, providing the third party to unconditionally pay an 
agreed sum to the Minister upon his request following the failure of the tenement holder to 
meet with the environmental conditions imposed on a mining tenement.434  
 Although the unconditional bonds did not reflect the estimated cost of rehabilitation,  
the size of the bond was expected in principle to be based on the amount it would cost for the 
government to rehabilitate the mine site and would be reviewed periodically, taking into 
account the amount of work required in the next phase of mining and rehabilitation already 
undertaken.435  
Under the performance bond system, all mining companies were required to provide 
unconditional bonds as security to ensure that they fulfilled their environmental obligations of 
rehabilitating mine land.  
Section 26 (a) of the Mining Act provides that, ‘any person carrying out mining operations on 
the land shall make good injury to the surface of the land or injury to anything on the surface 
thereof’.436 Furthermore, section 26 (d) provides that, ‘the person carrying out such mining 
operations shall lodge with the Minister, within such period as the Minister specifies in 
writing, a security to cover the probable cost of the work’.437  Section 60 requires, ‘an 
applicant for an exploration licence to lodge a security for compliance with the conditions to 
which the exploration licence will be subject’438 and section 126 (c) established that such 
securities could be ‘bonds for an amount as approved by the Mining Minister’.439  
It is important to note that no mining operation could commence or expand until the 
government agencies held a satisfactory unconditional bond. In the event of mine 
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abandonment or other failure by a mining company to manage their mine-site in accordance 
with conditions established under the Mining Act, the Western Australian government could 
in principle take possession of the bond and assume responsibility for rehabilitation works.440 
The final stage of bond retirement and mine site relinquishment would occur when it could be 
satisfactorily demonstrated that the rehabilitated area was safe and stable, where erosion is 
comparable to the natural landscape and biological systems are sustainable under a range of 
seasonal conditions representative of the local climate.441  
The reform of the performance bond system was necessitated by a number of factors, chief 
amongst them being that, ‘the level of security provided by the unconditional bonds did not 
keep pace with the increasing costs and standards of rehabilitation’.442 Their value was 
insufficient to cover appropriate mine closure activities and environmental remediation in the 
case of a default by a mining company.443 Thus, it is argued that the unconditional 
performance bond was significantly less than the potential environmental clean-up, mine 
closure and site rehabilitation costs. It was estimated that, ‘the unconditional bonds 
represented approximately 80 per cent of the total cost of rehabilitation and by 2008, this had 
dropped to around 25 per cent.’444 In support of the estimation Fulcher and Franz also noted 
that the bonds could ‘cover only 25-30 percent of Western Australia's contingent liability, 
thereby making government and wider community vulnerable in the event of unplanned mine 
abandonment’.445 It is against this background that it was reported that, ‘the bonds system 
does not cover the true cost of rehabilitating abandoned mines.’446 The DMP further noted 
that,  
                                                          
440 The Mining Rehabilitation Fund–The First Two Years’ (see note 29 above). 
441 Department of Industry & Resources ‘Environmental Branch Bond Guideline – Environmental Performance 
Bonds’ (2007) available at www.doir.wa.gov.au (accessed on 3 January 2015). 
442 The Mining Rehabilitation Fund–The First Two Years’ (see note 29 above).  
443 Gorey et al.  (see note  243 above).  
444 Western Australia - Department of Mines and Petroleum, ‘Mining Rehabilitation Fund – Guidance’ (2015), 
available at http://www.dmp.wa.gov.au/Documents/Environment/ENV-MEB-382.pdf (accessed on 05 January 
2016). Department of Mines and Petroleum and Environmental Protection Authority ’Guidelines for Preparing 
Mine Closure Plans’(2011)available at http://edit.epa.wa.gov.au/EPADocLib/Guidelines-for-preparing-
mineclosure-plans-210611.pdf (accessed on 7 May 2016).In  a 2011 policy paper, ‘the State estimated that 
bonds secured less than 25 per cent of the total potential rehabilitation liability for mines in Western Australia’. 
445 J Fulcher and M Fanz ’ Western Australian Tenement Holders Liable for Mining Rehabilitation Fund Levy’ 
(2013) 
available at  http://www.findlaw.com.au/articles/5045/resources-andenergy-alert-western-australian-tene.asp 
(accessed on 19 August 2013). 




Bonds discourage investment by tying up significant funds that could be used for developing a 
mining project and also have to be applied to the specific mine for which the security is held, 
they cannot be used to address the problem of legacy abandoned mines.447  
The above weaknesses necessitated a change of the performance bond system and it resulted 
in the evolution of the mining rehabilitation fund approach since, ‘increasing bonds to cover 
the full rehabilitation costs would impose a significant financial impact upon the mining 
industry’.448 The Western Australian government had to consider other alternative models 
that have the potential to provide a similar level of financial security to the government at a 
lower cost to industry.449 
4.4.5.2 Mining Rehabilitation Fund Act 2012 
The continual underestimations in financial provisioning and the inadequacy of the bond 
system meant a high probability of continual abandonment of mining sites.450 To address this 
challenge, government implemented the Mining Rehabilitation Fund Act451 (hereafter MRF) 
which aims to be an antidote to the above challenges. On 1 July 2013, Western Australia 
introduced a new form of mining security to replace a system of unconditional performance 
bonds, which were not considered to be providing an adequate level of surety to government 
in the event of a mine being abandoned prior to rehabilitation. The MRF is unique to Western 
Australia, and possibly the world for this type of application to the mining sector. In terms of 
section 6 of the MRF, ‘the main purpose of the Fund is to provide a source of funding for the 
rehabilitation of abandoned mine sites and other land affected by mining operations carried 
out in, on or under those sites’.452  
The Mining Rehabilitation Fund Regulations453 in terms of section 4, establishes a one per 
cent contribution levy based on the rehabilitation liability estimate per tenement to be paid 
annually into the fund.454 This is so because section 13 of the MRF provides that, ‘the amount 
                                                          
447Department of Mines and Petroleum   ‘Mining Rehabilitation Fund Fact Sheet’ (2013), available at 
http://www.dmp.wa.gov.au/documents/ Mining_Rehabilitation_Fund_ Fact_Sheet.pdf (accessed on 25 June 
2013).  
448 Ibid. 
449 Morrison- Saunders and Pope (see note 426 above).  
450 D Janse van Rensburg ‘Investigating Western Australia's Rehabilitation Fund as a Fiscal Policy Solution for 
South African Abandoned Mines’ (Unpublished Thesis, North-West University 2015). 
451 Western Australia, Mining Rehabilitation Fund Act, 33 of 2012. 
452 Ibid Section 6.  
453 The Mining Rehabilitation Fund Regulations, 2013. 
454 Ibid section 4. Section 4 provides that; 
1) For the purposes of section 13 of the Act, the amount of levy payable in respect of a mining 
authorisation in a year is the amount worked out in accordance with the following formula — RLE × 
FCR where —   FCR is the fund contribution rate of 1%; and RLE is the rehabilitation 
liability estimate for the mining authorisation for the year worked out under sub regulation (2). 
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of levy payable is the amount that is specified in, or worked out in accordance with, the 
regulations’.455 It is important to note that the existence of the MRF does not alter the legal 
obligations of mining companies for the management of abandoned mine sites, nor does it 
demand that all abandoned sites will be rehabilitated with funds from the MRF as provided 
for by section 8 of the MRF Act.456 Only in the event of the mine undergoing premature mine 
closure and is unable to complete closure as planned due to lack of financing, will the capital 
held in the fund be accessed to assist in the rehabilitation of these abandoned sites.457 Section 
8 (1) (a) (i) - (ii) of the MRF Act establishes that the interest earned would be used to fund 
rehabilitation of legacy-abandoned mine sites pre-dating establishment of the fund while the 
capital only would be used to rehabilitate mine sites levied through the fund.458 Money 
standing to the credit of the Fund (whether or not it consists of or includes investment 
income), may be applied for these purposes to fund the rehabilitation of  (i) abandoned mine 
sites that are, or have been, the subject of mining authorisations in respect of which the levy 
is, or has been, payable; and (ii) any affected land relating to those sites’.459  
It is important to note that the interest from the investment of the MRF can be used to fund 
the rehabilitation of abandoned sites (legacy sites) unlike the performance bonds that were 
used solely to rehabilitate the site for which they were created.460 This enables legacy 
abandoned mine sites to be rehabilitated ‘whilst overcoming any perception a mining 
company might have that the fund would be a kind of tax or revenue earning mechanism for 
government’.461 As noted by the DMP, money in the fund will be used for rehabilitation 
‘where the operator fails to meet rehabilitation obligations and every other effort has been 
used to recover funds from the operator.’462 Thus, the MRF will only finance rehabilitation on 
those abandoned mine sites where reasonable compliance options have been explored and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2) For the purposes of sub regulation (1), the rehabilitation liability estimate for a mining authorisation for 
a year is the amount obtained by —  
 (a) for each rehabilitation liability category —  
i. working out the total area of land (expressed in hectares and rounded to at least 2 decimal 
places) in the area of the mining authorisation that was in that category on the assessment day 
in that year for the mining authorisation; and 
ii. multiplying the figure worked out under subparagraph (i) by the unit rate that applies to that 
category; and 
 (b) adding together all of the amounts worked out under paragraph (a). 
455 Section 13 of the MRF Act. 
456 Section 8 of the MRF Act. 
457 Section 9A of the MRF Act. 
458 Section 8 (1) (a) (i) - (ii) of the MRF Act 
459 Ibid. 
460 Ibid. 
461 Morrison- Saunders and Pope (see note 426 above). 
462 Mining Rehabilitation Fund Fact Sheet (see note 447 above). 
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another operator cannot be found to take over the liability.463 The MRF provides excellent 
backup financing if mining operations cease and the company is unable to cover the entirety 
of the rehabilitation costs, as well as providing financing for the persistent problems caused 
by abandoned mines.464  
4.5 Canada 
It is beyond doubt that mining activities have been one of the pillars of the Canadian 
economy for over a century. This long history of mining activities has resulted in the negative 
legacy of more than 10,000 abandoned, derelict and ownerless mining sites.465 The legacy of 
the abandoned mining sites which exists in all Canadian mining jurisdictions, with the 
associated environmental liability, and the financial costs of clean up, is a serious issue facing 
Canada.466 The Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development reported 
that: 
hundreds of thousands of tons of highly toxic chemicals such as arsenic and cyanide are found 
at northern abandoned mine sites. These chemicals, the result of past mining operations, have 
accumulated to hazardous levels. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada estimates that the clean-
up and closure of these complex contaminated sites will cost Canadian taxpayers at least $555 
million. In many cases, long-term site management will be needed because complete and 
definitive clean-up will not be possible.467 
The above environmental affairs are a result of a legacy of centuries old practices of 
inadequate, insufficient or non-existent mine closure policies and provisions.468 It is against 
this background that the Canadian Whitehorse Mining Initiative suggested that the mining 
industry should aim, ‘to ensure that comprehensive rehabilitation plans that return all mine 
sites to viable, and, wherever practicable, self-sustaining ecosystems are developed, and are 
adequately financed, implemented, and monitored in all jurisdictions’.469 
Just like South Africa, the approach to mine closure is that the mining company is responsible 
for rehabilitating a mine site in an environmentally responsible manner at its own cost. The 
Canadian government also subscribes to the principle of polluter pays as evidenced by its 
                                                          
463 Gorey et al. (note 390 above). 
464Ibid. 
465 Castrilli (note 123 above). 
466 Ibid. 
467 Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development Abandoned Mines in the North: Report to 
the House of Commons (2002) 3. 
468 WR Cowan, WO Mackasey and JGA Robertson ‘The Policy Framework in Canada for Mine Closure and 
Management of Long-Term Liabilities: A Guidance Document’ (2010) National Orphaned/Abandoned Mines 
Initiative (NOAMI – Canada), available at http://www.abandoned-
mines.org/pdfs/PolicyFrameworkCanforMinClosureandMgmtLiabilities.pdf (accessed 15 June 2015). 
469 Government of Canada ‘Whitehorse Mining Initiative’ Natural Resources Canada, available at 
http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/mining-materials/policy/government-canada/8698 (accessed on 05 January 2017). 
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signing of the Rio Declaration.470 Principle 16 of the declaration,-  which captures the 
principle of polluter pays - provides that,  
National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalisation of environmental costs and 
the use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in 
principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting 
international trade and investment.471  
Thus, the government has been taking measures to ensure that presently operating and new 
mines do not leave behind environmental problems whose clean-up will be paid for by 
Canadian taxpayers.472 Canada has instituted, 
a series of legislative initiatives designed to create procedural and enforcement mechanisms 
support of mine closure planning, implementation and subsequent outcomes across all 
provinces. In Canada, the government requires that companies secure the necessary funding by 
providing guarantees for mine-closure funds prior to mine construction and operation.473  
It is important to note that Canada like Australia uses the federal system, and under the 
Canadian federal system responsibility for mining falls within the exclusive domain of the 
provinces. 
4.5.1 Ontario Mine Closure Provisions 
This section provides Ontario’s legislative, regulatory and policy framework governing mine 
closure and rehabilitation. The section seeks to determine whether the legal and policy 
framework in relation to operating mines is adequate to address concerns that current mining 
activities do not add to the legacy of abandoned mines in future.474 475 This section details the 
                                                          
470 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992), UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I) / 31 ILM 874 
(1992), available at 
https://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/il/pdf/1992%20Rio%20Declaration%20on%20Environment%20and%20Development-
pdf.pdf (accessed on 05 January 2017). 
471 Ibid, Principle 16. 
472 Cowan et al. (see note 468  above). 
473 SM Zobaidul Kabir, F Rabbi and MB Chowdhury ‘Mine Closure Planning and Practice in Canada and 
Australia: A Comparative Review’ (2014) Proceedings of 11th Asian Business Research Conference 26-27 
December, 2014, BIAM Foundation, Dhaka, Bangladesh, available at 
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(accessed on 24 December 2016 ). 
474 According to a study conducted by Hamblin, ‘Ontario has about 6,000 abandoned, derelict and ownerless 
mining sites, many of which are in the public domain. These legacy mines contain approximately 18,500 
individual hazards. The study further states that the cost to rehabilitate all of the abandoned sites in Ontario has 
been estimated at approximately $300 million (CAN). The cost to rehabilitate the 30 – 40% of sites that have 
reverted to the Province has been pegged at approximately $120 million (CAN).  According to a 2004 report, 
mines abandoned by bankrupt operators represented 67 of the sites on the EPA ‘Superfund National Priorities 
List’ and it was estimated that the federal government would be responsible for bearing $2.4 billion of costs 
associated with their clean-up’. See CD Hamblin ‘Ontario Leads the Way in Abandoned Mines Rehabilitation’ 
(2003) In Proceedings of the Sudbury 2003: Mining and the Environment Conference, Sudbury, Ontario, May 
25 – 28, 2003. 
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mine closure provisions under Ontario’s Mining Act, specifically the relevant provisions 
regarding financial security mechanisms. This section seeks to examine the financial security 
mechanisms that are used in Ontario and the role they play in protecting the government, and 
likewise the taxpayers from being compelled to incur costs related to the closure and 
rehabilitation of mining sites. This involves asking how Ontario’s provincial government 
translated the polluter pays principle into a practical regulatory framework for the mining 
industry.476  
4.5.2 Ontario’s Financial Security Mechanisms 
A central element in Ontario’s mine closure and site rehabilitation regulation is that mining 
companies are required to provide some form of financial guarantee to the government to 
cover estimated mine closure costs.477 It is important to note that Ontario’s Mining Act478 
defines a closure plan as including financial security to the government for the performance 
of the plan’s requirements.479 This is so because financial security is the cornerstone of mine 
closure planning in Ontario and the rest of Canadian jurisdictions. In addition to ensuring that 
a closure plan accurately follows the requirements of the Mining Act, a mining company 
must ‘ensure that a closure plan specifies the form and amount of financial assurance to be 
provided by the prospective mining company in respect of the project.’480 The Mining Act 
and its Closure Regulations481 also set out the type of acceptable financial security 
mechanisms.  Section 145 (1) of the Mining Act details the specific forms of financial 
security mechanisms that may be accepted by the director and these are:  
1 Cash. Section (8) of the Mining Act provides that, ‘the amount of any cash provided 
as financial security shall be paid into a special purpose account’.482   
2 A letter of credit from a bank named in Schedule I to the Bank Act (Canada). 
3 A bond of a guarantee company approved under the Insurance Act to write surety and 
fidelity insurance. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
475 J Castrilli ‘Report on the Legislative, Regulatory, and Policy Framework Respecting Collaboration, Liability, 
and Funding Measures in relation to Orphaned/Abandoned, Contaminated, and Operating Mines in Canada’ 
(2007) 5.  
476 M Hawkins ‘Rest Assured? A Critical Assessment of Ontario’s Mine Closure Financial Assurance Scheme’ 
(2008) 26(4) Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 499-525. 
477 ibid 
478 Mining Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.14. 
479 Mining Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.14. 
480 Section 13 (1) of the Ontario Regulation 240/00 Mine Development and Closure Under Part VII of The 
Mining Act. 
481 Mining Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.14 and Ontario Mining Act Regulation 240/00 - Mine Development and 
Closure under Part Vii of the Act. 
482 Section (8) of the Mining Act. 
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4 A mining reclamation trust as defined in the Income Tax Act (Canada). 
5 Compliance with a corporate financial test in the prescribed manner.  
6 Any other form of security or any other guarantee or protection, including a pledge of 
assets, a sinking fund or royalties per tonne, that is acceptable to the Director.483 
In order to determine the financial guarantee amount, ‘a mining company is obligated to (a) 
engage certain qualified professionals in the course of preparing a closure plan; and (b) 
estimate the costs of complying with its obligations based on the market value cost of the 
goods and services required by the work’.484 The mining company must certify that, ‘the 
amount of financial assurance provided for in a closure plan is adequate and sufficient to 
cover the cost of rehabilitation work required in order to comply with the Mining Act and 
Closure Regulations’.485 If the mining company does not rehabilitate the mining site, the 
‘Crown may use any cash, realize any letter of credit or bond or enforce any other security, 
guarantee or protection provided or obtained as financial assurance for the performance of the 
rehabilitation measures and may carry out those measures, or appoint an agent to do so, as the 
Director considers necessary’.486 Any rehabilitation costs incurred by the director over and 
above the amount of any financial security provided will constitute a debt due to the director 
secured by a lien against the mine property in question.487 This lien may be registered by the 
                                                          
483 Section 145(1) of the Mining Act.  For an informative discussion of some technical distinctions between the 
varying types of assurance listed, see Miller (note 440 above) 48–56. 
484 Section 12 (2)(a) – (b) of the Ontario Mining Act Regulation 240/00 - Mine Development and Closure under 
Part VIIi of the Act provides that; A closure plan filed under Part VII shall contain the following certificate 
signed by the proponent where the proponent is an individual, or the chief financial officer and one other senior 
officer where the proponent is a corporation: I (We) hereby certify that, 
 (a) the attached closure plan complies in all respects with the Mining Act and this Regulation, including the 
Code; 
 (b) the proponent relied upon qualified professionals in the preparation of the closure plan, where required, 
under the Mining Act and this Regulation, including the Code; 
 (c) the cost estimates of the rehabilitation work described in the attached closure plan are based on the 
market value cost of the goods and services required by the work; 
 (d) the amount of financial assurance provided for in the attached closure plan is adequate and sufficient to 
cover the cost of the rehabilitation work required in order to comply with the Mining Act and this 
Regulation, including the Code; 
485 Section 12 (2) of the Ontario Mining Act Regulation 240/00 - Mine Development and Closure Under Part Vii 
of The Act.  
486 Section 145(5) of the Mining Act. 
487 Section 151(1) of the Mining Act which provides that; If the Crown or an agent of the Crown carries out 
rehabilitation measures under subsection 147 (2) or does any work under subsection 148 (5), the resulting cost 
to the Crown is a debt due to the Crown by the proponent that, 
 (a) forms a lien and a charge on the site in favour of the Crown, realizable by action for sale of any part or all 
of the land or lands subject to it, including any buildings, structures, machinery, chattels or personal 
property situate in, on, over or under the land or lands; and 
 (b) is recoverable by the Crown in any court in which a debt or money demand of a similar amount may be 
collected.   
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Crown in a land registry office, and will thereafter effectively encumber the mine property 
until the debt is paid and the lien discharged.488 Section 151 of the Mining Act provides a 
mechanism for the director to secure closure claims against a given proponent by way of a 
lien against a mine property.489 
 
It is important to note that Ontario’s Environmental Protection Act490 also applies to mining 
activities as it is the province's most comprehensive environmental law. The Act allows the 
government department to impose financial security obligations in three circumstances 
namely; 
a. to ensure performance specified in the legal instrument; 
b. to provide alternate water supplies if the director has reasonable and probable grounds 
to believe primary water supplies are likely to be contaminated; and lastly 
c. to provide appropriate measures to prevent adverse effects post closure.491  
To show the government commitment to ensuring the rehabilitation of the environment 
failure to provide financial security is the ground for refusal or termination of the approval. In 
this regard the Ontario’s Environmental Protection Act provides that,  
Failure to provide financial assurance specified in an approval or in accordance with a stage 
specified in an approval is grounds for revocation of the approval and for an order in writing by 
the Director prohibiting or restricting the carrying on, operation or use of the works in respect 
of which the financial assurance is required.492  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(2)  The cost to the Crown of carrying out the rehabilitation measures under clause 153.2 (4) (b) is a debt due to 
the Crown by the proponent recoverable by the Crown in any court in which a debt or money demand of 
a similar amount may be collected.   
(3)  If the Crown or an agent of the Crown carries out rehabilitation measures under subsection 145 (5) and the 
financial assurance held by the Crown is insufficient to cover the total cost incurred by the Crown in 
completing the rehabilitation measures, the extra cost not covered by the financial assurance is a debt due 
to the Crown by the proponent that, 
(a) forms a lien and a charge on the site in favour of the Crown realizable by action for sale of any part or all 
of the land or lands comprising the site subject to the lien, including any buildings, structures, machinery, 
chattels or personal property situate in, on, over or under the land or lands; and 
(b) is recoverable by the Crown in any court in which a debt or money demand of a similar amount may be 
collected.   
488 Ibid, ss 151(1)–(4). 
489 Ibid, s 151(1). 
490 Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.19. 
491 Ibid., ss. 132(1) (approval or order), 132(1.1) (certificate of property use). 
492 Ibid section 133(1). 
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The financial security provisions of the Ontario’s Environmental Protection Act493 also apply 
to the approvals issued under the Ontario Water Resources Act.494 It is important to note that 
The Mining Act,495 the Ontario’s Environmental Protection Act,496 and the Ontario Water 
Resources Act497 all contain authority to require different financial securities, and recover 
government costs. 
4.5.3 Corporate Financial Test 
The main reason for choosing Ontario as a comparative jurisdiction is to determine whether 
the decision of the Ontario provincial government to allow the self-assurance of closure 
obligations pursuant to paragraph five of section 145(1)(5) of the Mining Act,498 can be 
feasible in the South African context. A corporate financial test allows a company to self-
bond if they can pass certain financial tests that measure the financial strength of the 
company. Under section 16 of the Closure Regulation,499 a mining company that can comply 
with one of two corporate financial tests does not need to provide any other form of guarantee 
to the government department.500 Other criteria include having a minimum tangible net 
worth, minimum value of fixed assets in the particular jurisdiction, and require several years 
of annual financial statements audited by an accredited accounting firm.501  It is important to 
note that if the mining company fails the corporate financial test, is will be required to 
provide other means of financial security, if it  
                                                          
493 Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.19. 
494 Ontario Water Resources Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.40. 
495 Ontario - Mining Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.14. 
496 Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.19. 
497 Ontario Water Resources Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.40. 
498 Ontario - Mining Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.14. 
499 Ontario Mining Act Regulation 240/00 - Mine Development and Closure under Part VII of The Act. 
500 Section 16. (1) If a proponent’s credit rating meets or exceeds two of the following credit ratings from the 
stated credit rating services, the proponent complies with the corporate financial test for the entire life of the 
mine: 
2 A (low) from the Dominion Bond Rating Service Limited. 
3 A3 from Moody’s Investors Services Inc. 
4 A– from Standard and Poor’s Inc.  
(2) A proponent that provides financial assurance by complying with the test under subsection (1) shall, in the 
closure plan, 
a) name the rating services whose ratings are being relied upon; 
b) submit confirmation from those services of their credit ratings for the proponent; and 
c) identify the form and amount of financial assurance that the proponent will provide if the proponent 
ceases to comply with the test under subsection (1) or ceases production from the mine.  O. Reg. 
240/00, s. 16 (2). 
(4)  If, as a result of a downgrading under clause (3) (a), the proponent no longer complies with the corporate 
financial test under subsection (1), the proponent shall, within 30 days, provide the Director with financial 
assurance in the form and in the amount identified in accordance with clause (2) (c).   
501 Hawkins (see note  475  above).  
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fails to comply in the prescribed manner with a corporate financial test, the Director may require, 
in the prescribed manner, that the proponent forthwith provide cash, a letter of credit, a bond or 
other security, guarantee or protection acceptable to the Director or that the proponent make 
provision for a mining reclamation trust.502 
4.6 Conclusion 
It is beyond doubt that the prevalent negative legacy of abandoned, derelict and ownerless 
mining sites around the world has compelled governments of major mining jurisdictions to 
strengthen their requirements for financial security to guarantee mine closure and 
rehabilitation. Until recently, mine closure and site rehabilitation was not ‘a requirement or 
regulated within the mining industry and the environmental impacts even though identified 
were not considered within the initial mine site development’.503 Mining activities that have 
left negative environmental legacies, ‘are now unacceptable, and require improved mining 
legislation and control to ensure mine site closure is completed successfully, in a sustainable 
manner’.504 The question that remains to be answered is whether the new laws, regulations, 
policies and guideline are adequate and efficient to combat mine site abandonment.  
Governments have also recently recognised the importance of guaranteeing that the taxpayers 
are not left with the financial burden of environmental clean-up and rehabilitation of mining 
liabilities, as has often been the case in the past. Thus, governments now require a financial 
security to guarantee the costs of preventing or repairing environmental damage at the end of 
a mine’s life to be lodged by the prospective mining company prior to the commencement of 
mining activities.505 In theory, ‘such mining securities ensure sufficient funds are available to 
a government to rehabilitate mine sites in the event operators fail to meet their mine 
rehabilitation and closure obligations’.506 It is important to note that laws, policies and 
regulations may require mine closure and rehabilitation, but in the end it is the financial 
security mechanisms that guarantee the completion of rehabilitation activities.507 The 
government agencies should therefore ensure that there is an appropriate mechanism in place 
that will guarantee that funds are available to complete closure and rehabilitation activities in 
the event that a mining company becomes unwilling or unable to complete the required 
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rehabilitation activities.508 Financial security mechanisms are, ‘one of the regulatory 
mechanisms which provide confidence to both the government and the community that 
satisfactory rehabilitation and closure will be achieved. An important aspect of the mining 
industry’s continuing “social licence to operate” is that the government and the community 
are assured that satisfactory mine closure and site rehabilitation will be achieved.509 
The ability of the Australian mining industry to recognise and establish improved mine 
closure practices and mining regulations is the fundamental reason why it was selected as a 
comparative jurisdiction for this dissertation. The main reason for choosing Ontario as a 
comparative jurisdiction is to determine whether the decision of the Ontario provincial 
government to allow the self-assurance of closure obligations pursuant to paragraph five of 
section 145(1)(5) of the Mining Act,510 can be feasible in the South African context. It can be 
argued that the main reason for the mine closure provisions’ review in Western Australia was 
to specifically address the financial risk to the Western Australia’s government by ensuring 
that mining securities provide a high level of financial security that reflects the full cost of 
rehabilitation for mine sites operating under the Mining Act 1978. It was against this 
recognition that such a system, particularly if based on the previous system of bank 
guaranteed unconditional performance bonds, would have a significant financial impact on 
the industry. It is anticipated that ‘the fund will enhance the State's ongoing capacity to 
manage and rehabilitate abandoned mines, leading to better environmental and community 
safety outcomes’.511  
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5. A Comparative Discussion and Evaluation of the Financial Provisions for 
Closure and Rehabilitation of Mines in South Africa and Western Australia and 
Ontario 
5.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter provided an overview of Western Australia’s and Ontario’s financial 
provisions for mine closure and rehabilitation, which although not without challenges, are 
considerably more comprehensive and progressive than that of South Africa. These 
jurisdictions were selected because they offer a useful comparison with the South African 
provisions, specifically the financial provisions for mine closure.   This will help in assessing 
whether the existing South African legislative provisions for securing mine closure and site 
rehabilitation obligations are up to date and sufficient. The choice of the above mining 
jurisdictions for comparative analysis was based primarily on their having different levels of 
experience with mining legacy issues, the on-going and anticipated future development in 
mine closure provisions. The ability of the Western Australian mining industry to recognise 
and establish improved mine closure practices and mining regulations is the fundamental 
reason why it was selected as a comparative jurisdiction.512 Thus, amongst the aims of this 
section is that of investigating the viability of Western Australia’s MRF as a policy solution 
for the rehabilitation of South African abandoned mines as there are currently no laws or 
policy frameworks in place for the maintenance or rehabilitation of abandoned mines.513 The 
main reason for choosing Ontario as a comparative jurisdiction is to determine whether the 
decision of the Ontario provincial government to allow the self-security of closure obligations 
pursuant to paragraph five of section 145(1)(5) of the Mining Act,514 is feasible in the South 
African context.  
This section provides a comparison of current mining financial security provisions in the 
three mining jurisdictions namely South Africa, Western Australia and Ontario. This section 
aims to complete a review of the policies and processes related to financial provisions in the 
leading mining jurisdictions of Ontario and Western Australia. This review is mainly focused 
on the form and scope of the financial security for mine closure and rehabilitation. The 
                                                          
512 Australian Government. Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources ‘Annual Report for 2006’, available 
at 
https://www.industry.gov.au/AboutUs/CorporatePublications/AnnualReports/Pages/AnnualReport200607.aspx 
(accessed on 24 December 2016). 
513 van Rensburg (note 450 above). 
514 Ontario - Mining Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.14 (note 111 above). 
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chapter will compare the present regulations and policies on financial security for mine 
closure and site rehabilitation in Ontario, Western Australia and South Africa. It is important 
to note that the financial provisions regulations in the selected jurisdictions have some 
differences and similarities in regulating agency, closure regulation, policy and guidelines 
governing mine closure and rehabilitation. Therefore, the aim is to determine what the current 
state of financial security provisions is and the types of financial security mechanisms for 
mine closure and rehabilitation, with a reference to the major mining jurisdictions like 
Western Australia, and Ontario. 
5.2 Comparative Analysis between South Africa, Ontario and Western Australia’s 
Financial Provision for Mine Closure and Rehabilitation 
It is beyond doubt that the financial security provisions for mine closure and site 
rehabilitation have been widely adopted by governments and mining companies in different 
mining jurisdictions. The main aim of the financial securities for mine closure and site 
rehabilitation is to ensure that the government has sufficient funds to rehabilitate mine sites in 
the event of mining companies failing to do so. These financial securities are one of the 
regulatory mechanisms which provide confidence to both the government and the community 
that satisfactory rehabilitation and closure will be achieved.515 Financial securities are not 
unique to the regulatory scheme governing mining in South Africa, but are also applied in 
different forms within different mining jurisdictions. Ontario and Western Australia offer a 
useful comparison with South African mining and environmental laws governing mine 
closure and site rehabilitation specifically the financial provisions. It is beyond doubt that 
financial securities play a pivotal role in the government’s efforts to protect the public interest 
by minimising the governments’ financial risk in the event of the mining companies failing to 
rehabilitate mine sites.  
5.3 Comparative Analysis of the Financial Provisions for Mine Closure and 
Rehabilitation 
Table 1 below provides a summary of the comparative analysis of the financial provisions for 
mine closure for South Africa, Western Australia and Ontario and this is followed by a 
summary of the legal provisions specifically dealing with the financial security provision for 
mine closure. 
  
                                                          
515 P Gorey et al ‘Critical elements in implementing fundamental change in public environmental policy: 
Western Australia’s mine closure and rehabilitation securities reform’ (2016) 23(4) Australasian Journal of 






Financial Provisions for 















Are there laws requiring 
financial provision for mine 






The Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996, 
Section 24(a), (b)(i-iii) which 
grants everyone the right to an 
environment that is not harmful 
to their health or well-being; 




Management Act (NEMA) 107 
of 1998 & NEMA: Regulations 
for Financial Provision for 
Mine Closure and 
Rehabilitation (GN R1147 in 
GG 39425 of 20 November 
2015). 
 
Section 24P of NEMA 
regulates the current financial 
provision for mine closure and 
rehabilitation and the section is 
titled ‘Financial provision for 




Western Australia’s Constitution Act 23 
of 1889 and Commonwealth of 
Australia Constitution, 1900 dos not 
specifically deal with any 
environmental issues nor does it 
mention it. 
 
The Mining Act (MA) 107 of 1978, 
Mining Rehabilitation Fund Act 2012 
and Mining Rehabilitation Fund 
Regulations 2013 
 
Section 26 (d) of the Mining Act 
provides that the person carrying out 
mining operations should provide a 
security to cover the probable cost of 
the work. 
  
Section 124(2) of the Mining Act 
states that the holder is responsible for 
surface rehabilitation and should take 
any possible measures to ensure that 
environmental damage is minimised as 
far as is possible and should provide 
monetary compensation for the 
rehabilitation of the impacts as a result 
 
Ontario’s Constitution Act, 1867 
does not specifically deal with any 
environmental issues nor does it 
mention it. 
 
Ontario Mining Act, R.S.O. 
1990, Chapter 14; Ontario 
Regulation 240/00 – Mine 
Development and Closure 
under Part VII of the Act 
 
It is important to note that 
Ontario’s Mining Act defines a 
closure plan as including financial 
security to the government for the 
performance of the plan’s 
requirements. 
 
Section 12 (2) of the Ontario 
Mining Act Regulation 240/00 
provides that the mining company 
must certify that, ‘the amount of 
financial security provided for in a 
closure plan is adequate and 
sufficient to cover the cost of 
rehabilitation work required in 
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Section 24P (2) of NEMA 
gives the minister the power to 
use the financial security when 
the mining company fails to 
fulfil its rehabilitation 
obligations. 
 
Section 24P(3) obliges the 
mining companies to annually 
assess their environmental 
liability and to increase their 
financial provision. 
 
NEMA: Financial Provision 
Regulation 4 provides for the 
determination of the financial 
provision by requiring the 
mining company to determine 
and make financial provision to 
guarantee the availability of 
sufficient funds to undertake 
rehabilitation and remediation 
of the adverse environmental 
impacts. 
 
NEMA: Financial Provision 
Regulation 5, provides that the 
mining company should make 
financial provision for (a) 
rehabilitation and remediation; 
(b) decommissioning and 
closure activities, (c) and 
remediation and management of 
latent or residual environmental 
impacts, including the pumping 
of mining activities 
 
Section 13 of the MRF provides that 
the amount of levy payable is the 
amount that is specified in, or worked 
out in accordance with, the 
regulations. 
 
Section 9A of the MRF provides 
that the person responsible for the 
site and rehabilitation thereof at the 
time of it being declared abandoned, 
is liable to pay a cost into the MRF as 
debt due to the state. If it has been 
established that the liable person is 
unable to provide for rehabilitation, 





order to comply with the Mining 
Act and Closure Regulations 
 
Section 145(5) of the Mining Act 
provides that If the mining 
company does not rehabilitate the 
mining site, the financial security 





and treatment of polluted or 
extraneous water. 
 
NEMA: Financial Provision 
Regulation 9 provides that, ‘the 
determination, review and 
assessment of the financial 
provision must be undertaken 




At what stage of mine life is 




Section 89 of the MPRDA 
provides that, in addition to 
section 5(4) of the MPRDA, 
no mining activities may 
commence unless the mining 
company has provided for a 
financial provision 
guaranteeing the availability of 
sufficient funds for mine 
closure and rehabilitation. 
 
 
Section 60 of the Mining Act requires 
that financial security be due at 
issuance of initial permits. Security is 
recalculated annually and may be 
adjusted up or down commensurate 
with rehabilitation obligations. 
 
 
Section 13 of the Ontario 
Regulation 240/00 provides that the 
financial security is collected at the 
same time as the Closure Plan is filed. 
This must be in advance of the 
commencement of mining activities. 
 
Are there laws specifying a 
requirement that financial 
security cover be 100% of 
the potential liability? 
 
 
NEMA: Financial Provision 
Regulation 6 provides that 
financial provisions should be 
determined through a detailed 
itemisation of all activities and 
costs, calculated based on the 
actual costs of implementation 
of the measures required for—
(a) annual rehabilitation, (b) 
final rehabilitation, 
decommissioning and closure; 
 
The Mining Rehabilitation Fund 
Regulations, section 4, establishes a 
one per cent contribution levy based on 
the rehabilitation liability estimate per 




Section 12 (2)(a) – (b) of the 
Ontario Mining Act Regulation 
240/00 provides that; a mining 
company is obligated to (a) 
engage certain qualified 
professionals in the course of 
preparing a closure plan; and (b) 
estimate the costs of complying 
with its obligations based on the 
market value cost of the goods 
and services required by the work. 
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(c) remediation of latent or 
residual environmental impacts 
which may become known in 
the future, including the 
pumping and treatment of 
polluted or extraneous water. 
 
NEMA: Financial Provision 
Regulation 7 provides for the 
availability of the financial 
security which the mining 
company must ensure is always, 
‘at any given time equal to the 
sum of the actual costs of 
implementing closure, 
rehabilitation as well as 




Section 13 (1) of the Ontario 
Regulation 240/00 provides that a 
mining company must ensure that 
a closure plan specifies the form 
and amount of financial security 
to be provided by the prospective 







Are there laws that allow 
the retention of a portion of 
financial security for latent 
or residue liability? 
 
 
Section 24P(5) of NEMA 
governs retention of the 
financial security for latent, 
residual or any other 
environmental impacts, 
including the pumping of 
polluted or extraneous water, 
for a prescribed period’. 
 
Minerals & Petroleum 
Resources Development Act 
(MPRDA) 28 of 2002 and 
Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act 28 
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Section 43(6) of the MPRDA 
provides for the retention of a 
portion of the financial 
provision for latent and residual 
safety, health or environmental 
impact which may become 
known in the future when a 
closure certificate is issued. 
 
 
Is long-term water 
treatment included in 




Section 24R(2) of NEMA 
which also provides for the 
retention of a portion of 
financial provision, ‘for any 
latent, residual or any other 
environmental impact, 
including the pumping of  
polluted or extraneous water, 
for a prescribed period after 
issuing a closure certificate. 
 
Section 28 of NEMA: Duty of 
care and remediation of 
environmental damage, 
 
National Water Act 36 of 1998 
Section 30 of the NWA 
provides that financial security 
may be required from a mining 
company to obtain water 
license. 
 
Section 114B of the Mining Act: provides 
for the continuation of liability after expiry, 
surrender or forfeiture of mining license 
and does not excuse the responsibilities of 




Ontario Regulation 240/00, 
Parts 3-9 requires that long term 
post closure monitoring and 
maintenance requirements must 
be included within the closure 
plan, and therefore allowances 
must be made within the 




Environmental Protection Act, 
R.S.O. 1990, c. E.19. The Act 
allows the government department 
to impose financial security 
obligations in three circumstances 
namely;(a) to ensure performance 
specified in the legal instrument; 
(b) to provide alternate water 
supplies if the director has 




Section 30(3) provides that the 
responsible authority must 
determine the type, extent and 
duration of any security 
required, whilst section 30(4) 
expressly stipulates that the 
duration of the security may 
extend beyond the time period 
specified in the licence in 
question. 
 
Section 24R(1) of NEMA also 
provides for the continuation of 
liability notwithstanding the 
issuing of a closure certificate. 
 
 
to believe primary water supplies 
are likely to be contaminated; and 
lastly; (c) to provide appropriate 
measures to prevent adverse 
effects post closure 
 
 
Are there laws that protect 
the financial provisions in 








Are there laws that 
regulate the closure and 
rehabilitation of 




Section 24P(6) provides that 
the Insolvency Act  does not 
apply to any form of financial 
provision provided by a mining 
company and all amounts 








There is no legal document in place 
which specifically deals with 














Mining Rehabilitation Fund Act 2012 
In terms of section 6 of the MRF the 
main purpose of the Fund is to provide 
a source of funding for the 
 
Section 151(1) of the Mining Act 
provides that any rehabilitation 
costs incurred by the director over 
and above the amount of any 
financial security provided will 
constitute a debt due to the 
director secured by a lien against 
the mine property in question. 
This provides special protection 
for all environmental claims 
against a mining company that 
goes bankrupt  
 
 
The NAOMI policy initiative 
deals and governs closure and 
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 does not delegate due-responsibility 
or have an approved strategic or 
business plan for the rehabilitation 
of these sites. 
 
rehabilitation of abandoned mine sites 
and other land affected by mining 
operations carried out in, on or under 
those sites. 
 
Section 8 (1) (a) (i) - (ii) of the MRF 
Act establishes that the interest earned 
would be used to fund rehabilitation of 
legacy-abandoned mine sites pre-dating 
establishment of the fund while the 
capital only would be used to 
rehabilitate mine sites levied through 
the fund. 
 




Table 1: Comparison of financial provisions for mine closure and site rehabilitation in South Africa, Australia and Ontario
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5.3.1 Common Strengths, Weaknesses and Similarities  
 
While the South African Constitution clearly outlines the environmental right, and gives 
effect to the principle of sustainable development,516 Western Australia’s and Ontario’s 
Constitutions517 on the other hand do not specifically mention the environment but their laws, 
regulations and policies accord with the principle of sustainability. Even though their laws are 
not specifically based on sustainable development like those of South Africa, achieving 
sustainability and environmentally friendly mining is their primary objective.518 The mining 
and environmental laws endeavour to achieve sustainable goals and to ensure that the 
taxpayers are protected, which indirectly supports proper environmental management.519 As 
can be deduced from the above comparison, South Africa, Ontario and Western Australia 
recognise that mining right carries environmental obligations, and the mining company is 
therefore under a legal duty to fulfil closure and rehabilitation obligations. Like Western 
Australia and Ontario, South African legislation makes it clear who the responsible parties for 
mine closure and site rehabilitation are. 
 
One of the common features of the above jurisdictions is the adherence to and application of 
the PPP through regulatory frameworks, especially the financial provisions for mine closure. 
Although the PPP is common to all three jurisdictions, it is differentially applied. Western 
Australia uses the MRF, while Ontario uses self-bonding amongst other mechanisms,520 and 
South Africa uses the cash deposit, bank guarantee and the trust fund.521 South Africa now 
requires a financial security sufficient to pay 100 percent of the estimated mine rehabilitation 
which must be undertaken by a specialist or specialists522 and closure costs for the mine, 
subject to annual review, including reductions where mines perform rehabilitation concurrent 
with ongoing mining operations.523 In Ontario, the amount of financial security is equal to the 
total estimated cost of closing and rehabilitating the site as well as the subsequent monitoring 
                                                          
516 Y Oke ‘Africa and the quest for mining sustainability: A comparative evaluation of the mineral law of 
Nigeria with South Africa and Ghana’ (2008) 15(2) The South African Journal of Environmental Law and 
Policy 183. See also Section 24 of the Constitution. 
517 Western Australia’s Constitution Act 23 of 1889 and Commonwealth of Australia Constitution, 1900 and 
Ontario’s Constitution Act, 1867. 
518 van Rensburg (note 450 above). 
519 Ibid. 
520 Section 145(1) of the Mining Act (note 440 above). 
521 NEMA Financial Provision Regulations (note 254 above) Regulation 8. 
522 NEMA Financial Provision Regulations (note 254 above) Regulation 9. 
523 NEMA Financial Provision Regulations (note 254 above) Regulation 11(3). 
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and maintenance that is to be carried out until such long term care is no longer needed.524 A 
phased approach may be taken and security may be adjusted up or down commensurate with 
rehabilitation obligations.525  
Western Australia is unique as it requires an annual payment into the MRF instead of a 100% 
rehabilitation security. The other jurisdictions under review do not have the same kind of 
scheme. The purpose of the MRF is to secure long-term funding for the Western Australian 
Government to rehabilitate abandoned mine sites within the State. The MRF annual payment 
is calculated by applying a unit cost to each hectare in the mining lease, based on land use, to 
generate a liability amount, and then factoring that liability amount by 1%.526 As a result of 
this annual payment approach, 100% of the rehabilitation security is not required in Western 
Australia as it is in other jurisdictions.527 The MRF funds are to be used to rehabilitate 
historic-abandoned mines and any new mines that default on their obligation to perform 
rehabilitation and closure. Operating mines are still expected to pay for their own 
rehabilitation and closure costs.  
In all the jurisdictions under review the rehabilitation security estimate is subject to a review 
and adjustment process involving the mine company and the regulatory agencies. 
Rehabilitation security adjustments are made periodically to correspond with permit renewal 
cycles and/or significant changes in mine operations, except that in Western Australia the 
payment into the MRF is recalculated annually, even in the absence of any changes to the 
scope or character of the mine project.528 Long-term liabilities, including water treatment 
where it is required, are included in the calculation of the rehabilitation security in all study 
jurisdictions except Western Australia, where long-term water treatment is not a typical need 
owing to the arid environment.529 Both in South Africa and Ontario the government can 
retain a certain portion of the financial security for residual and latent defects that may arise 
in future which may not be presently known.530 The requirement to maintain and retain the 
financial provision is very important as it provides for the continuation of liability despite the 
issuance of a closure certificate.  
                                                          
524 Stantec Consulting Ltd ‘Policy and Process Review for Mine Reclamation Security’ (2016), available at: 
http://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/farming-natural-resources-and-industry/mineral-exploration-
mining/documents/reclamation-and-closure/stantec_report_mine_reclamation_security_sept_30_2016.pdf 
(accessed on 24 December 2016). 





530 Section 24R(2) of NEMA, Section 28 of NEMA and Ontario Regulation 240/00, Parts 3-9. 
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The mining jurisdictions’ similarities in financial provisions for mine closure regulations are 
also noticeable in the laws under review. South African mining companies are now obliged to 
assess their environmental liability annually, increase the financial provision to the 
satisfaction of the minister, and submit an independent audit report on the adequacy 
thereof.531 The environmental risks assessments and annual rehabilitation plans are now 
required, with prescribed contents, and must be audited annually.532  In Ontario, financial 
security is calculated based on the rehabilitation measures set out in the closure plan. A third-
party will typically prepare the closure plan and associated cost estimate, in a form that 
mirrors the closure plan format set out in Schedule 2 of Ontario Regulation 240/00.533 
Costing of the rehabilitation measures is based on independent contractor rates. 
5.4 Evaluation of Commonly Used Financial Surety Instruments 
Financial security is similarly defined in the three jurisdictions as, ‘a guarantee provided 
through an acceptable form of financial instrument or annual payment, that mining 
companies will perform the rehabilitation and closure activities prescribed in their 
rehabilitation and closure plans, including monitoring and other long-term obligations where 
they exist’.534 Rehabilitation security is also termed financial security in most mining 
jurisdictions and is often required in policy, statute and regulation for mine development 
projects.  A comprehensive study of the financial provisions reveals that in addition to 
similarities in the financial provisions regulation, there are also differences in the type and 
scope of the financial provisions acceptable in the jurisdictions under study. The most 
common form of financial surety instrument currently in use is the letter of credit, which is 
accepted by both South Africa and Western Australia but not accepted in Ontario.  
Table 2 is a summary of the financial surety and the types of financial instruments that are 
acceptable for securing mine closure and rehabilitation. The table also looks at the advantages 
and disadvantages of each financial provision and instrument type. There is also a 
comparison of the levels of financial security required as well as the calculation method.  
                                                          
531 Section 24P (3) of NEMA (as amended by Act 25 of 2014). 
532 NEMA Financial Provision Regulations (note 254 above) Regulation 11 (3)(a). 
533 Schedule 2 of Ontario Regulation 240/00 and Policy and Process Review for Mine Reclamation Security’ 
(note 524 above). 























Disadvantages of the Form of the 


















 Cash is readily available for closure 
and rehabilitation 
 Investment-grade securities 
(treasuries) can be traded with minimal 
risk of liquidity 
 High public acceptance ("visibility" of 
guarantee) 
 It can be used by smaller companies 
that may not meet other financial 
security criteria imposed by the 
financial institution 
 Can be dissolved only partly in case of 
need  




 Significant capital is tied up 
for the duration of the mine 
life, especially for large 
mining projects 
 Some governments may be 
tempted to use the deposited 
cash for purposes other than 
securing the mining project 
 Cash is more vulnerable to 
















 It is inexpensive to set up (if the 
mining company meets the bank's 
requirements) with no tied-up capital 
 Modest cash outflow from mine 
 
 Surety provider (bank, surety 
company) itself may fail 
 Obtaining an LoC may reduce 
the borrowing power of the 
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operator to maintain the LoC 
depending on the relationship between 
the operator and the bank 
 Less administrative requirements 
 The government can reserve the right 
to approve banks from which they 
accept an LOC, thereby minimising 
the risk of failure of weak banks. 
 
mining company 
 Availability of bonds depends 
on state of surety industry and 
may be negatively affected by 













 Most advantageous for mining 
company 
 Does not tie up capital 
 Simple to administrate 
 Public availability of Annual Reports. 
 
 Even very large companies 
can fail, no matter what their 
financial health was when 
mining project started. 
 Annual Reports and financial 
statements are not immune to 
manipulation (accounting 
scandals) 













 A 100% bond can ensure that the 
company responsible for mining is 
responsible for paying for the 
rehabilitation  
 Avoids costing the taxpayer money 
and improves community confidence 
in mining 
 A full mine closure cost in bonds 
could provide a good incentive to 
 
 They can be expensive to set 
up and maintain for operators, 
particularly smaller operators.  
 There are annual fees, legal 
costs and the requirement to 
provide either cash or asset 
guarantees 
 Some operators have also 




 Generally low costs 
 No tied-up capital. 
 
obtaining a bond facility from 
banks, (particularly if they are 
small ‘start-up’ companies) 
 Bond issuer may fail over the 











 High public acceptance ("visibility" of 
trust fund) 
 Trust funds may appreciate in value 
over time, depending on market trends. 
 
 Risk of bad management of 
the trust fund (loss of value if 
fund invests in 
risky assets) 
 Trust fund may not have 
enough value accumulated 
through annual payments if 
mining project ceases 
prematurely 
 Trust fund management and 
administration consumes 
some of the value and income 
earned. 
 Trust funds may not be as 
effective as a financial 
guarantee from a bank, 
because money invested in 
fixed trusts holds back funds 
which could be used for 
concurrent rehabilitation or 
for investments in improved 
mining practices, ultimately 
lowering the liabilities at 
mine closure, whether it is 
















 Places the burden of financing 
rehabilitation work on the mining 
industry. This presents advantages for 
industry, the community and the 
government. 
 Could potentially fund the 
rehabilitation of current legacy sites 
and provide a safety net for the future 
 A significant financial advantage for 
operators is that the fund will be open 
to any mining company (unlike bank 
guaranteed unconditional performance 
bonds or insurance policies, where 
some operators may be refused credit), 
and 
 There is no requirement for operators 
to provide “cash backing” for the 
equivalent of their full closure costs. 
This will have a positive impact on the 
credit available to operators, which is 
particularly important in the early 
years of development, before full 
production is reached. 
 
 Where there is no bond or 
punitive measures made 
available to regulators (for 
example the WA MRF), the 
levy provides no incentive for 
meeting mine closure 
objectives and a lack of 
consequences for not meeting 
them 
 It is unclear how quickly the 
funds can be generated. There 
is no clear time frame on 
investments, returns and the 
allocation of funds for works. 
Like other mechanisms for 
rehabilitating legacy sites, it 
could simply fail to move into 
action 
 The move away from bank 
guarantees is expected to have 
a financial impact on those 
banks which currently gain 






























1978 who have 
an estimated 
rehabilitation 
cost for more 
than A$ 50,000 




the MRF each 
year, with the 
payment 
equivalent to 































into the MRF is 
calculated 
using the 














for the hectares 
in the mining 
authorisation 
and a unit rate 
per hectare 
based on the 
category of 
land use. FCR 
is the fund 
contribution 
rate and is set 





















5.5 Evaluation of Commonly Used Financial Surety Instruments 
Western Australia used to allow the unconditional performance bond system which can be 
described as ‘up-front or gradual set-aside or guaranteeing of expected clean-up cost’.535 
However, the bonds systems have commonly been criticised for falling short of meeting the 
actual mine closure costs.536 One of the principle concerns of the bond system in Western 
Australia was that its value was insufficient to cover appropriate mine closure activities and 
environmental remediation in the case of a default and there is a significant problem for any 
regulator who underestimates a bond.537 The inadequate value for bonds in Western Australia 
was apparently as a result of the adopted methodology for calculating them. In short, ‘the key 
policy change was a shift from unconditional performance bonds, which are a globally 
common mining security mechanism in the form of bank guarantees that approximates the 
cost of environmental rehabilitation for each mineral tenement being paid by a mining 
company, to a central MRF’.538 Current practice, however, is primarily to require 
unconditional bank guarantees with the amount of security based on a calculation of the 
estimated cost to government of the full cost of rehabilitation and closure of mine sites. 
Every mining jurisdiction identified above seems to have different views about mining 
legacies, different solutions, and financial security arrangements. It is important to note that 
Western Australia offers an alternative system to the more common bank guarantee and cash 
system through its recently implemented MRF Act for the mining industry. As noted in the 
preceding chapter, ‘the MRF was developed as a way of creating affordability for mining 
operators as it requires a smaller ongoing annual contribution rate as opposed to the previous 
system that required one bank guarantee equal to 100% of the total cost to rehabilitate the 
site’.539 The accumulated deposits in the MRF will be used for rehabilitation when an 
operator fails to meet rehabilitation obligations and every effort has been made to recover 
funds from the operator. The fund will be used as an investment fund, with the profits 
generated from investments to be used to fund rehabilitation of existing legacy mines. Thus 
the MRF has been designed to fund any future legacy mine sites this has been part of the 
justification for removing requirements of bonds. The policy implemented in WA for 
                                                          
535 P Peck and K Sinding ‘Financial assurance and mine closure: stakeholder expectations and effects on 
operating decisions’ (2009) 34(4) Resources Policy 227-233. 
536 M Pepper, CP Roche and GM Mudd “Mining Legacies – Understanding Life of Mine Across Time and 
Space’ (2014) Life of Mine Conference/Brisban, QLD 16-18 July 2014. 
537 Gorey et al.  (see note  243 above). 






environmental mining securities appears to be globally unique as neither South Africa nor 
Ontario uses it.  
The NEMA regulations essentially provide for three different formats in terms of which the 
financial provision may be made, either one or a combination of a cash deposit, bank 
guarantee, or trust fund.540 As observed from Chapter three above, Ontario uses different 
types of financial security mechanisms such as ‘a cash deposit, a letter of credit, 
unconditional performance bonds, a trust, corporate financial test and any other form of 
security or any other guarantee or protection, including a pledge of assets, a sinking fund or 
royalties per tonne, that is acceptable to the director to guarantee mine site closure and 
rehabilitation’.541  
Both South Africa and Ontario accept Trust Funds as a form of financial security, however 
Trust Funds may not be as effective as a financial guarantee from a bank, because money 
invested in fixed trusts hold back funds which could be used for concurrent rehabilitation or 
for investments in improved mining practices, ultimately lowering the liabilities at mine 
closure, whether it is planned or premature.542 Trust Funds ‘make it difficult to provide 
adequate funding for premature closure as the cost of closure will be higher than the available 
funds in the trust when a mine closes prematurely’.543 However, the specific form of financial 
security mechanism of interest to this discussion is the corporate financial test even though 
not unique to Ontario but it is not used in the South African jurisdiction. This discussion of 
the corporate financial test is to determine whether it can also be applied in South Africa as a 
financial security mechanism. This accords with the aim of this section which is to examine 
the experience of other jurisdictions that have allowed, or at least considered, similar and 
different financial security mechanisms.  
As described in the mine development and closure regulation,544 a financial strength test is 
used to assess the mining company.  Financial strength is considered in terms of a number of 
stated credit rating services, including the Dominion Bond Rating Service Limited, Moody’s 
Investors Services Inc., and Standard and Poor Inc. By meeting minimum criteria set by two 
of the abovementioned credit rating services, the proponent may be considered to pass the 
                                                          
540 NEMA Financial Provision Regulations (note 254 above) Regulation 8. 
541 Section 145(1) of the Mining Act (note 440 above). 
542 van Rensburg (note 450 above). 
543 Ibid. 





financial strength test.545 If a mine company fails to meet the requirements of either tier, or 
fails to continue to meet the financial strength test at any point, then the mining company 
must provide a rehabilitation security in the amount described in the closure plan.546 
5.6 Conclusion 
It is trite that there is no regulatory system that is one hundred percent perfect. Though some 
forms of regulatory inadequacies are noticeable in all the financial provisions considered 
above, the review undertaken in this chapter shows that the financial provisions of Western 
Australia and Ontario are filled with useful provisions that, if applied, could impact positively 
in positioning the South African financial provisions to meet the closure and rehabilitation 
objectives. The comparison of the legal provisions for abandoned mine sites management in 
South Africa with that of Western Australia and Ontario, highlighted the jurisdictions that 
have the noble intention of protecting the environment and while promoting sustainable 
mining but as can be seen in South Africa, even if the intentions of the legislation are good, 
they have limited value without proper implementation and enforcement.547  
This chapter evaluated the use of financial provisions (and the instruments) by looking at 
their strengths and weaknesses, and their effectiveness as tools to impose liability on the 
mining companies to close, rehabilitate, and manage the environmental impacts caused by 
mining activities. The inadequacy and inefficiency of the financial provision estimates 
pointed to the need to improve the current system of determining and making financial 
provision for closure and rehabilitation. Whilst mining legislation in South Africa has 
certainly helped to clarify the obligations of mining companies to set aside funds for closure 
and rehabilitation of mines there is still much work to be done on the implementation of these 
laws and regulations.  
All the mining jurisdictions included in this study require rehabilitation security in some form 
of financial guarantee to assure that mine rehabilitation is performed in the event that the 
mine operator fails to perform that work. The jurisdictions in this study have different 
requirements for the timing and amounts of financial securities for rehabilitation. All 
jurisdictions require rehabilitation security in advance of the commencement of the mining 
activities. Western Australia is different from the other study jurisdictions due to the fact that 
it requires an annual payment into a fund that may, or may not, eventually provide sufficient 
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financial security for rehabilitation. Significantly, none of the study jurisdictions require a 
financial security for catastrophic events on, or off, the mine sites.  
It is trite that the continual underestimations in calculating financial provisions for mine 
closure, leads to the continual abandonment of mining sites.548 To address this challenge, 
Western Australia implemented the MRF which provides for a government administered 
pooled fund into which all current mining operators pay an annual levy. The funds are used to 
rehabilitate abandoned mining areas, alleviating the burden of government to solely fund 
their rehabilitation.549 It is important to note that the South African regulatory framework for 
mine closure does not currently provide funding for cases of abandoned mines nor does the 
legislation delegate due-responsibility or have an approved strategic or business plan for the 
rehabilitation of these sites.550 To address comparable issues, Western Australia has 
established a rehabilitation fund to deal with abandoned sites and alleviate the financial 
burden on government and rehabilitate these sites to a sustainable landform. This presents an 
opportunity for South Africa to learn from a working example on how to deal with 




                                                          









6. Recommendations and Conclusion 
6.1 Background 
It has been established that South Africa, like many other countries with a long mining 
history, is faced with a legacy of the negative environmental impacts of mining. Even though 
the negative legacy of abandoned mines is a global concern, ‘the situation in South Africa is 
particularly severe and the magnitude of the impacts from past mining activities are often 
considerable as environmental concerns and environmental regulation of mining activities 
were not always adequately regulated under mining and other environmental legislation in the 
pre-constitutional dispensation’.552 The above concerns give rise to questions about the 
adequacy of the current financial provisions made by mining companies for mine closure and 
site rehabilitation when operations cease.553  It is beyond doubt that there is now ‘a pressing 
need to address the issue of mine closure because the pollution legacy makes difficult the 
sustainability of the mining activity and it is imperative to set up comprehensive mine closure 
systems.’554 This is so because,  
there are real and significant financial considerations with respect to mine closure and site 
rehabilitation, especially given that closure and rehabilitation occur at a time when the 
operation is no longer economically viable, when cash flow is often severely restricted or 
negative, and when the value of assets is below the expenditures required to achieve the 
environmental objective of mine closure. The objective of securing mine closure funding at an 
early stage is to mitigate against the risk that an enterprise may either be unwilling or unable to 
undertake mine closure due to lack of funding.555  
It is important to note that once the mine is exhausted, rehabilitation of the mine site is a cost 
to the mining company and does not provide any direct benefits to the company. The above is 
‘one major reason why governments are increasingly requiring companies to provide 
guarantees for mine closure prior to a mine opening and it is important that these funds be 
established in accordance with both best accounting practices and in accordance with the tax 
provisions in the mine’s jurisdiction’.556 There has been a general move by governments in 
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recent years to strengthen their requirements for mining financial securities.557 Government 
agencies throughout the world have increasingly adopted policies that require mining 
companies to provide financial securities to guarantee the costs of mine closure and site 
rehabilitation.558 Mining companies and governments in mining jurisdictions both have an 
interest in agreeing on realistic forms and amounts of financial securities.559 It is generally 
accepted that ‘these needs to be effective in terms of environmental protection but should not 
unduly depress capital availability or damage the investment climate’.560 It is only recently 
that the South African government come to the realisation that it has the most direct 
responsibility for ensuring comprehensive mine closure and site rehabilitation within the 
broader context of sustainable development as required by section 24 of the Constitution.561 
This is because the South African government has had experience of the environmental risk 
and financial demand that an inadequately rehabilitated mine site can leave as the 
responsibility of the government.562  
6.2 Introduction  
It is trite that the bedrock principle of environmental law and regulation is that pollution costs 
should be borne by their creators.563 Conceptually, the PPP is nearly ‘unassailable as a 
guiding principle for environmental regulation’.564 The South African environmental laws 
that regulate mining activities gives this principle form by making mining companies liable 
for environmental damages caused by their mining activities. Financial securities for mine 
closure and site rehabilitation are a requirement for all mining activities in South Africa, as in 
many countries, giving governments’ recourse to funds if mining companies do not meet their 
environmental obligations.565 The South African government came to the realisation that ‘the 
then existing financial securities for mine closure and site rehabilitation arrangements were 
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inadequate and extended the concept of financial security much more broadly to include 
cradle-to-grave environmental performance’.566  
Mining operations in South Africa are subject to a range of environmental legislation in 
addition to the provisions of the MPRDA,567 NWA,568 NEMA.569 While these other 
mechanisms ‘can assist in the enforcement matters of pollution, environmental harm or 
contamination, the mining securities system is a key mechanism by which the government 
can be guaranteed access to funds to complete rehabilitation works rather than through 
protracted court action (which may be an issue with some of the other legal mechanisms).570 
The inadequacy and inefficiency of the financial provision estimates pointed to the need to 
improve the current system of determining and making financial provision for closure and 
rehabilitation. Whilst mining legislation in South Africa has certainly helped to clarify the 
obligations of mining companies to set aside funds for closure and rehabilitation of mines 
there is still much work to be done on the implementation of these laws and regulations. The 
review and analysis of the financial security instruments applied in other jurisdictions 
supports the justification to re-examine the suitability of the financial security mechanisms 
currently in use in South Africa. 
6.3 Lessons for South Africa – Recommendations 
The need for financial securities for mine closure and site rehabilitation is beyond doubt. But 
choosing the best form of financial security mechanisms requires careful consideration.571 
Policies that meet environmental objectives should also be compatible with a healthy 
investment climate and be financially efficient.572 This entails agreeing on the appropriate 
financial instruments and the expected standards of rehabilitation before the commencement 
of any mining activities.573 Financial security instruments may be chosen from many options. 
Different instruments may be appropriate depending on the financial strength of the mining 
company, the amount of the potential environmental liability, the time frame over which the 
fund will need to be in place and so on.574 It is also essential that ‘the financial security be 
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quarantined from other company assets, so that it is still available in the event of bankruptcy 
and/or government abuse’.575 The chosen financial security instrument should meet two tests 
namely:  
a. It should be effective in assuring the government that the mining company can take all 
necessary and reasonable measures to protect the environment (or that another party is 
enabled to do so if the mining company fails) and  
b. it should be the least costly of all the effective instruments available.576  
 
Even though these financial securities are originally intended to provide sufficient security to 
cover the cost of rehabilitation, often the level of security has not kept pace with increasing 
costs and standards of rehabilitation. This has resulted in the amount of financial security 
held by governments against mine sites being well below actual rehabilitation costs. The 
continual underestimations in calculating financial security for mine closure and 
rehabilitation, leads to the continual abandonment of mining sites.577 The South African 
regulatory framework for mine closure and site rehabilitation does not currently provide 
funding for cases of abandoned mines nor does the legislation delegate due-responsibility for 
the rehabilitation of these sites.578 To address comparable issues, ‘Western Australia has 
established a rehabilitation fund to deal with abandoned sites and alleviate the financial 
burden on government and rehabilitate these sites to a sustainable landform’.579 This presents 
an opportunity for South Africa to learn from a working example on how to deal with the 
negative environmental legacies of abandoned mines.580  
6.3.1 Current system of financial security mechanisms for mine closure and site 
rehabilitation 
The financial securities for guaranteeing mine closure in South Africa are currently applied in 
the form of bank guarantees, cash deposits and trust funds. NEMA Financial Regulation 8 
provides that,  
‘(1) An applicant or holder of a right or permit must make financial provision by one or a 
combination of a— (a) financial guarantee from a bank registered in terms of the Banks Act, 
1990 (Act No. 94 of 1990) or from a financial institution registered by the Financial Services 
Board as an insurer or underwriter; (b) deposit into an account administered by the Minister 
                                                          
575 Sasson (see note 264 above).6. 
576 Miller (see note 348 above) 7. 








responsible for mineral resources; or (c) contribution to a trust fund established in terms of 
applicable legislation.’581 
The above are the financial security mechanisms that are intended to ensure that the 
government has sufficient funds to rehabilitate mine sites in the event of the mining 
companies failing to do so. Even though the current financial security mechanism are 
progressive and comprehensive certain challenges are often encountered with these 
mechanisms, ‘they are commonly insufficient to cover appropriate mine closure activities and 
environmental remediation in the case of a default and they do not solve the problem of 
historical abandoned mine sites’.582 The rates used to calculate the potential amount for mine 
site rehabilitation are still not adjusted for inflation and this may result in significant under-
estimations of adequate financial security provided by the mining company.583 Also, the 
DMR guideline document which was produced in 2005 is still being used as a reference 
document despite it being generic in nature, thus it cannot deal with all situations relating to 
financial provisions and mine closure.584 
In light of the weaknesses present in the current financial provisions concerning the 
estimation and adequacy of financial security for mine closure and site rehabilitation there 
should be, ‘The elevation, enhancement and regular updating of the DMR guidelines for the 
evaluation of the quantum of closure-related financial provisions’.585 This will entail treating 
the ‘DMR guideline document as a living document through regular scheduled reviews and 
updates given the dynamic nature of rehabilitation, and the adjusting the rates used to 
calculate the amount of the potential environmental liability for inflation every year’.586 
 
6.4 Review of the current financial security mechanisms 
Even though the making a cash deposit has certain advantages such as high public acceptance 
since it is readily available for mine closure and site rehabilitation and that it can be used by 
smaller companies that may not meet other financial security criteria imposed by the financial 
institution. The disadvantages outweigh the advantages in that cash is more vulnerable to 
being lost to fraud or theft as the government may be tempted to use the deposited cash for 
purposes other than rehabilitating the mine site. The mining company may also be at a 
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disadvantage in that significant capital is tied up for the duration of the mine life. A bank 
guarantee as a financial security mechanism has the advantage of being inexpensive to set up 
with no tie-up capital and has less administrative requirements. However, the major 
disadvantage is the bank may fail which in turn will have dire consequences for both the 
mining company and the government. Also, establishing a bank guarantee greatly reduces the 
borrowing power of the mining company.  
A Trust fund is another financial vehicle for securing mine closure and site rehabilitation that 
seems the most attractive in that just like the cash deposit is has a high public acceptance and 
the trust funds may appreciate in value over time. The major advantage of using the trust fund 
option is that section 37A(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act,587 provides that the purpose of a trust 
must be, “solely for rehabilitation upon premature closure, decommissioning and final 
closure, and post closure coverage of any latent and residual environmental impacts on the 
area… to restore one or more areas to their natural or predetermined state, or to a land use 
which conforms to the generally accepted principle of sustainable development”.588 Thus, it is 
not legally permissible to use or liquidate the trust and use those funds for another purpose, 
since the funds in a rehabilitation trust fund can only be moved to another fund with a similar 
purpose.589 The Trust fund also has its own disadvantages such that the fund may not have 
enough value accumulated through annual payments if mining project ceases prematurely and 
that, ‘Trust funds may not be as effective as a financial guarantee from a bank, because 
money invested in fixed trusts holds back funds which could be used for concurrent 
rehabilitation or for investments in improved mining practices, ultimately lowering the 
liabilities at mine closure, whether it is planned or premature’.590 
6.5 Proposed alternative financial security system for mine closure and site 
rehabilitation  
The aim of the alternative financial security mechanisms is to ensure that the South African 
government holds sufficient money to guarantee mine closure and site rehabilitation in event 
of the failure of the mining company to fulfil its closure and rehabilitation obligations. The 
alternative system should also provide a model that reduces the cost of doing business to the 
mining company but at the same time giving a sufficient guaranteed for mine closure and site 
rehabilitation. The goal of this section was not an exhaustive review of all existing financial 
                                                          
587 Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962. 
588 Section 37A(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act.  
589 Ibid. 





security mechanisms, but rather a focused review of the possible alternatives that the South 
African government can adopt from the comparative jurisdictions used in this dissertation. 
This dissertation has identified at least two possible options available as financial security 
mechanisms in South Africa.591 The first option is to introduce the bank guaranteed 
unconditional performance bonds (hereafter UPBs), and the second option is the introduction 
of a government held Mining Security Fidelity Fund (hereafter MSFF). 
6.5.1 Option 1 – Introduction of the bank guaranteed unconditional performance 
bond system (UPBs) 
The first alternative option is to introduce the financial security mechanism for mine closure 
and site rehabilitation based on bank guaranteed unconditional performance bonds (hereafter 
UPBs) which covers the full rehabilitation costs. In terms of the application of this option, 
‘mining companies will be required to provide the government with UPBs for the full cost of 
mine closure and site rehabilitation’.592 The UPBs will be applicable to all mining activities 
from exploration, prospecting and the actual mining. The amount of the bond to be paid 
should be sufficient to cover 100 percent of the estimated mine site rehabilitation or equal to 
the ‘the cost of a third party conducting the rehabilitation works and additional funds to cover 
contingencies, administrative and monitoring costs.”593 It will be the responsibility of the 
mining company to provide updates of closure costs at least once every three years, which 
will be then used to automatically update the requirement for the bonds.594 
 
6.5.1.1 Advantages of the unconditional performance bond system 
The following is the list of the advantages that the South African government as well as the 
mining industry can derive if the use of the UPBs is adopted; 
a. The UPBs are widely used by the mining industry around the world, therefore they are 
well understood by the industry as well as the regulators, therefore there is considerable 
experience in their administration within regulators and the industry.595 
b. If the UPBs amounts are set to fully cover the costs of government undertaking 
rehabilitation and closure, any failure of a mining company to meet their closure 
obligations is effectively borne by that mining company. This means that any closure 
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liabilities are not subsidised by other mining companies or by the general community at 
large.596 
c. The UPBs offer a continuing, unconditional liability on the part of the mining company as 
there is essentially no requirement for the regulator to demonstrate specific performance 
failures prior to exercising the UPB (e.g. demanding that the financial institution pay the 
sum of the UPB).597 This means that immediate rehabilitation activity which the regulator 
has deemed as needed, can proceed without delay or dispute.598 
d. The UPBs are enforceable until the bonds are formally retired.599 UPBs have no time limit, 
and continue to exist in law until the regulator deems that the UPB is no longer required. 
This means that once the assurance is in place, a UPB cannot lapse without the express 
decision of the regulator. 
e. The UPBs are not subject to claims by creditors if the mining company becomes bankrupt 
or enters liquidation. Operators of mine sites are usually subject to financial exposures 
(e.g. commodity price fluctuations, currency exchange rates), and there is occasion where 
operations cease due to financial failure of the operating company.600 
 
6.5.1.2 Disadvantages of the unconditional performance bond system 
There are also challenges that are associated with the use and application of the UPBs. Even 
though this system of UPBs is used in several jurisdictions including Ontario, the system 
failed to produce desired results in Western Australia. It is because of the failure of the 
system that the Western Australian government decided to move away from the use of the 
UPBs. One of the principle concerns for UPBs in Western Australia was that their value was 
insufficient to cover appropriate mine closure activities and environmental remediation in the 
case of a default.601 However, this failure can be attributable to the fact the amount that the 
mining company made was not equivalent to 100 percent of the potential environmental 
liability.  
a. A major concern regarding the use of bank guaranteed UPBs is that they can be expensive 
to set up and maintain for the mining companies, particularly the smaller operators.602 This 
is so because there are annual fees, legal costs and the requirement to provide either cash 
or asset guarantees and some banks may decline to enter business with some operators 
(particularly if they are small ‘start-up’ companies).  
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b. The UPBs also require considerable set up and maintenance costs for operators 
(particularly for smaller companies).603 Companies may be required to provide either cash 
or asset backing for the full amount of the bond in addition to paying direct costs such as 
annual fees and legal costs.604  
c. As the UPBs only relate to assurance for each specific mining site, any underestimate of 
the total rehabilitation cost will mean that the rehabilitation will not be able to be 
completed to the full extent, or funding will have to be provided from another public 
source.605 
However, it is submitted that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages therefore the South 
African government could still adopt the UPBs. Despite their failure in Western Australia, the 
UPBs are still very common and are in use in major mining jurisdictions such as Canada and 
United States of America. 
 
6.5.2 Option 2 – Introduction of the Mining Security Fidelity Fund (MSFF) 
Another alternative option for the South African financial security system is for the 
government to adopt and establish a Mining Securities Fidelity Fund606 (hereafter MSFF). 
The MSFF will be ‘structured as a fidelity fund whereby the Government is able to claim the 
cost of rehabilitating a mine site when a company has defaulted on its obligations to 
rehabilitate, but only after reasonable compliance options have been explored.’607 In terms of 
this option ‘mining companies will be required to contribute a non-refundable amount to a 
central fidelity account (a Mining Security Fidelity Fund) managed by the government.’608 
This model completely replaces the requirement for each mining company to maintain a bank 
guaranteed UPBs, or to establish a trust fund or to provide a bank guarantee.609 Each mining 
company would be required to fund their own rehabilitation and closure costs. Such a fund 
would accumulate over time and be used by the government to meet the occasional failure by 
a company to meet its mine rehabilitation and closure obligations, and would also be used to 
fund the negative legacies of abandoned mining sites. This model will mean that ‘if the 
government was required to use these funds to undertake closure of a mine site due to the 
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inability of an operator to do so, then the overall industry is funding this cost and not the 
government’.610  
 
6.5.2.1 Advantages of adopting the Mining Security Fidelity Fund 
This option presents advantages for mining industry, the community and the government. The 
fund will enhance the State’s capacity to manage and rehabilitate abandoned mines, leading 
to better environmental and community safety outcomes.611 The MSFF will be structured to 
cover the mine closure and site rehabilitation costs which are likely to be borne by the 
government. 
a. The advantage of having all resource activity operators participating in the pooled fund 
means that the money held by the South African government accumulates faster and the 
risk that an insufficient amount is held in the event of a large claim dissipates more 
quickly.612  
b. It also means that the South African government would administer only one system 
enabling a more simple and easy to understand process as well as keeping administration 
costs to a minimum.613  
c. The MSFF approach provide a lower cost alternative to UPBs, and will also provide a 
perpetual fund to address historical abandoned mine sites.  Therefore, the MSFF is likely 
to present cost savings (compared to UPBs) for South Africa as it has a high number of 
sites and historical legacies.614 
d. This option spreads the risk of default across the mining industry. It shares the risk of any 
one mining company defaulting on its rehabilitation obligations across many contributors.  
e. This option is also cheaper in that the contributions made by mining companies is 
significantly cheaper than the costs of maintaining a bank guaranteed unconditional 
performance bond for most operators.  
f. A significant financial advantage for operators is that the fund will be open to any mining 
company (unlike bank guaranteed unconditional performance bonds or insurance policies, 
                                                          
610 Ibid. 
611 “The new system encourages early rehabilitation and will provide a mechanism for the state to rehabilitate 
abandoned mine sites in the event that a company defaults on its obligations, which is a win-win for the sector 
and the environment as it frees up valuable funds at the start of projects and encourages ongoing rehabilitation. 
The new fund provides a more flexible and cost effective system for industry,” 
612 Queensland-Department of Environment and Heritage Protection ‘Reform of Queensland's Financial 
Assurance System: Consultation Report on Discussion Paper’ (2014) Department of Environment and Heritage 
Protection 5. 
613 Ibid.  
614 South Africa may be an appropriate candidate with a relatively large number of mine sites, and abandoned 
mines and in 2012 the number of abandoned mines was estimated to be around 6,000 with the South African 





where some operators may be refused credit), and there is no requirement for operators to 
provide “cash backing” for the equivalent of their full closure costs.615 This will have a 
positive impact on the capital available to mining companies, which is particularly 
important in the early years of development, before full production is reached.616 
 
6.5.2.2 Disadvantages of adopting the Mining Security Fidelity Fund 
It is important to note that there is no regulatory system that is 100 percent perfect and 
without flaws. Even the Western Australian innovative approach in establish a similar option 
of the MRF has its disadvantages that should not be overlooked. In deciding whether to adopt 
the MSFF the government should consider the following disadvantages. 
a. The establishment and adoption of the MSFF can be an open invitation for defaulting 
mining companies or defaulted companies to cut and run from their closure obligations. 
b. Where there are punitive measures for mining companies that fail to make the required 
contributions the MSFF will therefore provide no incentive for meeting mine closure 
objectives and a lack of consequences for not meeting them. 
c. It is unclear how quickly the funds can be generated. There is no clear time frame on 
investments, returns and the allocation of funds for works. Like other mechanisms for 
rehabilitating legacy sites, it could simply fail to move into action. 
 
It is important to note that for the MSFF to be effective it must be supported by robust 
legislated punitive provisions (both criminal and civil) against mining companies who fail to 
comply with their rehabilitation obligations. The MSFF should be established and adopted as 
a ‘response to a potential increase in ‘unfunded’ rehabilitation liability for mines that became 
abandoned, while also providing a funding source to address historical or ‘legacy’ mines in 
South Africa’.617 Therefore, the adoption of the MSFF will ensure that the government and 
the taxpayers will not be called upon to fund the mine closure and site rehabilitation for 
mining operations that may become abandoned in the future. Also, the interest earned on the 
fund can be used to rehabilitate historical abandoned mine site as this will be a perpetual and 
perpetual fund for the rehabilitation and management of historical abandoned mine sites.618 
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The legacy of abandoned mining sites, the associated environmental problems, clean-up costs 
and the post mine land use development has led to an increased emphasis on mine closure 
planning and rehabilitation as they provide difficult legacy issues for governments, 
communities and mining companies.619 A detailed review of the South African provisions for 
mine closure and site rehabilitation revealed that there is a significant range of legal 
mechanisms and requirements which specifically pertain to mine closure and site 
rehabilitation. Thus, this dissertation was developed as a response to the existing financial 
security provisions which fail to ensure and recognise the need for effective and adequate 
financial security systems for mine closure and site rehabilitation. It is against this 
background that this dissertation provided a critical analysis and review of the processes 
surrounding the financial security provisions for mine closure and site rehabilitation. The 
research further assessed the implementation of the financial security provisions for mine 
closure and site rehabilitation in South Africa and recommended potential improvements to 
the financial security provisions system.620 
It is beyond doubt that, ‘there is a clear need to ensure that current and future mining 
activities do not add to unacceptable environmental impacts and impose costs on society’.621   
Mining operations and activities that in the past resulted in legacies of abandoned mine sites, 
‘are now unacceptable, and require improved mining legislation and control to ensure mine 
site closure is completed successfully, in a sustainable manner’.622 It has been argued that 
ineffective enforcement of mine closure laws, an absence of effective financial security 
mechanisms and inadequate financial securities for mine closure can have a significant 
impact on the success of mine site closure.623 It is important to note that,  
‘Comprehensive mine closure for abandoned, presently operating, and proposed mines remain a 
challenge for all mining jurisdictions and mining companies. Thus, to accommodate the need to 
close abandoned mines and to ensure that existing and proposed mines are appropriately closed 
and rehabilitated will require the cooperation of a diverse stakeholder community, new 
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innovative methods of financing closure and significant policy and legislative amendments to 
ensure post mining sustainable development and economic viable post mine land use’.624  
It is submitted that the substantive content of the financial security provisions for mine 
closure and site rehabilitation clearly assigns the responsibility to rehabilitate the mine sites 
to the polluters and it is clear that the legislative provisions for mine closure in South Africa 
are generally consistent, if not more onerous on paper, with the international expectations 
internationally.625 This dissertation has shown that while the South African financial security 
provisions for mine closure and site rehabilitation contains some improved mechanisms for 
environmental protection, management and rehabilitation, the implementation of many of 
these mechanisms has yet to achieve the environmental ideals of sustainability as enshrined 
in the South African Constitution.626 The One Environmental System particularly the 
application of the financial security  provisions for mine closure is still new with most of its 
provisions not yet having been properly tested, applied or understood, it is important to 
ensure its effectiveness going forward.627 Although South Africa has a progressive mineral 
law regime there are evidently some gaps and aspects that are insufficient and need to be 
updated by embedding the appropriate and adequate financial provisions of closure and 
rehabilitation of mines. The current provisions are not enough to prevent the future legacy of 
abandoned, derelict and ownerless mines. The government should formulate the framework 
that is clear, stable and predictable which can evolve but not fluctuate nor be unequally 
applied.628  
It is trite that the purpose of the financial security is to ensure that there will be sufficient 
funds to pay for mine site rehabilitation and post closure monitoring and maintenance at any 
stage in the life of the project, including early or temporary closure.629 These financial 
securities are one of the regulatory mechanisms which provide confidence to both the 
government and the community that satisfactory rehabilitation and closure will be 
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achieved.630 Financial securities are not unique to the regulatory scheme governing mine 
closure and site rehabilitation in South Africa, but are also applied in many mining 
jurisdictions albeit in different forms.  
In theory, such mining securities ensure sufficient funds are available to a government to 
rehabilitate mine sites in the event operators fail to meet their mine rehabilitation and closure 
obligations.631 The financial security mechanisms should be able to specifically address the 
financial risk to government by ensuring that mining securities provide a high level of 
financial security that reflects the full cost of rehabilitation for mine sites. Without proper 
financial security for mine closure and rehabilitation, the costs to the community and country 
from environmental damage will outweigh the benefits derived from mining. It is against this 
background that this dissertation considered alternative models that have the potential to 
provide sufficient and adequate levels of financial security to the government at a lower cost 
to the mining industry. 
It is submitted that the South African financial security mechanisms ‘raise a set of design 
issues, including the level of security to be required, the financial mechanisms to be allowed, 
the conditions under which the financial security is released, and the interaction of the 
financial provisions with other areas of law—most importantly, insolvency law’.632 This 
research illustrated those issues and identified a set of correctable weaknesses present in 
some of the financial provision mechanisms. For example, the failure to adjust the master 
rates to be in line with inflation and the failure to update the DMR guideline document results 
in inappropriately and inadequately low levels of financial security.633 It is argued that ‘from 
the standpoint of economic efficiency and legal effectiveness, financial security mechanisms 
for mine closure and site rehabilitation can be improved’.634 
It is submitted that, ‘financial mechanisms need to be in place to ensure sufficient resources 
exist at the end of the mine’s life to implement closure plans, and fund appropriate 
compensation and redundancy schemes.’635 It is beyond doubt that ‘the responsible 
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management of the rehabilitation of mine sites and the affected environments requires an 
effective regulatory, policy, and financial securities framework in place’.636 The quantum of 
mining securities should not unnecessarily deter investment, but should ensure that South 
Africa remains competitive in attracting investment to the resources exploration and 
development sector.637 The financial security legal framework should be clear and workable, 
and be supported by a robust compliance system to ensure operators do not avoid their mine 
closure obligations.638 The calculation of a financial security should also be flexible, and be 
commensurate with environmental risk.639 The financial security mechanisms should be 
economically efficient and readily convertible to cash.640  
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